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Cover
Pirates no longer resemble (and probably
never did) the melancholy, much-
wronged hero of Rafael Sabatini’s 1922
novel Captain Blood: His Odyssey. Vari-
ous aspects of the nature and sources of
piracy today, and international responses
to it, are the subjects of three articles
(“Understanding Piracy”) in this issue,
which will also appear as chapters in our
Newport Paper 35 (forthcoming in late
2009 or early 2010), Piracy and Mari-
time Crime: Historical and Modern
Case Studies, edited by Bruce Elleman,
Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg.
They appear here by permission of their
authors and of Professor Elleman and his
coeditors.
Our cover image was painted by the fa-
mous American artist and illustrator N.
C. Wyeth (1882–1945) for the original
Houghton Mifflin edition of Sabatini’s
novel, which became the vehicle for the
1935 movie Captain Blood, starring
Errol Flynn and Olivia de Havilland. The
book was reissued in 1998, with the same
cover art, by the Akadine Press.
© 1922 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
Used by permission.
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The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discussion of
public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts and opinions
expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
The journal is published quarterly. Distribution is limited generally to commands
and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; regular and reserve
officers of U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a present or previous
affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. government officials and agen-
cies; and selected U.S. and international libraries, research centers, publications, and
educational institutions.
Contributors
Please request the standard contributors’ guidance from the managing editor or
access it online before submitting manuscripts. The Naval War College Review nei-
ther offers nor makes compensation for articles or book reviews, and it assumes no
responsibility for the return of manuscripts, although every effort is made to return
those not accepted. In submitting work, the sender warrants that it is original, that
it is the sender’s property, and that neither it nor a similar work by the sender has
been accepted or is under consideration elsewhere.
Permissions
Reproduction and reprinting are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and appli-
cable treaties of the United States. To obtain permission to reproduce material
bearing a copyright notice, or to reproduce any material for commercial pur-
poses, contact the editor for each use. Material not bearing a copyright notice
may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use; however, it
is requested that the author and Naval War College Review be credited and that
the editor be informed.
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FROM THE EDITORS
No one imagines that piracy today constitutes the kind of menace it once did in
certain parts of the globe—not least in our own hemisphere, as we can learn
from a recent popular film trilogy. But there can be little question that the dra-
matic upsurge in pirate attacks on international commercial shipping in the wa-
ters off Somalia in recent months has gotten the world’s attention, particularly
because the problem has been so resistant to easy solution. Like the mythical
Captain Jack Sparrow, Somali pirates have proven surprisingly competent.
Moreover, the combined effect of legal uncertainties and humanitarian inhibi-
tions that come into play in dealing with crime on the high seas today has too of-
ten seemed to paralyze Western governments and navies—not least those of the
United States. Like terrorism and narcotics smuggling, piracy is a security prob-
lem that, while frequently operating at the level of mere annoyance, nevertheless
poses substantial if not intractable challenges to law enforcement and military
authorities alike. In this issue, several contributors focus on the question of pol-
icy responses to piracy within the larger context of understanding contempo-
rary piracy as such, with particular attention to its economic dimensions.
In “Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy and the Horn of Africa,” Gary E. Weir
traces the origins of contemporary piracy in this troubled region to the collapse
of the local fishing industry as well as that of a functioning Somali state during
the 1990s. Catherine Zara Raymond, in “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the
Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?” argues that piracy in the strategically critical
Strait of Malacca, unlike that in the waters off Somalia, has been successfully
managed if not entirely eliminated by the efforts of the local littoral powers. In a
somewhat more pessimistic assessment, “The Political Economy of Piracy in the
South China Sea,” David Rosenberg emphasizes the continuing inadequacy of
coordination within and between states throughout the region and beyond to
deal with a persisting threat. All three of these papers, it should be added, will ap-
pear in due course as part of a larger collection on this subject: Piracy and Mari-
time Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce Elleman,
Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg (forthcoming in late 2009 or early 2010
from the Naval War College Press as Newport Paper 35).
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In “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” Toshi
Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, both on the faculty of the Naval War College,
offer a useful reminder that Japan remains not only a key American ally in the
Far East but potentially an independent actor capable of having a dramatic im-
pact on the security environment in that region. While admitting and indeed
stressing the purely hypothetical character of their analysis, Holmes and
Yoshihara make an intriguing case that the Japanese have a plausible path to an
affordable sea-based nuclear deterrent force should they choose to avail them-
selves of it in the future. In another contribution to our “Asia Rising” rubric,
Commander Todd A. Hofstedt, USN, provides a comprehensive survey of recent
Chinese activities on the African continent. He urges the United States, and in
particular its newly established Africa Command, to work with rather than
against China in serving African needs and common interests in the region. This
article, by a recent Naval War College graduate, usefully supplements the ex-
tended treatment of Africa in the Winter 2009 issue of the Review.
The March 2009 confrontation between U.S. and Chinese vessels in the South
China Sea has reminded us again of the volatility and potentially severe conse-
quences of disagreements between states over maritime legal matters. Captain
Raul Pedrozo, USN, until recently the Staff Judge Advocate for the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, provides in his “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident”
an authoritative though unofficial analysis of this episode and its implications.
His exhaustive discussion makes it clear that China’s aggressive actions find no
support in current international maritime law or state practice. A wider per-
spective on recent trends in the international legal regime at sea is offered by
Commander James Kraska, USN. Commander Kraska argues that law is increas-
ingly shaping the behavior of maritime states today, in ways congruent with,
though perhaps not sufficiently recognized in, the U.S. Navy’s recently promul-
gated maritime strategy. Both authors are recent additions to the International
Law Department of the Naval War College.
Finally, Commander Steven C. Boraz, USN, provides an informed overview
of an issue that has gained steadily in prominence since 9/11. His article “Mari-
time Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities” is a useful analysis of common
misconceptions that tend to understate the complexity of this challenge and lead
planners to grasp at simplistic solutions. Boraz argues for the creation of “mari-
time interagency task forces” operating on a regional basis to fuse the full range
of relevant information in support of Navy (and Coast Guard) global maritime
security efforts as well as the safety of the homeland.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), in the Naval War College’s Cen-
ter for Naval Warfare Studies, was established in 2006 to support the research
needs of the U.S. Navy by increasing knowledge and understanding of the mari-
time dimensions of the rise of China. It conducts related research in energy,
global commerce, law of the sea, maritime technologies, merchant marine, naval
development, naval diplomacy, and shipbuilding.
In 2008, working through the Naval War College Press, it founded the unique
China Maritime Studies series, of which the first title was A Comprehensive Survey
of China’s Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic
Implications, by Gabriel Collins and Michael C. Grubb. The second, Scouting, Sig-
naling, and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the In-
ternational Law Implications, by Peter Dutton, has recently appeared. Both are
available online, at www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/publications.aspx. For printed
copies, contact the institute’s director, Dr. Lyle Goldstein, at the addresses, etc.,
given at www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/default.aspx.
A third title, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy “Assassin’s Mace,” by Andrew
Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, is now in preparation. CMSI is
committed to deep scholarship on Chinese maritime development, as this new
series demonstrates. Manuscripts by external contributors will be considered.
“THE CONFERENCE ROOM”
We’ve set up on our website a page for responses to issues raised in the Review, to
be known as “The Conference Room”—supplementing our print “In My View”
department but less formal and quicker in turnaround. Submit postings by
e-mail to “ConferenceRoom@usnwc.edu.” Full procedures, rules, and caveats
appear on the site.
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 7
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Com-
mander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from the University of Southern Califor-
nia, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Com-
manding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquar-
ters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Direc-
tor, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
This is a professional graduate institution, where “the U.S. Navy
connects to the world.”
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER put a fine point on something very
important here at the Naval War College, and that is excellence in
scholarship—but not scholarship for its own sake. Scholarship here must serve a
purpose—support the Navy and the nation, which it does. This is one of the
things that make this institution unique, as we prepare to enter our 125th year of
service. After four months in Newport, one thing in particular has become clear
to me: many of our people in uniform do not understand what goes on at the
Naval War College and have not read much about our own Navy’s history or cul-
ture. How do I know this? By using myself as a data point, as a serving flag officer,
carrier strike group commander—though I am a 1998 NWC graduate and was a
fellow on the 2003 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group
(also in Newport), my first six months in this assignment revealed just how
much I did not know about the College.
Without going through an extensive “laundry list” of events such as lectures,
conferences, and war games, or talking about the curriculum and the distin-
guished faculty, let me put it to you this way: there is a lot happening here, and it
is not mere churning in some vacuum or some “academic ivory tower” pursuit.
This is a professionally focused, graduate institution. It is accredited by the New
England Association of Schools and Colleges, which accredits universities in the
Northeast. American graduates are awarded a master of arts degree in national
security and strategic studies. It has a unique student body, our next generation
of leaders, many arriving here directly from the front lines in Afghanistan and
Iraq, other overseas postings, Pentagon assignments, or ship, squadron, or bat-
talion command. They are a motivated and purpose-driven group.
14
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1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Here in residence in Newport in our intermediate- and senior-level programs
are normally about six hundred students, about half Navy and half other services
and agencies, and somewhere around a hundred international students, from al-
most fifty countries. Teaching them is a faculty numbering over 150, nearly half of
whom are military, of whom in turn nearly thirty are from the other services—so
do the math on the rich student/faculty ratio. It’s a sophisticated, small seminar
approach that hones students’ analytical and writing skills.
There are currently about thirty international alumni who are chiefs of their
navies or chiefs of defense, and many of them know each other from their year at
Newport. In fact, in October the International Seapower Symposium will re-
unite chiefs of navies and other sea services from all over the world.
Before you roll your eyes and tell me, “Okay, so what?”—before you ask me,
“Why do we send naval officers here, who can’t afford to take a year off?”—let me
tell you, it’s not a “year off,” and more important, we can’t afford not to send
them here. The problems the Navy and the nation are facing are just too complex
to be handled by officers who only have an “on the job” education and those
problems are not getting easier. The program here is not preparation for officers’
next duty assignments, it’s preparation for the big events and huge decisions
they may have to take or try to influence in the future—an investment, both per-
sonal and professional.
This is not a new issue—Admiral William Sims, in his 1912 pamphlet The
Practical Character of the Naval War College, pointed out that “too many officers
assume knowledge will come to us as a result of a faithful discharge of our duties
as we advance in years and grade toward positions of command and responsibil-
ity. So far is this from the truth that no apology seems necessary for any length of
illustration that may be required to show its fallacy, and its extreme danger.”1
For the current students, here is an example of what you are preparing for,
and a short story. Our very experienced information and archival staff here in
Newport found me a copy of Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’s November 1938 report
“Situation in the Pacific.”2 Why does this matter? Well, for starters, it is fasci-
nating and very well written; more important, of course, it was forwarded to
CNO about three years before Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yarnell warned his lead-
ers (along with the Naval War College) in a very cogent situation report on the
Pacific, providing not only background but advice and an indication that time
was running out, all from someone on the scene. It’s worth reading (it was de-
classified in 1972). Yarnell, for those who don’t know his story well, saw service
in the Spanish-American War, was a Naval War College graduate, worked on
Sims’s staff during the First World War, and, after working on innovative use of
carriers during war games at sea, eventually became Commander in Chief, Asi-
atic Fleet, during the critical years 1936–1939, where he compiled this report.3
15
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P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
He served this nation well, for fifty-one years and in three wars, from 1893 to
1944.
It seems to me that there will always be a demand for this kind of synthesis,
cogent writing, and ability to state clearly and concisely what should be done.
For the students studying at the Naval War College, whether here in Newport, in
fleet seminars, or online, the mandate is clear—in the near future, many of you
will need to be able to digest an enormous amount of information, think criti-
cally about it under time pressure, and distill it into something your admiral,
your commander, or your president can use. The nation needs this type of think-
ing and needs it from our uniformed military officers—lest we abdicate our re-
sponsibility and our profession, to paraphrase Admiral Turner. That means you.
For me, the point came home five years after NWC graduation, when I worked in
the White House Situation Room.
Let me give you some other examples of the practical scholarship currently in
progress here at the Naval War College.
The “final exercise” of the core National Security Decision Making course,
which puts nineteen seminars in a weeklong pressure cooker to synthesize con-
cepts of strategy development, policy formulation, and strategic leadership, has
been briefed to me by Dr. David Chu and Ambassador Larry Dinger (chargé
d’affaires in Burma and former NWC faculty member). Two interesting concepts
that surfaced were recommendations for major Defense Department efforts to
use alternative energy and encouragement to turn to a Civilian Response Corps
(“super provincial reconstruction teams”), an approach that is actually under way
now at the State Department. The opinions of international officers on these ef-
forts were very interesting, and they were full players in the seminars.
The voice of the International Law Department (which I have learned is one
of the few in military education institutions anywhere in the world) is heard on
various United Nations law of the sea issues, such as exclusive economic zones
and their impact on operations, as well as the Arctic, using a variety of means,
such as lectures, articles, and workshops.
The Current Strategy Forum, to occur in mid-June this year, is the Navy lead-
ership’s opportunity to talk in Newport with invited guests about the way ahead
for the Navy. For U.S. flag officers, it’s also a chance to interact with civilian deci-
sion makers who are invited here. As in most major conferences, though great
speakers are invited, the conversations “in the margins” can be as important as
what goes on at the dais.
The International Seapower Symposium, which will be held 5–9 October, is
actually the Secretary of the Navy’s conference, one that brings together heads of
sea services around the world. It is a signature event at the College—which is
where, as CNO says, “the U.S. Navy connects to the world.”
16
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The China Maritime Studies Institute will run a summer workshop and a
conference in December.
There are electives on Lincoln, the American Revolutionary War and the co-
lonial military tradition, nuclear proliferation issues, issues in international eco-
nomics (with case studies), the history of technology, and “small” wars. Our
Halsey Scholars, Mahan Scholars, and Stockdale Scholars are working on a vari-
ety of warfare analysis, nuclear deterrence, and ethics/leadership issues.
I hope you get the idea. I’m just giving a sample. The idea is to show the re-
markable variety and depth of the academic experience—and except for Na-
tional Security Decision Making, I haven’t even addressed the core-curriculum
Strategy and Policy or Joint Military Operations courses.
Someone asked me if coming to the Naval War College was just a “ticket
punch” for its students. At the time, I had literally just arrived, so I couldn’t give
him any answer except my own as a graduate. The next time I see him, I can hon-
estly say that this professional graduate institution is relevant and ready; the fac-
ulty (brainpower accounting for over 80 percent of our budget) is more than
capable. It’s up to the Navy to get the right officers here, and then up to individu-
als to make the effort: do the reading, hone their writing skills, and prepare
themselves to be critical thinkers as they take their places as leaders in the Navy.
Clearly, the other services are sending top-quality individuals and future leaders
to the Naval War College. For example, General Ray Odierno, our commander in
Iraq, was recently recognized as a Distinguished Graduate, as have been General
Mike Hagee (former Commandant of the Marine Corps), General James Cart-
wright (currently vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Ambassador
Christopher Hill (a well known diplomat), as well as Admirals William Fallon
and James Stavridis. Presiding at the U.S. Naval War College is an honor and
privilege, and it has been a challenge for almost 125 years—this year is no
different. Come see for yourself or visit our website: www.usnwc.edu.
JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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N O T E S
1. Admiral Sims’s pamphlet is available on the
Naval War College website, at www.usnwc
.edu/about/history.aspx.
2. Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, “Situation in the Pa-
cific,” report, 26 November 1938, A16-3,
Shanghai, China.
3. Admiral Sims is an interesting person in his
own right. He led our naval forces in World
War I; wrote his memoir, The Victory at Sea,
for which he earned a 1921 Pulitzer Prize;
and became President of the Naval War Col-
lege for a second time in 1919.
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 3
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Gary E. Weir is chief historian of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in Bethesda, Maryland.
A specialist in undersea warfare, intelligence tradecraft
and collection, and related technologies, he is the au-
thor, most recently, of Rising Tide: The Untold Story of
the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War
(2003, with Walter Boyne). Among his articles are two
in this journal (Winter 1991, Autumn 1997). Dr. Weir
is also founder and editor of the International Journal
of Naval History.
This article will appear as chapter 13 of Piracy and
Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Stud-
ies, edited by Bruce Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and Da-
vid Rosenberg, forthcoming in late 2009 or early 2010
from the Naval War College Press as Newport Paper 35.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2009, Vol. 62, No. 3
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FISH, FAMILY, AND PROFIT
Piracy and the Horn of Africa
Gary E. Weir
The frightening increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia since the turn of thepresent century demonstrates just how fast this kind of threat can emerge
and how severe the difficulties involved in understanding and subduing it can
be. Since 1992, in fact, there have been 3,583 piratical attacks worldwide. Ac-
cording to the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Transport Committee:
“This represents an increase from 1993 to 2005 of 168%. In the same period, 340
crew members and passengers died at the hands of pirates, and 464 received in-
juries. In 2005 alone piracy resulted in over 150 injuries and assaults and over
650 crew members were taken hostage or kidnapped.”1 Recent assaults on Japa-
nese and French vessels near Somalia and the military response by the latter in
April 2008 demonstrate the lasting significance of this problem and the com-
plexity of its roots.2
Given the definition of piracy crafted in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), most activity characterized by that name
over the past decade actually comes far closer to armed robbery than actual pi-
racy.3 In Malaysia and Indochina, traditional hotbeds of this practice, most inci-
dents reported by the International Maritime Bureau (or IMB, a division of the
International Chamber of Commerce, or ICC) actually take place at the pier,
while the ship rests at anchor, or in territorial waters, a distinction often not
made in gathering the statistics.
The nature of this definitional problem in its Somali form presents a contrast
with the historical Asian paradigm. Pursuit, seizure, and deprivation at sea in
waters bordering the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean fall more clearly than
the Asian events into the UNCLOS definition of piracy. This kind of lawlessness
20
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has always presented political and international complexities, made more diffi-
cult by national jurisdictions, corporate motives, and the scattered geography of
the broader Asian region. In the Horn of Africa, part of the considerable expanse
patrolled by U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Combined Task Force
150, the geography and the jurisdictional difficulties, while not simple, do not
present the same level of complexity.
The proximity of politically unstable nations or territories has regularly
emerged as both cause of and permission for armed robbery or piracy at sea.4 The
northeast and eastern coasts of Somalia, at the Horn of Africa, have caught the
attention of the IMB, which reported a very “alarming rise” in what it called pi-
racy beginning in midsummer 2005. Somalia’s internal unrest, its lack of gov-
ernment control, and the authority of local clan warlords have created a
favorable climate for maritime crime, one that often gives thieves and pirates
permission to act freely.
The IMB has called for a combined response and solution—that is, interna-
tional naval assistance, especially along the Somali coast. It also initially encour-
aged merchant masters and navigators to observe a coastal approach limit of at
least fifty nautical miles. The threat to international commerce extends to cargo
and container ships, oil tankers, and even United Nations food and medical sup-
ply ships. In the Gulf of Aden, in the Indian Ocean, and off the Somali coast, the
uncontrolled activity of maritime criminals also presents a threat to the traffic
that supports American forces in Iraq. However, in evaluating the event statistics
collected by the IMB, one needs to remember that profitability and the safety of
business interests drives the ICC, making it eager both for peace and for some-
one to bear most of the cost for piracy countermeasures.
In September 2001, a group of nations agreed to form Combined Task Force
(CTF) 150 in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which
committed them to regional patrols as part of the global war on terrorism. The
task force members include the United States, Pakistan, Australia, Great Britain,
France, and Netherlands, among others. The French very early began escorting
UN World Food Program ships into Mogadishu.5
BACKGROUND TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA
Historically, the IMB request for combined assistance resonates with the
nineteenth-century American experience against privateers and pirates based in
northern Africa and the Caribbean Sea. Two hundred years ago, the United
States needed logistical bases so that its armed forces could operate in the Medi-
terranean, thousands of miles from home. As the nineteenth century dawned,
British-held Gibraltar became an essential logistical base for U.S. operations
during the Barbary Wars. In that same conflict, the loan of shallow-draft vessels
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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from the Kingdom of Sicily also enabled the U.S. Navy to operate in shallow wa-
ters to enforce a blockade of Tripolitan ports. In this war, cooperation with local
authorities and collaboration with allied navies made success possible. This for-
mula brought success once again when the U.S. Navy worked closely with the
Royal Navy in the 1820s against Caribbean piracy.6
During that same century and on the other side of the world, the Italians,
French, and British controlled the Horn of Africa. The latter nation took the
lead, due to the authority of the Royal Navy and the proximity of both imperial
India and the presence of a British resident authority in Aden. Thus, the United
Kingdom effectively exerted control over the strategically significant Somali
Basin and the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. A formal
protectorate emerged as British Somaliland, with the governing authority in
nearby Aden administering British interests through 1905.
British authority in the area survived World War I, and the presence of signif-
icant air and naval power through the 1920s permitted the United Kingdom to
sustain its position there. Losing control for just a short time to Italy during the
East African campaign in 1940 and 1941, British forces once again asserted im-
perial authority and retained control of the region until both independence and
unification with Italian Somaliland gave birth to the Somali Republic in 1960.
This infant democracy lasted only nine years before succumbing to a coup and
the dictatorship of General Muhammad Siad Barre, who initially established
very close ties with the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War. His loy-
alties later shifted when neighbor and traditional enemy Ethiopia allied itself
with the Soviet Union.
Control over local waters provided a foundation for the local economy and
the only hope of prosperity. Siad Barre maintained a small maritime force to
protect the enormously rich fisheries in Somali waters, to sell (at a profit) fishery
licenses to foreign companies, and to monitor access to regional ports that
served the import and export trade through this strategic region south of the
Red Sea and Suez. The humble Somali maritime force guarded these resources
and also restricted the traditional regional tendency toward piracy and maritime
crime. But when the Siad Barre regime collapsed in 1991, everything changed.
The evaporation of the Siad Barre regime opened the door to a period of in-
stability. The naval task force associated with United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) between 1991 and 1995 managed to
monitor effectively the considerable maritime traffic through the important
lanes of passage off the Horn of Africa. These routes historically cater to ships
moving from Africa into the Gulf of Aden–Red Sea area. In most cases ships
passed fairly close to the Somali coast to effect more economical passages. For
each large modern merchant bottom that plies these waters one can also find
W E I R 1 7
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many more ships traditional to the region carrying cargo along routes regularly
employed for centuries. Many of these vessels are the large cargo dhows so com-
mon in those waters.
Before unrest closed destinations or made calls too risky, a number of Somali
ports regularly played host to ships moving through this portion of the Indian
Ocean. These included Kismaayo, El Aolde, Merca, and El Maan. Mogadishu
played this role as well until it was closed to foreign vessels in 1995. When the
United Nations forces left in 1995, Somalia had no effective government, could
not continue monitoring the waters off its coast, and descended into a period of
clan warfare.7
PIRACY AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
The chaotic situation ashore and the damage inflicted on the country’s economy
and infrastructure had a very significant effect at sea. For many of the coastal vil-
lage communities, offshore fishing represented a regular and significant liveli-
hood. These small businessmen and their families depended completely on the
rich fishing off the Somali coast as a source of treasure going back generations.
In these cases the fishermen operated from small dhows, wooden canoes or
boats, or more recently modern small boats, such as motorized fiberglass skiffs.
They would use traditional techniques, for the most part gathering their catch
using nets and then off-loading the take for sale upon returning to shore.8
The collapse of the Somali central government in 1995 opened the region to
uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Large commercial fishing vessels began
working off the Somali shoreline and very often inside the country’s territorial
waters and traditional domestic fishing areas. These large-scale fishing ships
dwarfed the boats of the local fishing fleet and placed in danger a coastal subsis-
tence economy based on traditional fishing practices.9 The high-seas piracy
problem emerged from this context.
When violence first erupted between these conflicting interests in 1995, it
came as a surprise to no one. Many pirates armed themselves with weapons,
which were easily available due to the struggle for power among the Somali
clans. Somalia’s 2,060-mile-long coastline was soon considered to be one of the
“world’s most dangerous stretches of water because of piracy.”10 By 2002, the
IMB was reporting that the number of attacks had jumped from 335 in 2001 to
370 in 2002 and had increased its rating for the risk of attack from “possibility”
to “certainty.”11
PIRACY AND THE ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
The first incidents between 1995 and 2000 occurred when Somali fishermen
boarded foreign vessels and accused them of fishing illegally. The local
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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W E I R 1 9
fishermen sought immediate compensation for catches taken in their tradi-
tional fishing areas. These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local
clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and to coordinate
actions against the foreign interlopers at sea. Many groups who boarded for-
eign vessels in this manner frequently referred to themselves as a “coast guard,”
protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases this self-proclaimed
coast guard took the vessels in question back to Somali ports, holding their
cargoes and crews for ransom in compensation for lost revenue.
Foreign interests responded not by withdrawing but by arming the crews of
their ships, hiring security forces, or bargaining with the local warlords or clan
leaders for fishing “licenses.” The
latter came at prices high enough
to make those documents a rather
lucrative source of income for the
clans ashore. Of course, the clans
had no legal authority to offer li-
censes of any kind, but no central
government existed to set the entire problem in a national context with legal
agreements and effective enforcement power.12
In the months immediately after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, both the
Republic of Somaliland in the northern, formally British imperial, territory, and
the Puntland Autonomous Region, formed in 1998, attempted to exert control
and supervision of fishing and territorial waters. Both had rudimentary coast
guards and dabbled in the lucrative business of fishing licenses.
To the south the internal strife and the offshore issues produced a different re-
sult. The clans fought over the right to control Mogadishu and took over the ba-
sic revenue sources usually reserved for central governments. Some clan
warlords controlled the airports, others the maritime facilities and customs rev-
enue, and still others focused on the profitable business of selling fishing li-
censes of dubious legality. Piracy, as an independent and openly illegal
enterprise, developed only slowly, because clan leaders did not wish to have their
licensing businesses interrupted.
Central Somalia has produced the most aggressive forms of piracy—well or-
ganized, clan related, and determined. In this region, traditionally called the
Mugdug, poverty has reigned as long as memory serves, and the region’s lack of
resources has permitted it to escape the attention of the other regional clan war-
lords. For this area, the fishing industry provides virtually the only means of in-
come.13 Thus the people of the Mugdug suffered most from the foreign
exploitation of the coastal fishing grounds. When clashes began between local
The long-term solution to this problem must
go beyond traditional coalitions, formal alli-
ances, the power of regional neighbors, and the
destruction of individual targets.
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fishermen and the commercial fishing ventures, no clan interests or presumptive
central authority intervened to prevent uncontrolled escalation.
In the dangerous environment of the Mugdug, legitimate efforts to limit both
foreign exploitation of Somali resources and the growth of various related, prof-
itable, but often illicit businesses collectively transformed themselves into a
full-fledged venture in modern piracy. The developing piracy ring, initially act-
ing under the direction of the Habir Gedir subclan of the Hawiye clan, emerged
as a major threat to Horn of Africa commercial interests in 2004 under the lead-
ership of Mohamed Abdi Afweyne. Under Afweyne’s leadership, the organiza-
tion flourished; the town of Harardhere became the ring’s headquarters and
gave its name to this potent enterprise. In spite of the transition to piracy, an im-
portant part of the justification, openly trumpeted by those involved, remained
the need to protect from foreign exploitation Somali resources and the popular
livelihood of coastal communities. The ring, portraying any fees collected or
cargoes expropriated as legitimate products of the defensive effort, used the na-
tional turmoil and economic suffering as political and cultural cover for its illicit
activities.14
When the Harardhere ring made the leap to high-seas piracy and much larger
commercial vessels as victims, it naturally used the traditional tools available to
Somali fishermen, with a bit of tactical refinement. Its skiffs, frequently seen in
international press coverage, were employed because of the availability of small
motorized boats of fiberglass construction with styrofoam cores. These boats
litter the coastline, and the local fishermen, from among whom the Harardhere
ring recruited its members, knew how to use them.
By 2004 the pirates began to use multiple skiffs in their work. A larger skiff
provided room for provisions that might sustain a pirate crew, just as it would a
fishing party, for up to two weeks, and at a range of two hundred nautical miles.
It could also carry food and water, as well as providing the means and space for
storing and repairing fishing nets, reflecting the more traditional occupational
habits of the crew. In looking for targets, these fishermen-turned-pirates identi-
fied their prey visually. Thus, a patrol vessel or potential victim could hardly tell
the difference at distance between a pirate and a legitimate fisherman.
In approaching any vessel two smaller skiffs, each with a crew of four or five,
would place themselves astride the vessel, one to starboard and the other to port,
with the larger skiff astern in pursuit. The pirates then placed one or more of
their number on board the target vessel to intimidate the crew and clear the way
for the rest of the boarding party, which would bring the captured vessel to port
with the skiffs in tow. (In many recent cases CTF 150 patrols intercepting seized
ships have first destroyed the towed skiffs to make sure the pirates remained on
board and could not slip away.)15
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Implemented in early 2005, this technique has resulted in some failures but
also in some disturbing successes. The latter include the capture of MV Feisty
Gas, a compressed-gas transport, in April 2005 and MV Torgelow the following
October.16 These major attacks as well as an attempt to take the cruise ship
Seabourne Spirit in November 2005 drew international media attention, a warn-
ing to mariners from the IMB, and a response from international naval forces in
the area. The IMB advised all merchant masters to keep their vessels two hun-
dred nautical miles away from the Somali coast. The merchantmen most vulner-
able tended to operate at ten knots or less, in daylight, with no emergency
broadcast capability and no security force on board. Moving into Somali territo-
rial waters proved especially dangerous, since the American component of CTF
150 could not operate within the twelve-mile limit.
All three episodes also brought up the legal and tactical issue of onboard
armed security. Seabourne Spirit carried Gurkhas, former military personnel, as
security, and this fact played a role in the vessel’s ability to resist seizure. The
masters and shipping companies did not favor arming the crew, however, and
professional onboard security added expense. For many shipowners these mea-
sures also seemed to increase the likelihood of more violent clashes with pirates.
The only other option seemed increasing the size of the crew to enable more ef-
fective ship security, enhance lookout capability, and reduce the debilitating ef-
fect of fatigue. The latter had become a critical factor, because the crew had to
perform security functions in addition to its regular duties.17
ENTER COMBINED TASK FORCE 150
The presence of CTF 150, especially after the Seabourne Spirit incident,
prompted a change in pirate habits. The Harardhere group began using cap-
tured low-value vessels as mother ships for the skiffs. In this they sought the ad-
vantage of surprise, by appearing to be part of the normal commercial traffic of
the region.
In one case the U.S. Navy responded to an alert from the IMB in Kuala
Lumpur that pirates had in this way (unsuccessfully) assaulted MV Safina Al
Bisarat, a bulk carrier outside the two-hundred-nautical-mile safety zone off So-
malia’s central eastern coast. U.S. Central Command responded by sending the
guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) to investigate. The
warship located the dhow responsible for the attack, chased it down, and
boarded it, after firing some warning shots by way of persuasion. The boarding
party detained sixteen Indian nationals and ten Somali men. The Indians
claimed that the Somalis had seized their dhow six days before near Mogadishu
and had used it since to surprise and capture victims. The Navy investigated the
W E I R 2 1
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incident and discussed with international authorities the proper disposition of
the men taken from the dhow.18
Ships assigned to the patrol area of Somalia had repeated encounters with pi-
rates.19 USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) assisted the North Korean crew of MV
Dai Hong Dan in regaining control of its vessel after pirates seized its bridge in
October 2007. The Koreans had kept control of both the steering gear and the
engines, and with the assistance
of the American vessel they suc-
cessfully assaulted the pirates on
the bridge. At the same time an-
other American destroyer pur-
sued a Japanese vessel reportedly
hijacked by pirates off Somalia. As if to demonstrate the extent of the danger in
these waters, the destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS Porter (DDG
78) responded to a call for help from MV Golden Nori, a Japanese chemical
tanker seized off the Socotra Archipelago near the Horn of Africa on 28 October
2007. When the destroyers drew near the captured ship, Porter used its main bat-
tery to destroy the skiffs being towed astern. Arleigh Burke then received permis-
sion from the tenuous transitional government of Somalia to enter territorial
waters to subdue the ship. The Navy continued to track Golden Nori until the pi-
rates abandoned it on 12 December.20
Somali national instability, of which maritime crime is one of the worst
by-products, inevitably came into direct contact with the war in Iraq. In 2005,
the IMB reported a rise in maritime lawlessness in the Arabian Sea. In spite of
the proximity of warships, the ICC reported two attacks off the Basra oil termi-
nal, two more at buoy anchorages, and another five in Iraqi waters on 19 and 20
November. In each case the perpetrators injured and robbed the crew and made
away with arms, cash, personal property, and, occasionally, some rather ad-
vanced technologies.21 In some Somali episodes the IMB and other sources have
reported the use of fast pursuit craft against commercial targets as far as a hun-
dred nautical miles out to sea. Virtually all reports confirm the use of sophisti-
cated small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as crude weapons. This
activity represents a threat to life, property, and free navigation of the sea at the
southern end of an area of great concern to the U.S. Navy Central Command and
Combined Task Force 150.
The advent of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006, capable of con-
fronting the clans and warlords, presented the prospect of Somalia as a haven for
terrorists but not for pirates. While some of the more radical members of the
courts supported al-Qa‘ida and had little love for the United States, they had
even less love for high-seas piracy, which they declared immoral. This produced
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
By 2002, the IMB . . . had increased its rating
for the risk of attack [off the Somali coast]
from “possibility” to “certainty.”
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a challenge to Somali pirates when during 2006 the CIC briefly managed to re-
open the port of Mogadishu without pirate interference to gather port-entry
fees and other profits. However, the CIC’s influence over piracy lasted only a very
short time. A transitional-national-government force and the Ethiopian Na-
tional Defense Force brought the brief reign of the council to a close and intro-
duced uncertainty once again.
THE WAY AHEAD
On 22 April 2008, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States called for a
United Nations resolution to support the nations determined to fight piracy off
Somalia. Only one week before, the French armed forces had captured six So-
mali pirates who had seized the French-owned luxury yacht Le Ponant and held
the crew of twenty-two for a week, hoping for ransom. The French government
had the pirates taken to France for interrogation. Apparently undeterred, an-
other contingent of pirates took a ship moving through the region from Dubai
on 21 April; in addition, the Spanish navy went off in pursuit of a seized Spanish
tuna boat taken with a crew of twenty-six off the Somalia coast. The French am-
bassador to the United Nations, Jean-Maurice Ripert, commented to the press
that his country had no desire to endanger the law of the sea; the French, Ameri-
cans, and the British, he said, simply wanted a mandate from the United Nations
to take action against piracy in the name of the international community.22 He
explained, “The idea is to give a mandate, to call on states of the U.N. to tackle pi-
racy by organizing patrols, reacting to acts of piracy, to take as many preventative
measures as possible.”23
In response to the increased threat of piracy off Somalia, on 2 June 2008 the
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816, with the consent of Soma-
lia—which, the resolution observed, “lacks the capacity to interdict pirates or
patrol and secure its territorial waters.” This resolution authorized foreign naval
vessels to enter Somali territorial waters for an initial period of six months,
which could later be lengthened by mutual agreement. This resolution also al-
lowed foreign naval vessels to use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea, consistent with relevant and existing provisions of in-
ternational law.24
This resolution may result in stopping the pirates, but it does not address the
underlying factors that created them in the first place. In looking for a solution,
we need to recall the history of the problem. The Somali situation emerged from
the exploitation of traditional fisheries and the inability of local fishermen to
preserve their resources and livelihood. Thus, the long-term solution to this
problem must go beyond traditional coalitions, formal alliances, the power of
regional neighbors, and the destruction of individual targets. An international
W E I R 2 3
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framework of common applicable law, common enforcement, and common
policy must extend beyond regional boundaries and political borders.25
Rather than reinventing the wheel, building upon existing successful civilian
fisheries agreements might present the best model for not only strengthening
those agreements but also extending them to provide greater security against
maritime crime.26 Developed in
this way, the collaboration would
feel inclusive, mostly civilian, and
military only in a minimal sense.
In Asia, the forms of cooperation
developed by the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency, whose
members have already agreed to
enforcement collaboration, would certainly provide the basis for a framework
that would address piracy and armed robbery at sea.27
In the immediate region of Somalia, concerned nations might look to the Re-
gional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI). This association counts among its
members Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.28 Its objectives include the development, conservation,
and management of marine resources and the promotion of aquaculture. At the
same time RECOFI has decided to regulate fishing methods and gear as well as
the seasons for fishing and the extent of the catch.
Many of RECOFI’s primary concerns and goals address the issues of central
control and national sovereignty that triggered the so-called coast-guard actions
off Somalia by local fishermen. The lack of such control has generated a pool of
unemployed and desperate candidates ripe for recruitment into the pirate crews
that have turned the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden into such dangerous
places. RECOFI has also embraced the need “to keep under review the economic
and social aspects of the fishing industry.” Regardless of its present nature, large-
scale and increasingly deep-ocean piracy in Somalia originated from the desire
of poor communities to save their livelihoods. In its present form RECOFI can-
not entirely address the problem at hand, but it can certainly provide a frame-
work upon which to build. Many other agreements exist that might serve the
same purpose, and they touch every part of the world ocean.29
For their part, navies can inform and support locally enforced regional
frameworks built upon agreements like RECOFI and upon the progress made in
previous years by the Piracy Reporting Center in Malaysia, and its supporting
organizations, created in 1992. Any framework must include all nations affected,
regardless of political perspective or bilateral commitments. The same common
Control over local waters provided a founda-
tion for the local economy and the only hope of
prosperity . . . [but] the collapse of the Somali
central government opened the region to un-
controlled foreign exploitation.
29
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civilian and commercial interests that lead nations to agree on fisheries manage-
ment will help to address maritime crime.
More practical policy responses might include enabling both local authori-
ties and corporate countermeasures. Naval forces can provide mine counter-
measure vessels, should criminals lay mines in choke points or ports. Navies
should also offer to increase or enhance exercises, training, and cooperation to
assist regional or secondary maritime forces in undertaking these tasks. Naval
experience with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ship security systems can
help the spread of best practices in the use of methods suggested by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, such as the Inventus UAV, ShipLoc, and Secure-
Ship. These measures would dovetail well with the strategy of supporting a re-
gional framework.
Any effort to explore a more global framework would obviously require more
multinational naval involvement. Addressing the Seventeenth International
Seapower Symposium on 21 September 2005 at the Naval War College, in New-
port, Rhode Island, Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, then the Chief of Naval
Operations, began to explore the possibilities open to global navies: “As we com-
bine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will,
made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world. . . .
This 1,000-ship Navy would integrate the capabilities of the maritime services to
create a fully interoperable force—an international city at sea.”30 For some naval
historians the admiral’s statements seemed timely indeed. The Combined Oper-
ations Project led in 2005–2006 by the Contemporary History Branch of the U.S.
Naval Historical Center had examined the nature of effective naval coalitions
and their ability to address the varied threats on the high seas. In each of the case
studies, conducted by American, Canadian, Australian, and British historians,
communication and trust emerge as paramount. Without the trust engendered
by effective, well trained liaison officers, and frequent collaborative exercises at
sea, combined operations can quickly become exercises in futility.
Deliberate, frequent, and regular contact allowed his commanding officers to
broker the mutual understanding that served Vice Admiral Lord Nelson so well
two centuries ago. This dynamic has become even more necessary today, given
the potential contemporary barriers of language, culture, technology, and oper-
ational experience. The history of recent combined operations repeatedly
speaks to these critical but often overlooked personal aspects. In short, history
suggests that in naval operations as well as in international, civilian maritime
policy, “you cannot surge trust.”31
Human relations emerge strongly as the primary asset or resource needed to
bring peace and enforcement to the maritime commons, including the Horn of
Africa. Commodore James Stapleton, Royal Australian Navy, the naval
W E I R 2 5
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component commander in the international military response to violence in
East Timor in 1999, once made this very point in reflecting on the reasons for
success in that operation. The naval component of the multinational United Na-
tions task force supporting Operation STABILISE achieved a very high level of
interoperability. Effective communication and division of labor brought to the
effort in East Timor the kind of success currently sought off the Somali coast.
In a 2004 oral interview by the author, referring to the commanding officers
of the ships under his temporary command for Operation STABILISE, Stapleton
recalled that “they’d all come from a major exercise that was called off, the one
that I was going to go to. So they’d had time in company and they’d worked with
[USS] Mobile Bay before, they’d worked with [HMS] Glasgow . . , they’d worked
with [HMNZS] Te Kaha. . . . I’d worked with these ships before, I knew the COs, I
knew the capabilities of each of the ships. So we’d worked together pretty much
for a lot of the time.”32 Combining proved relatively easy, as the relationships re-
mained fresh and current and drew on strong common experience: “It was very
much a one-on-one . . . with every country, but the way I spoke to them and the
operation order for communications, the operation order for the flying pro-
gram . . . , was the standard NATO signal which they all have.”33
It was necessary to take measures consciously designed to build and renew the
human network among ships and people, a relationship that cannot have the fla-
vor of a single nation alone: “[I had people] from each country on my staff. . . . I
had a Frenchman on my staff, I had a Canadian or two, engineers. I had New
Zealanders. This became a problem for me then about classification, and what I
could leave lying around . . . [i]ssues like that. And what was privileged informa-
tion, and what wasn’t. . . . It does make problems, but if you don’t manage it, and
I didn’t have those guys and girls on my staff, for sure, then the coalition thing
doesn’t work.”34
All this had to become as natural as the first cup of coffee in the morning, a fit
so well engineered over time, socially and professionally, that it could become
second nature:
You hear people say, “I’m an Australian,” but people in Australia still know what you
mean when you say “I’ll have a brew,” a coffee, “I’ll have a NATO standard” (that’s
white and two [sugars]). Maybe that’s because that reflects my age . . . and I did a lot
of training in the UK. So I knew NATO, and I know the publications. But if you’re
using ATP, the tactical publications, you can talk to any navy in the world, because
everyone’s got Allied Tactical Publications. You can also use international codes. So
it was never really an issue about integration. . . . Everybody just fitted in.35
History strongly suggests that very often, ignoring these experiences, we have
placed our emphasis elsewhere or viewed naval personnel simply as extensions
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of platforms and technologies. We must recognize that the cultural expectations
shaping naval careers have long militated against the role the international com-
munity needs many officers to play—the very role that can make combined ac-
tion against Somali piracy most effective.36
As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to an end, the Horn of
Africa needs more than ever officers who can play these roles. A three-million-
dollar ransom was paid in early January 2009 to free the Saudi supertanker Sirius
Star from Somali pirates;37 in response to that event, on 8 January Vice Admiral
William Gortney, the commander of Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command, and
of the Combined Maritime Force, announced the creation of Combined Task
Force 151, dedicated exclusively to antipiracy operations.38 Four days later Com-
modore Stapleton’s homeland announced that it would join other international
forces, including those of the United States and China, in the new mission
against pirates in the Gulf of Aden and near the Horn of Africa.39 A force ade-
quate to address the symptoms of piracy seems near. What will the cure look
like?
If navies intend to help keep the ocean open in an age of regional instability, pi-
racy, and terrorism, combined operations regularly informed by professional
historical perspective must become a permanent and essential part of naval
practice. Addressing piracy in a way that goes beyond simple retaliation has
proved very difficult. Recent historical experience in Asia suggests the ingredi-
ents of a possible solution to modern maritime crime, a solution that while nat-
urally displaying the difficulties of crafting a working formula, shows promise.
Malaysia and China have traditionally opposed combined antipiracy patrols
in the Asia-Pacific region, and their unsuccessful effort to collaborate raises a
significant question. Are patrols the answer to piracy? Given that Asian mari-
time crime mostly occurs at the pier or at anchor, many navies openly question
the efficacy of patrols. The Royal Malaysian Navy recently noted that ships, on
average, actually report attacks about ten hours after the event. By that time, a re-
sponding patrol cannot help, as the criminals might be anywhere.40
Patrols address the symptoms but not the cause. If regional agreements on
fisheries management form the basis for comprehensive security agreements to
protect resources and regional economies, navies will have to play a variety of
high- and low-profile roles to enable the agreements to take hold. Not all of the
measures taken to ensure a safe, healthy, and shared ocean will take the form of
overt naval action. Some still await definition and may recall times past when a
modest naval presence directly advanced local economic interests in many and
varied ways.41 In the end, the solution to piracy is as local as the lost livelihood of
a pirate recruit in one of the Harardhere camps along the Somali coast, and as
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global as Admiral Mullen’s international city at sea. If we can see the connection
and act on it, the region can once again find both the rule of law and a way to sus-
tain itself.
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The Malacca Strait is a narrow waterway that extends nearly six hundred nau-tical miles from the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea, between Malaysia
and Indonesia. The strait provides a vital shipping lane for vessels sailing from
Europe and the Middle East to East Asia, as well as smaller vessels on local voy-
ages. Unfortunately, when we think of the Malacca Strait, images of a waterway
infested with pirates often spring to mind.
While this image could arguably have been justified in the past, it is now rather
outdated. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which pro-
duces quarterly and annual reports on piracy and
armed robbery against ships, there were only three suc-
cessful and four attempted attacks by pirates on ship-
ping in the Malacca Strait in 2007.1 This low level of
piracy has continued into 2008, with the Half Yearly
Report issued by the Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Center in
Singapore listing only one successful attack on a vessel
in the Malacca Strait and three attempted ones.2 Con-
sidering that around ninety thousand vessels transit the
strait on an annual basis, the proportion of ships being
attacked in the waterway is extremely small.
With statistics such as these, one might wonder
why we are still seeing the publication of articles such
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as one appearing in a recent issue of National Geographic Magazine, whose cover
delares, “The Strait of Malacca, Dark Passage: Pirates Haunt It. Sailors Fear It.
Global Trade Depends on It.”3 There seems to be a failure, particularly outside
the region, to keep pace with the change in the frequency of pirate attacks and
the scale of the problem. While piracy has certainly been a concern in the water-
way in the past, with reported attacks reaching seventy-five in 2000, the number
of cases has been falling since 2005, largely as a result of a number of counter-
measures introduced by the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and In-
donesia. This decrease in attacks was achieved despite a 10 percent increase in
cases worldwide.
This article will discuss the reduction in pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait
and how the attacks themselves have changed over the last decade. The measures
attributed to the reduction will then be discussed, as well as the underlying prin-
ciples and attitudes that have shaped these initiatives. Particular attention will
be given as to how the issue of sovereignty, a principle of utmost importance in
Southeast Asia, has impacted multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts to ad-
dress the transnational problem of piracy, including a series of International
Maritime Organization (IMO) meetings convened to tackle pressing issues af-
fecting the safety and security of shipping in the Malacca Strait. The conclusions
will make recommendations regarding issues that require further action.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF PIRACY IN THE MALACCA STRAIT
Piracy has occurred in the Malacca Strait for hundreds of years. The October
1992 creation in Kuala Lumpur of the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC),
which was tasked with, among other things, collecting data on pirate attacks
around the world, started to highlight the scale of the problem in Southeast Asia.
However, it was not until the late 1990s that the issue came to the attention of the
international community.
This occurred primarily for two reasons. First, in 1997 the Asian financial cri-
sis had a harsh impact on the region. It is believed that the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation forced many people living in coastal areas in Indonesia and
Malaysia to turn to piracy to supplement their incomes. The economic collapse
also caused widespread political instability, in particular in Indonesia, making it
easier for people to pursue illegal methods of income generation. Second, in the
late 1990s several high-profile pirate attacks took place in the region, among
them the attack on the Petro Ranger in 1998. This may have led to an increased
tendency among shippers to report attacks, particularly attempted attacks or
more minor cases.
As a result of these factors, by the late 1990s the annual number of reported
pirate attacks in the strait had gone from virtually zero to seventy-five.4 Piracy
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was now seen as a significant problem that required urgent attention. One year
after piracy incidents peaked in the Malacca Strait, al-Qa‘ida launched its attack
on the Twin Towers in New York, demonstrating that ordinary means of trans-
portation can be utilized to carry out large-scale attacks on economically impor-
tant targets.
This incident prompted a reassessment of the vulnerability of the maritime
sector to attack by terrorists; in Southeast Asia, the presence of pirates operating
seemingly unchecked highlighted how insecure the maritime domain was. Spec-
ulation soon began as to the likelihood that the region’s pirates would cooperate
with regional or international terrorist groups to carry out a devastating attack
on shipping.
During this period there were several different types of piracy taking place in
the Malacca Strait.5 These included robbery of vessels at sea, the hijacking of ves-
sels, and kidnap-for-ransom attacks. Another common type of piracy takes
place against vessels berthed in harbors or at anchor. However, this type of attack
is unlikely to affect vessels on international voyages through the strait. The most
common targets in this case would be smaller vessels that transit the coast of In-
donesia or those on local voyages from, for example, Malaysia’s Port Klang to the
port of Belawan in Indonesia.
The robbery of a vessel by pirates usually takes place while the ship is under
way, often at night, and most often between one and six o’clock in the morning.
The pirates board the vessel using grappling hooks and then take any cash and
valuables from the ship’s safe and crew, including high-tech navigation equip-
ment or whatever else they can seize quickly. In this type of attack the value of
the stolen goods can be between ten and twenty thousand U.S. dollars.6 The ship
can be taken over for up to a few hours by from five to ten pirates, although many
incidents are over within half an hour.7 It is in this type of piracy that the most
significant reduction has taken place since 2000. This may be partially due to an
increased awareness on the part of crew members following the introduction of
new maritime security requirements for vessels.8
If a vessel is hijacked, it is usually seized for a significant length of time, per-
haps for several days, while the cargo is unloaded at a port selected by the pirates
or transferred to another vessel. Hijacking has been less common than the for-
mer type, simple robbery, because good intelligence gathering and careful plan-
ning prior to the attack are required to ascertain the cargo and route of the
vessel. A secure port to unload the stolen cargo is also needed, not to mention a
willing buyer.
A variation of this latter kind of piracy is the permanent seizure of a vessel by
pirates, who turn the vessel into a “phantom ship”; the key difference is that once
the pirates have disposed of the vessel’s cargo, they do not abandon the vessel
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itself. The ship is repainted and the crew dumped or killed. The ship then sails to
a new port with a false name and forged documentation.9 In recent years tugs
have been favorite targets of pirates, perhaps because they do not usually have
Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment installed and yet are very
valuable ships. Also, they are easier to attack, given their low freeboards. Once
taken, they may be used in various maritime criminal activities, which would fa-
vor a small vessel of kinds commonly seen in ports and international waterways.
Kidnapping is the most serious form of piracy taking place in the Malacca
Strait since 2001. During a kidnap, armed attackers take over the vessel and ab-
duct two or three senior crew members, who are then held ashore pending ran-
som negotiations. The kidnapped crew members are usually released unharmed
following payment by their employers. Ransoms demanded can range from
US$100,000 to US$200,000. However, the sum of money eventually paid to the
attackers following negotiations is usually substantially lower, somewhere be-
tween ten and twenty thousand U.S. dollars.10
Of the three 2007 attacks deemed successful by the IMB in the Malacca Strait,
one was a boarding of a containership under way northwest of Pulau Perak: crew
members spotted flashlights on the deck of their vessel, and when they raised an
alarm a small boat was seen moving away from the ship. Another incident took
place when several unlit fishing boats approached a containership while it was
under way. The ship’s master took evasive action to deter the suspected pirates;
two were still able to board. However, the pirates were unarmed; they were de-
tained by the ship’s crew and handed over to the authorities in Singapore. The
third incident was a kidnapping; according to the IMB report documenting the
attack, “ten pirates armed with firearms boarded the tug towing the barge laden
with steel billets. The pirates damaged all communications equipments and
stole crew personal belongings and ship’s documents.” The pirates kidnapped
the master and the chief engineer, whom they took ashore. A ransom was de-
manded, and eleven days after they were kidnapped, following payment of the
ransom, the two were released.11
The details of the three incidents from 2007 reveal that two were essentially
unsuccessful. Although they were classified by the IMB as “actual attacks” rather
than “attempted attacks,” the pirates were able neither to steal anything nor at-
tack anyone during the incidents. Meanwhile, in the only successful case of pi-
racy documented in the first half of 2008 in ReCAAP’s Half Yearly Report,
pirates reportedly attacked two fishing trawlers in the early hours of the morn-
ing while the vessels were under way. All the crew members were thrown over-
board off a nearby island in Indonesia. The crews were rescued, but the trawlers
have yet to be located.12 It is likely that the vessels and their cargoes were sold on
the black market.
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If the overall frequency of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait has been signifi-
cantly reduced in recent years, however, kidnapping remains a worrisome threat,
especially given the great danger it poses to crew members. The continued oc-
currence of this form of piracy, even at low levels, necessitates a reexamination
of the various countermeasures that have been implemented to improve secu-
rity in the Malacca Strait. The current practice is for the employers of kidnapped
crews to pay ransoms for their release. It is widely acknowledged by experts in
this field that not only does paying ransom encourage further kidnappings, but
the ransom money often goes to finance weaponry to be used in future attacks. A
policy of no negotiation with kidnappers must be adopted to make kidnapping a
nonprofitable industry.
HOW PIRACY WAS REDUCED
International pressure has been exerted on the littoral states, in particular on In-
donesia and Malaysia, to address the problem of piracy.13 This effort began in
2000, when piracy attacks peaked in the Malacca Strait, and increased even more
following the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent conclusions
drawn about the possible insecurity of the maritime domain. At this time, both
Japan and the United States indicated a desire to participate in enhancing secu-
rity in the waterway. However, it was not until 2004 that real steps toward secur-
ing the strait were made.
There were several stumbling blocks. Malaysia and Indonesia saw the issue of
piracy purely as a domestic concern to be addressed internally by each state as it
saw fit. They repeatedly emphasized their desire to uphold the sovereignty of
their territorial waters, which make up most of the waterway. Singapore was
more willing to cooperate, on both the regional and extraregional levels. Its
stand on the issue was voiced by the then deputy prime minister Tony Tan at a
2004 conference on maritime security in Singapore, during a discussion on the
issue of patrolling the strait: “It is not realistic to unilaterally confine such pa-
trols only to countries in this part of the world. . . . [W]e can do more if we galva-
nize the resources of extra-regional players.”14
The concerns of Malaysia and Indonesia were heightened when Admiral
Thomas B. Fargo, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, outlined a
proposal by the United States called the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in
a speech to the U.S. Congress on 31 March 2004. In his statement he remarked
that “we’re looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations
Forces on high-speed vessels to conduct effective interdiction in, once again,
these sea lines of communication where terrorists are known to move about.”15
In response to the suggestion by Fargo, the Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, remarked, “I think we can look after our own area.”16
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Another disagreement that stalled cooperation was in the level of priority
that should be given to addressing the problem of piracy over other, more press-
ing domestic issues. This applied particularly to Indonesia, which was still re-
covering from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and it manifested itself in a
public denial of the reported scale of the piracy problem in Indonesian waters.
Another reason why Indonesia was reluctant to address the problem of piracy
may have been that only 25–30 percent of the military’s expenditure was covered
by the military budget following the financial crisis, with the remaining funds
believed to be coming from illegal activities, such as piracy.17
Even today, inadequate resources and a lack of funding prevent Indonesia
from fully addressing the problem; according to the navy chief of staff, Admiral
Slamet Soebijanto, the country is still in need of another 262 patrol ships to
make up a total of 376, the amount deemed necessary to safeguard Indonesia’s
seventeen thousand islands.18 In addition, of the 114 vessels that the Indonesian
navy currently has, only 25 percent are believed to be serviceable at any given
time.19
Even in its ports, Indonesia is struggling to enforce regulations that have now
become an international norm: in September 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard issued
a warning to the Indonesian transport ministry stating that it had found seven
port terminals that did not fully comply with the ISPS Code (a set of measures
designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities that were made
mandatory under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, of
which Indonesia is a signatory).
NEW MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES
Despite these problems, several maritime security initiatives were introduced in
the Malacca Strait between 2004 and 2007. Although significant, they have argu-
ably been constrained in their scope and capability by both the unwillingness of
some of the littoral states to cooperate fully and a lack of resources. The first
multilateral measure to be introduced by the three littoral states was the Trilat-
eral Coordinated Patrol, or MALSINDO.
MALSINDO was launched in July 2004 and involved the navies of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore patrolling in a coordinated fashion in their respec-
tive territorial waters. Following the introduction of this new measure, how-
ever, there was no immediate reduction in the number of pirate attacks taking
place in the strait. The lack of a provision for cross-border pursuit into each of
the participating states’ territorial waters has been cited as the main flaw in this
measure. However, cross-border pursuit would have been viewed by the par-
ticipating states as an infringement of their sovereignty.20
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Five months after the introduction of MALSINDO, an earthquake occurred
off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The earthquake triggered a series of
devastating tsunamis that affected most coastlines bordering the Indian Ocean.
However, the areas worst hit were in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, on the
northern tip of Sumatra, an area in which many pirates were believed to be
based. Some coastal villages in Aceh are thought to have lost more than 70 per-
cent of their inhabitants, while 44 percent of the people lost their livelihoods.21
Reports received by the IMB in the weeks after the tsunami indicated that pi-
racy attacks in the Malacca Strait had ceased. Even unaffected areas recorded
zero attacks immediately following the disaster.22 The significance of the impact
that the tsunami seems to have had on pirate incidents in the waterway is evident
in a comparison of the total attacks in 2004 with those in 2005, which show a
more than 60 percent reduction, from thirty-eight to twelve.23 However, this ex-
planation cannot account for the continued decline in piracy from 2005 to 2007.
It was predicted that “once life resumes normally in North Sumatra crime will
return and with it attacks against ships.”24 Yet four years on from the disaster,
when life has certainly returned to some measure of normality in the affected ar-
eas, the frequency of pirate attacks has not returned to its 2004 levels.
One explanation could be the changing political situation in Aceh. Before the
tsunami, the province had been the site of a bitter twenty-six-year conflict be-
tween the Free Aceh Movement (known by its Indonesian abbreviation, GAM)
and the Indonesian authorities. Around thirty-five thousand Indonesian troops
and 14,700 police had been stationed in the area in an effort to suppress the
GAM independence movement. However, following the tsunami both parties
were brought to the negotiating table in order to discuss the disaster relief opera-
tion. This paved the way for a peace deal that was signed in August 2005.
Under the terms of the settlement, the GAM agreed to decommission its
weapons and dissolve its armed wing, while the Indonesian authorities agreed to
withdraw more than half of their forces from the area. As a result, around eight
hundred weapons were handed in by the rebels and more than twenty-five thou-
sand Indonesian troops left. Given that both GAM rebels and Indonesian troops
had been accused of carrying out piracy, this development may well have played
a part in the reduction in the number of attacks in the Malacca Strait.
The introduction in September 2005 of joint air patrols over the strait by the
littoral states may have been another factor contributing to the decline in the
number of incidents. The three states each donate two planes for the patrols,
known as the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) plan. The plan permits aircraft to fly for up
to three nautical miles into the twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters of the par-
ticipating states; it was hoped that this measure would provide a valuable
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supplement to the trilateral coordinated sea patrols, which were limited to their
own territorial waters.
Politically, EiS was significant because it was the first time the littoral states
had been willing to put aside concerns over the sovereignty of their territorial
waters and allow foreign forces across the border. This compromise included the
agreement that each patrolling aircraft would have on board a representative
from each of the three littoral states. Later, in April 2006 both MALSINDO and
EiS were brought together under the umbrella of the Malacca Strait Patrols.
Despite its political success, EiS has been criticized as superficial and a mere
reflection of the desire of the littoral states to be seen to be doing something in
the face of international pressure. It is estimated that seventy sorties per week
need to be carried out by the aerial patrols in order to monitor the strait effec-
tively, 24/7. However, currently only eight are flown. There is also a lack of patrol
vessels to carry out investigation and interdiction, if necessary, following the
sighting of a suspect vessel by the aerial patrols.25 It would seem that EiS’s appar-
ent success in helping to prevent any resurgence in attacks may be a function
more of its deterrent effect than of its actual, practical application.
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy
The most recent antipiracy initiative to be implemented is ReCAAP, which came
into force in 2006. The agreement, which encompasses the whole region, was
drafted in 2004 and required the signature and ratification of ten of the partici-
pating countries—all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, plus Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—in order to
enter into force. The aim of the initiative, which is the first antipiracy measure to
be implemented on a government-to-government level, is to foster multilateral
cooperation to combat the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Its
activity takes the forms of information sharing, capacity building, and coopera-
tive arrangements.
A total of fourteen countries have now signed and ratified the agreement, and
an Information Sharing Center, or ISC, has been set up in Singapore to facilitate
communication and information exchange between member countries and to
produce regular reports on pirate attacks in the region.26 Information is ex-
changed between designated points of contact, or “focal points,” in the member
countries via a secure Web-based information-network system, on a 24/7 basis.
In addition to acting as a point of information exchange, these focal points man-
age piracy incidents within their territorial waters, facilitate their respective
countries’ law enforcement investigations, and coordinate surveillance and en-
forcement with neighboring focal points.27
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Nonetheless, the agreement has not yet been signed or ratified by Malaysia or
Indonesia; the two countries have signaled a willingness to cooperate with the
ISC, but to date no progress has been made toward securing their formal accep-
tances of the agreement. The lack of participation by Malaysia and Indonesia
cannot help but cast doubt on its effectiveness, particularly given Indonesia’s
status as the most pirate-prone country in the world and both countries’ strate-
gic positions along the Malacca Strait.28
Although these antipiracy measures suffer from obvious and sometimes seri-
ous flaws, the continued decline in the number of pirate attacks in the waterway
is testimony to their collective success, even if that success has been more in
terms of improving security awareness on the part of the shippers and in deter-
ring perpetrators. However, if piracy is to be completely eradicated in the
strait—an important task, given that organized criminals are still able to carry
out successful kidnappings in the waterway—countermeasures need to become
more targeted. In particular, the land bases and networks of pirates need to be
disrupted; without these, the pirates cannot launch effective attacks on the
water.
The International Maritime Organization Meetings
During this period of increased multilateral activity among the littoral states,
another process has been under way at the international level, in cooperation
with the IMO. The initiative was conceived by the IMO in 2004 with the aim of
promoting a comprehensive approach to security, safety, and pollution control
in critical sea-lanes around the world. Known as the “Protection of Vital
Sealanes” initiative, it takes as its current focus the straits of Malacca and Singa-
pore. A series of meetings was convened under the title “Straits of Malacca and
Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,” the first
of them in Jakarta in 2005. This was followed by another meeting in Kuala
Lumpur in 2006 and then one a year later in Singapore.
These meetings are significant with regard to piracy in the Malacca Strait less
for what they produced than for what they did not produce. At the start of this
process there was speculation that these meetings would result in some sort of
organized burden sharing of the maintenance of security in the waterway, with
at least some involvement of the user states, in the form of financial or resource
donation. This assumption seemed to be borne out when during the Jakarta
meeting it was agreed that “a mechanism be established by the three littoral
States to meet on a regular basis with user States, the shipping industry and
other stakeholders with an interest in the safe navigation through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore (the Straits) . . . to discuss issues relating to the safety, se-
curity and environmental protection of the Straits.”29
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However, it was later stated, at the Singapore meeting, that “the scope of the
Co-operative Mechanism focuses on safety of navigation and environmental
protection in the Straits.”30 That is, the word “security” had been dropped from
the discussions. Indeed, this more narrow focus on safety of navigation and en-
vironmental protection was reflected in the list of six projects, outlined by the
littoral states during the Kuala Lumpur meeting, that are to be addressed under
the framework of the Co-operative Mechanism:
(i) Removal of wrecks in the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits;
(ii) Cooperation and capacity building on Hazardous and Noxious Substance
(HNS) preparedness and response in the Straits;
(iii) Demonstration project of class B automatic identification system (AIS)
transponder on small ships;
(iv) Setting up a tide, current and wind measurement system for the Straits to
enhance navigation safety and marine environment protection;
(v) Replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits;
(vi) Replacement of aids to navigation damaged by the tsunami incident.31
The outcome of this process shows once again that the littoral states, in par-
ticular Indonesia and Malaysia, are unwilling to share the responsibility of
maintaining security in the straits with the user states. While ad hoc contribu-
tions from user states on a bilateral basis have been accepted in the past for im-
proving security in the waterway, there seems to be a desire at present to avoid
any long-term institutionalization of the process—which, according to the In-
donesian state secretary, Hatta Radjasa, would provide an opportunity for the
involvement of foreign forces in securing the waterway.32
The outcome of the meetings also reflects the view that improving naviga-
tional safety in the straits and the protection of their marine resources is of the
greatest regional concern. Although completely eradicating the piracy threat is
considered a laudable goal, piracy still poses very little risk to the majority of ves-
sels passing through the straits, while navigational safety and environmental
concerns affect them all equally.
In the short term, it would seem that low levels of piracy will continue to occur
in the Malacca Strait until countermeasures are developed that address the root
causes of the problem and not just the symptoms. Economic development must
be encouraged among the coastal areas of Indonesia and Malaysia in order to re-
duce unemployment, and corruption of local officials also needs to be ad-
dressed. However, antipiracy measures already in place should not be neglected;
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they need to be continuously developed to keep pace with the changing nature
of piracy in the waterway.
It is clear from events over the past few years that maintaining the security of
the straits and dealing with the problem of piracy will remain the responsibility
of the three littoral states. The role of the user states will continue to be limited to
ad hoc financial or resource contributions, supplemented by diplomatic pres-
sure. Whether or not this is to the detriment of the fight against piracy in the
Malacca Strait, it is most likely to remain the status quo for many years to come.
What is needed now is greater attention to regions that are considerably more
insecure than the Malacca Strait. According to one maritime security expert,
“while international attention was focused on the Strait of Malacca . . . the secu-
rity situation in the sea lanes linking the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia
[was] allowed to deteriorate.”33 The areas referred to are the Sulu and Celebes
seas—the first of which is located in southwest Philippines, while the Celebes
Sea is bordered by the Phillipine island of Mindanao to the north, Sabah and
Kalimantan to the west, and Indonesia’s Sulawesi Island to the south. Largely as a
result of the separatist conflict taking place in Mindanao, the areas have become
“notorious for illegal maritime activities such as smuggling, piracy, and traffick-
ing in illegal narcotics, guns and people.”34
While the claim that the situation in these areas has been allowed to deterio-
rate further due to the current focus on the Malacca Strait may be to some extent
unwarranted, clearly these areas have been insecure for some time and this
should be addressed. Meanwhile, other parts of the world, including Bangla-
desh, are experiencing sharp increases in piracy. Lessons learned in the fight
against piracy in the Malacca Strait should be applied to other regions to make
these waters more secure. No longer should there be a false perception that the
Malacca Strait is a “Dark Passage.” Rather, it is time for it to be held up as an ex-
ample to the rest of the world of how piracy can successfully be reduced.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PIRACY IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA
David Rosenberg
Piracy is an ancient, persistent, and elusive phenomenon in the South ChinaSea. In the past two decades it has increased substantially, leading to a re-
newed interest in piracy and its possible nexus with maritime terrorism, espe-
cially after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Although it has
been widely reported and investigated, piracy remains difficult to understand
and to control. The oceans are “a domain increasingly beyond governmental
control,” says William Langewiesche. They are “vast and wild, where laws of na-
tions mean little and where the resilient pathogens of piracy and terrorism
flourish.”1 In the Asia-Pacific region, “maritime disorder prevails,” observes Sam
Bateman. “This includes unregulated pollution of the marine environment,
over-fishing, marine environmental degradation and
widespread illegal activities at sea.”2
This article attempts to analyze piracy through the
perspective of political economy, with an emphasis
on state and market stakeholders and on the eco-
nomic, technological, and institutional factors af-
fecting ocean governance of piracy. The major area
of concern here is the South China Sea, where ap-
proximately half of the world’s reported incidents of
piracy have taken place since the 1990s. Following
the usage of the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), this estimate includes instances of both pi-
racy as defined under international law—theft on the
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high seas—and armed robbery or theft in the territorial waters or ports of
coastal states.3
This article will examine the scope and trends in piracy in the South China
Sea as well as the factors that motivate this form of maritime crime. It continues
with an analysis of the factors that impede antipiracy efforts, including uncer-
tainties over definitions and legal jurisdiction, the underlying dynamics of pi-
racy, and uncoordinated efforts at detection, pursuit, arrest, and conviction of
pirates as well as recovery of crew, cargo, or ships. It concludes with an analysis
of the limited progress made by state and market stakeholders to improve
antipiracy security in the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea.
MARITIME TRADE AND SHIPPING TRAFFIC
The most important factor affecting piracy and government efforts to interdict
pirates is the dramatic increase in shipping traffic. Maritime trade through the
South China Sea has expanded rapidly in recent years, due to three major,
long-term trends: the high growth rates of regional economies and increasing
trade flows among them, rising energy demand and energy imports, and the au-
tomation of cargo handling in hub ports.
Seaborne trade has doubled every decade since 1945, and shipbuilding ton-
nage worldwide has doubled since 1990. It is estimated that 80 percent of all
world trade, or about 5.7 billion tons of cargo, is transported by sea. This mari-
time superhighway in the world economy is supported by a massive infrastruc-
ture, including ninety-three thousand merchant vessels with 1.25 million
seamen bound for eight thousand ports.4
Intra-Asian trade is growing more quickly than transpacific trade. For exam-
ple, in 2003 South Korea’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the United
States for the first time. In 2004, Japan’s trade with China surpassed its trade
with the United States for the first time. More and more Asian states are reori-
enting their trade flows toward China. The several explanations for this trend in-
clude the recovery of Asian economies from the 1997 economic crisis, the
dynamic China market, and trade-opening agreements between China and
Southeast Asia.5
Asian countries had the largest share of the total tonnage of seaborne world
exports in 2006, at 38.8 percent. Exports of crude oil from western Asia and
manufactured goods from China and other countries of East and Southeast Asia
contributed to this result. European countries accounted for 21.8 percent of
world export tonnage, with the major share coming from countries belonging to
the European Union. Industrialized countries in North America and developing
countries in the Americas made up 21.1 percent of world export tonnage; the
latter accounted for about two-thirds of the total tonnage for the hemisphere,
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owing to their considerable exports of crude oil, iron ore, coal, and grains. Af-
rica’s and Oceania’s shares of overall world tonnage exported were 8.5 percent
and 8.8 percent, respectively.6
Of the world’s twenty busiest container-handling ports in the past five years,
Asian ports accounted for the top six: Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, Busan, and Kaoshiung. The top twenty busiest global ports generally
also include Port Kelang and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, Tanjungpriok in In-
donesia, Laem Chabang in Thailand, and Manila in the Philippines.7 The rapid
growth of maritime trade has created enormous pressures for hub ports and
shipping companies to speed up shipping traffic. Port managers and shipping
companies have tried to accelerate shipping traffic flows, including container-
ization, automation of cargo handling, and increased ship sizes.
Oil tanker traffic—already high—will increase substantially with the pro-
jected increase in Chinese oil imports. Almost all of this additional Asian oil de-
mand, as well as Japan’s oil needs, will be imported from the Middle East and
Africa. Most tankers pass through the strategic Malacca Strait into the South
China Sea. About sixty-five thousand vessels of all types passed through the
Malacca Strait in 2005.
This rise in shipping has also created a corresponding increase in the risks of
congestion and delay, collision, and crime, including in particular all forms of
piracy, especially in the narrow and shallow choke points of the South China Sea.
Clearly, there is a growing concern among coastal states and user states to ensure
speedy and safe passage through the shipping lanes of the South China Sea. Ef-
forts to halt piracy have been stymied, however, by differing views of what con-
stitutes piracy and as to which countries should have jurisdiction over stopping
it in highly disputed waters.
THE DETECTION, COST, AND PREVENTION OF PIRACY
Despite the problem of defining piracy and determining which stakeholder
should be responsible for stopping it, several widespread generalizations about
piracy set it apart from other maritime activities. These include the link between
growing shipping volume and piracy, economic drivers (such as poverty), the
role of organized crime, and the role that law enforcement agencies on land can
play in stopping piracy.
First, the more the shipping, all things being equal, the more the opportunities
for piracy. As shipping volume and velocity increase, targets of opportunity in-
crease for pirates to seize valuable and accessible cargo from ships in port or at sea.
Globalization has not only accelerated world trade. It has also seen a move to the
use of flag-of-convenience shipping and a privatization of port cargo-handling
services. It is increasingly difficult for port officials to distinguish legal from illegal
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trade, especially among the contents of millions of containers passing through
their ports. All these factors enhance the opportunities for illegal trade in pirated
goods.
Second, “piracy is largely driven by poor economic conditions.”8 “The vast
majority of lower-end piracy . . . is largely motivated by poverty and disenfran-
chisement that afflicts vulnerable targets like fishermen and local traders.”9 Sud-
den and severe impoverishment, especially among marginal coastal seafaring
communities, makes piracy a viable way to meet basic needs. For example, the
big increase in the number of piracy attacks in Indonesia’s waters and ports in
the past ten years may be attributed to its sharp economic downturn and domes-
tic instability in the wake of the 1997 currency crisis. Eric Frecon has inter-
viewed one poor migrant from a poor Indonesian kampong who puts it this way.
“I became a pirate . . . to earn a living. Singapore was rich; we were poor. So, we
went to pillage the areas [around] Singapore.”10
In times of economic hardship piracy is still viable for some traditional mari-
time peoples. This helps to explain why most acts of piracy involve petty theft
from ships in ports or anchorages. According to one study, in 2002, 77 percent of
all attacks occurred in ports.11 Economic duress also makes impoverished fisher-
men more vulnerable to and available for recruitment by entrepreneurial crimi-
nal organizations. Piracy will continue as long as poverty and unemployment
persist.
Third, there is a small but increasing amount of piracy by organized criminal
groups. This may be attributed in large part to the increasingly lucrative cargoes
created by the economic dynamism of the region. There has been some increase
in the kidnapping of crew members for ransom and in theft of bulk cargo. More
attackers are armed, more crew members are injured, and more vessels are being
hijacked. The role of organized crime in large-scale piracy is indicated by the so-
phisticated equipment, skilled labor, and managerial infrastructure necessary to
transfer commodities on a global scale.
Fourth, all maritime piracy begins and ends on land. Whether they are poor
seafarers or criminal gangsters, pirates are recruited and based on shore. Ulti-
mately, their booty must be “fenced” on land. Whatever is taken at sea eventually
arrives at a port. This requires official documentation. In the case of pirated
goods, this means reliable false documentation. Officials have to be persuaded to
look the other way; their corruption is essential to the routine transfer of contra-
band. Hence, effective antipiracy measures need more than maritime security
measures; they also need close coordination with national law enforcement au-
thorities and anticorruption agencies.
How costly is the piracy threat to shipping through the South China Sea?
James Warren of the Asia Research Institute at the National University of
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Singapore has claimed that piracy in the (Southeast Asia) region has cost the
world economy a staggering twenty-five billion U.S. dollars a year.12 Stanley
Weeks notes that “piracy raises insurance rates, restricts free trade, increases ten-
sions between the affected littoral states, their neighbors and the countries
whose flagged ships are attacked or hijacked.”13
Coastal states have been under considerable pressure from user states to pro-
vide safe and secure navigation through the South China Sea, especially in nar-
row choke points such as the Malacca Strait. The coastal states, particularly
Indonesia, have been described in the media as not doing enough to suppress pi-
racy. Also, despite the clear threat that piracy appears to offer, shipowners have
not taken much action to stop it. This is perhaps explained by the high cost of
preventive measures. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), for example, has stated that new security measures to counter
the threat of terrorist attacks will require an initial investment by ship operators
of at least US$1.3 billion and will increase annual operating costs by US$730
million.14
In economic terms, however, the relatively low cost of piracy may not warrant
such expensive preventive measures. A closer examination of the data on piracy
shows that the problem might not be as alarming as sometimes portrayed by the
media, at least not in economic terms. For example, in 2005 over sixty-three
thousand ships sailed through the Malacca and Singapore straits. In the same
year, the IMB reported only twelve cases of actual and attempted attacks on ships
in the straits. Hence, the probability of attack in 2005 was a relatively low 0.019
percent, or nineteen out of a hundred thousand. In 2003, in the heavily traf-
ficked Malacca Strait—frequently referred to as one of the most “pirate infested”
seas of the world—the risk of a transiting ship being attacked was less than 0.001
percent.
Moreover, many of these reported piracy attacks were little more than cases of
petty theft against ships at anchor in port, and most piracy victims are them-
selves poor fishermen and traders. Considering the relatively minor costs, many
shipowners may also be reluctant to report pirate attacks to the authorities or
otherwise assist in the investigation of pirate attacks. Apart from reflecting badly
on the company’s image, reporting a pirate attack may cause the victim vessel to
be detained in harbor for investigation. The cost of such delays—varying from
five to twenty-five thousand U.S. dollars per day—may easily exceed the losses
incurred by a pirate attack. If suspected pirates are arrested, crew members of
the victim ship may be unable or unwilling to bear the expense or risk of testify-
ing at the trial.
Many low-cost antipiracy measures are available, such as equipping the su-
perstructure with proper locks and providing antipiracy training. However,
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shipowners and insurance companies have little economic incentive to imple-
ment antipiracy measures. Contrary to the popular impression from news me-
dia reports, most shipowners have not seen piracy as a menace to international
shipping. Ultimately, “repelling intruders becomes a cost-benefit analysis for
ship-owners.”15 Shipowners and shipping companies don’t adopt antipiracy
measures because they don’t find it worth the cost.
ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PIRATES
Piracy is related to other criminal activity in and around ships and ports, and it
often overlaps other crimes. The arrest and conviction of pirates, smugglers,
drug runners, and terrorists—both politically and economically moti-
vated—are in many ways interconnected. In particular, the proceeds from all of
these crimes eventually end up on land, which means that responsibility for
stopping piracy must ultimately include law enforcement authorities on land.
The range of criminal activity around seaports is extensive, including the
smuggling or illicit import of illegal drugs, contraband, stowaways and aliens,
restricted or prohibited merchandise, and munitions. Metropolitan areas near
major seaports often have the highest rates of motor vehicle theft. Stolen cars
and computers are reported among the most lucrative illegal trade from rich
countries to poor countries.16 Smuggling may also be a precondition for piracy,
by providing the essential goods and services of weapons, speedboats, port ac-
cess, and illegal markets to dispose of pirated goods. Hence, piracy may repre-
sent only one aspect of criminality. Widespread poverty around the Malacca
Strait also generates smugglers, procurers, prostitutes, and other criminals.
Port authorities are understandably more concerned about smuggling and il-
legal imports—the most common maritime crimes—than about piracy. Smug-
gling and illegal importation occur whenever ships unload goods illegally, in
areas where they are prohibited, thereby violating states’ embargo or import
quotas. Hence, embargoed Iraqi oil found its way to energy importers in Asia,
and black-market Marlboro cigarettes evade import duties in many porous
ports. It is possible that a shipper may be unaware of an illegal cargo; that is the
responsibility of the cargo owner or customs broker. Given the rapid speed and
volume of trade flows, it is extremely difficult to detect and detain prohibited
shipments. On the contrary, there are substantial pressures on port authorities
to expedite shipments across their borders, especially in large, hub ports.
Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, links between ter-
rorism and piracy have been extensively examined.17 However, maritime terror-
ist attacks or threats—that is, politically or ideologically motivated attacks
against ships—have been scarce around the South China Sea. Those few that
have occurred were within the territorial waters of coastal states. For example,
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Singapore foiled a terrorist plot in 2002 to hit visiting U.S. Navy vessels using a
small boat rigged with explosives. The most notable maritime attack to date was
carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Superferry 14 in Manila Bay in
February 2004; 116 people were killed or missing and presumed dead. However,
it is not clear whether the attack was primarily motivated by ASG in pursuit of its
political objectives. ASG was later found to have sent an extortion letter prior to
the bombing, suggesting that it had been motivated by economic factors.
There are some notable obstacles to staging a successful terrorist attack in the
South China Sea. Targets are less accessible at sea. A maritime terrorist attack
would require very complex and expensive coordination of efforts. An attack,
even if successful, could be much less visible than a terrorist attack on land. So
far, there have been no terrorist attacks or hijacking attempts in the South China
Sea, compared with dozens of terrorist attacks against churches, hotels, and
other land-based targets. Overall, the probability of a maritime terrorist attack
appears low. However, the total costs of a major blockage of vital sea-lanes like
the Malacca Strait could be huge. Although they have been scarce, terrorist at-
tacks on a ferry or cruise ship might have dramatic public impacts: the low prob-
ability times the high possible cost still makes maritime terrorism a substantial
risk. To date, there has not been a clear relationship between piracy and
terrorism.
Arresting and convicting pirates in the South China Sea is a major concern
for nonregional countries with major shipping and naval interests, such as the
United States, Japan, India, and Australia. They want to maintain freedom of
navigation through the straits and sea-lanes of the South China Sea for oil tank-
ers, containerships, and naval vessels. The South China Sea is the main thor-
oughfare between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and is therefore of
great strategic significance. The United States sends its warships, including air-
craft carriers from its Pacific Fleet, through the South China Sea in support of
military missions in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The South China Sea is
the vital artery that connects America’s prime Asian ally, Japan, with its Middle
East energy suppliers.
Coastal states with extensive coastlines, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet-
nam, and China, mainly want to protect their recently declared sovereign rights
and resource control over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) up to two hundred
nautical miles off their respective coastlines, as provided by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). They have also taken on the
political responsibility for controlling piracy along with their claims of eco-
nomic control in their EEZs. For example, Indonesia will not allow any country
or private security firm to guard international ships passing through the
Malacca Strait on its side of the waterway. Ibnu Hadi, the Director for Asia
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Pacific and Africa Inter-Regional Cooperation at the Indonesian Foreign Minis-
try, has said, “Indonesia will strongly object to any security guard escorting ships
in its waters. Indonesia cannot accept foreign ships escorted by foreign security
guards.”18
Coastal countries also want to assert their sovereign rights to protect tourism,
fisheries, and other environmental resources in their territorial waters and EEZs.
However, many coastal Southeast Asian nations want to share with international
shippers the burden of providing safety of navigation. Overall, this situation
presents a dilemma for user states with high concerns over piracy as to whether
and how to demand accountability from the coastal states with political respon-
sibility for maritime security where international sea-lanes traverse their terri-
torial waters. The dilemma is complicated by other pressing concerns for
countries bordering the South China Sea, such as smuggling, trafficking, poach-
ing, and pollution.
Poaching or illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing is perhaps a more im-
portant concern for coastal states. For centuries, the South China Sea has pro-
vided abundant fisheries offering food security and employment opportunities
for coastal countries. However, as coastal urban populations have grown and as
fishing technology has improved, competition for shared fish stocks has intensi-
fied considerably.
There is massive illegal fishing, in the form of unregistered foreign vessels who
“pirate” the seas. Foreign fishing boats intruding in rich regional fishing grounds
are especially vulnerable and attractive targets for pirates. Eduardo Santos asserts
that pirates in the southern Philippines prey more on marginal fishermen than on
tankers, barges, containerships, or other commercial shipping vessels. They may
not only seize the fish catch; they may also rob ships of their engines, equipment,
cash, and other valuables.19 In May 2004, the director of the North Sumatra Fish-
ery Office estimated that eight thousand fishing boats, or two-thirds of the prov-
ince’s fishing fleet, were not operating, because of the threat of piracy.20 The
Indonesian government has estimated that the country loses four billion U.S. dol-
lars each year due to illegal fishing alone—several times more than the estimated
cost of all pirate attacks worldwide.21
For some South China Sea coastal states, any proposed international coordi-
nation to combat terrorism or piracy is of lower priority than other pressing is-
sues. These include protecting and maintaining control over newly acquired
ocean resources, protecting national security, or protecting bureaucratic inter-
ests. In Indonesia, all three issues may coexist. With a coastline twice as long as
the circumference of the earth, and with no more than a few dozen operating
vessels to patrol its territorial waters, the Indonesian navy and marine police face
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a wide range of problems, including illegal fishing, illegal migration, drug traf-
ficking, smuggling, and marine pollution.
To put this in perspective, there were only 103 incidents of piracy in Indone-
sian waters reported to the IMB in 2002, compared with 1,687 murders, nine
thousand cases of violent theft, and eleven thousand serious assaults on land.22
This means that piracy makes up less than 0.05 percent of Indonesia’s cases of re-
ported crime. As a direct result of these competing demands, antipiracy mea-
sures not surprisingly receive limited funding.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTIPIRACY MEASURES AND BUR-
DEN SHARING
Stakeholder priorities changed substantially after July 2005, when the Joint War
Committee (JWC) of the Lloyd’s Market Association listed the Malacca Strait
and certain areas in the southern Philippines (together with areas such as Iraq,
Lebanon, and Somalia) as “prone to hull war, strikes, terrorism and related per-
ils.” As a result, marine insurance premiums were increased for vessels transiting
these areas despite very strong protests by regional governments and
shipowners. The JWC removed the listing in August 2006 after regional govern-
ments—with the assistance of international organizations and user states—in-
stituted several security measures.
The JWC listing was a catalyst for several antipiracy developments. In 2003,
the thirty-sixth Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial
Meeting had issued a “Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other
Threats to Maritime Security” but had taken little action. Subsequently, the
ASEAN Regional Forum convened a meeting of maritime specialists to coordi-
nate coast-guard action, information exchange, and investigation of piracy re-
ports. Japan’s Anti-piracy Coast Guard Program provided additional antipiracy
technologies and training.
The IMB Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur and the International
Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) Piracy Reporting Center in London stepped
up monitoring and compliance efforts. The IMO made it mandatory for all
oceangoing vessels of three hundred gross tons or more to be equipped with an
Automatic Identification System (AIS) by the end of 2004. The AIS automati-
cally sends and receives such ship information as identity, position, course,
speed, and cargo information to and from other ships, aircraft, and shore instal-
lations, all integrated by satellite links. The IMB has endorsed antipiracy mea-
sures like the Secure-Ship electric fence and ShipLoc, an inexpensive satellite
tracking system designed to locate ships at sea or in port by a tiny transmitter
concealed on board. This would permit long-range identification and tracking
of ships by anyone with authorized Internet access.
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Singapore has implemented the most forceful measures to address maritime
security threats. It was the first Asian port to join the U.S.-sponsored Container
Security Initiative and has provided sea security teams to escort selected vessels
transiting the Singapore Strait. It has restricted circulation of small craft and fer-
ries within the port area and increased surveillance efforts by installing tracking
devices on all Singapore-registered small boats to identify their locations,
courses, and speeds. Together with Indonesia, it operates a radar tracking system
on Batam Island to identify, track, and exchange intelligence on shipping in the
Singapore Strait.
In 2003, Malaysia and Thailand started coordinated naval patrols along their
joint maritime frontier. Following this, in 2004, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indo-
nesia began coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait, under the code
name MALSINDO. In September 2005, the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative began,
with coordinated air patrols over the strait by the three coastal states. The Philip-
pines, meanwhile, has proposed building on its maritime border patrol exercises
with Malaysia and Indonesia by formalizing a tripartite agreement to exchange
information and intelligence. The increase in coordinated patrol activities has
been accompanied by an increased effort to modernize regional naval and
coast-guard capabilities.
Representatives of the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have fre-
quently asked shipping companies and the international community to share
the costs of policing the Malacca Strait against pirates. Their requests, however,
are received with little enthusiasm by most international actors involved—with
the notable exception of Japan, which has funded a number of initiatives to pro-
vide training and resources to the law enforcement authorities in the region. Re-
grettably, the states that are most adversely affected by piracy—Indonesia,
Myanmar, Bangladesh—can hardly afford to suppress it, whether financially,
militarily, or politically. In September 2005, Indonesia and the IMO convened a
meeting in Jakarta to discuss safety, security, and environmental protection in
the Malacca and Singapore straits. This assembly recognized the role of burden
sharing between coastal and user states, especially in the use and maintenance of
international straits pursuant to article 43 of UNCLOS (“Navigational and
Safety Aids and Other Improvements and the Prevention, Reduction and Con-
trol of Pollution”).
Following on from this, in February 2006 the United States hosted a meeting
in Alameda, California, that assembled representatives from Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Singapore, Australia, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the
Philippines, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. (China was invited but did
not attend.) While the meeting’s objective was to coordinate potential user-state
contributions to assist the Malacca/Singapore Strait littoral states, little progress
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was made on burden sharing. On the one hand, the littoral states want burden
sharing to include the cost of providing safety and environmental protection
services. On the other hand, international user states view burden sharing as a
means of becoming more directly involved in maritime security measures to ad-
dress piracy and terrorism threats.
In September 2006, Malaysia and the IMO organized a meeting in Kuala
Lumpur of coastal states, major shipping nations, and shipping companies.
Working groups on safety of navigation and maritime security were established
to undertake projects on such issues as the removal of shipwrecks, the establish-
ment of a hazardous and noxious-substance response center, the installation of
AIS transponders on small ships, and the placement of tide, current, and wind
measurement systems.
Substantial voluntary contributions have been made by China and Japan for
these projects. Some have advocated toll-road or user-pays systems to help fund
pollution cleanup and navigational aids. The United States and many shippers,
however, oppose strongly the introduction of any fees. They prefer to see greater
transparency and accountability in any use of funds for maritime safety and se-
curity. They would also like to see Malaysia and Indonesia ratify the Interna-
tional Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 and the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
1988 (known as the SUA Convention).
In addition, these countries are also considering becoming members of the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was initiated by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in 2001. Its Information Sharing Center was estab-
lished in Singapore during September 2006. Malaysia and Indonesia indicated
their willingness to participate in this effort but have not yet ratified the agree-
ment, due to sensitivities over national sovereignty.
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN CONTROLLING PIRACY
Despite the recent developments in antipiracy efforts and the recent decline in
piracy reports in several areas of the South China Sea, there are some persistent
problems in combating piracy. Long-standing concerns include many unre-
solved overlapping claims and jurisdictional disputes. For example, the Spratly
Islands are claimed by six countries and occupied by three of them. These terri-
torial claims are especially important as anchors for assertions of exclusive eco-
nomic zones around the disputed islands and the oil and natural gas resources
they are thought to contain. With few agreed-upon boundaries in the South
China Sea, countries act largely in their own self-interest. Hence, “the lack of
agreed jurisdiction complicates maritime enforcement, leads to unchecked
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degradation of the marine environment and facilitates illegal activities at sea, in-
cluding possible maritime terrorism.”23
Second, international user states themselves have divergent security priori-
ties. For example, recent policy of the United States in the region has been pri-
marily driven by its global war on terrorism. It aims to achieve “maritime
domain awareness”—the development of a comprehensive picture of every-
thing that moves on the world’s oceans. American security officials want to
“wire” ships so that their locations, courses, speeds, cargoes, registrations, ports
of departure, and ports and times of arrival can be tracked with precision, as in
an air traffic control system.24 Japan, on the other hand, is primarily interested in
antipiracy measures, reflecting its acute vulnerability to any disruption of its
trade and raw materials flows.
A third reason for limited progress is that many coastal states give top prior-
ity to protecting national sovereignty and controlling their recently acquired
EEZ resources. The declaration of EEZs by coastal states has led to numerous
overlapping and multiplying jurisdictional claims and to legal confusion over
the right to exercise innocent passage through territorial seas by warships, the
right to conduct military surveillance activities in the EEZ of a coastal state,
and the arrest authority of states in hot pursuit of pirates in contested waters.
There is general agreement that the exercise of freedom of navigation and
overflight in and above EEZs should not interfere with the rights of the coastal
state. However, there is still disagreement about when overflights become in-
trusive eavesdropping missions to scout the defenses of potential rivals. One
tragic symptom of this disagreement was the collision between a U.S. EP-3 sur-
veillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet over Chinese EEZ waters near
Hainan Island on 1 April 2001, after which a political crisis ensued.
Fourth, antipiracy efforts are also greatly hindered by the “flags of conve-
nience” system of ship registration. It is extremely easy and convenient to
reregister and reflag a ship. According to former IMB director Captain Jayant
Abhyankar, “One simply has to fax information as to a ship’s name, ownership,
tonnage, and dimensions, and a registration will be granted. The information
given is not checked. Once registered, it is free to be hired for trade trans-
port.”25 It is a system of “managed anarchy,” according to Stephen Flynn, for-
mer commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and a writer on maritime security.26
According to the International Transport Workers Federation, the flags of con-
venience condone poor safety, pay, and training standards. A 2001 IMO survey
found over thirteen thousand cases of falsified documents of seafarers, most of
whom were from Indonesia and the Philippines.27 This provides an easy op-
portunity for pirates or hijackers to infiltrate a ship’s crew. Having hijacked a
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ship, they can elude detection by reregistering it at sea for a nominal fee, thus im-
posing a layer of obfuscation against the search for the attackers.
Piracy carried out by organized-crime groups sometimes employs “phantom
ships,” operating under false identities. They may be hijacked or bought in the
salvage market. They can be registered and reflagged after unloading illegal
cargo. Reregistration and safety inspections are cheap, fast, and cursory in sev-
eral jurisdictions. Adding to the problem is the widespread practice of most
maritime shipping services to require payment in hard currency on delivery.
The cash-based, fast-paced, transient nature of shipping makes it an ideal me-
dium of exchange and money laundering for criminal entrepreneurs. At one
time there were thought to be twelve phantom ships operating in Southeast Asia;
all but one of them were registered in Panama or Honduras.28
There are some simple solutions for preventing smuggling or fraudulent sale
of contraband from phantom ships. Every ship has an IMO identification num-
ber, based on its original Lloyd’s registry. That number could be engraved per-
manently in a prominent place, so that any cargo dealer can quickly determine
whether or not a suspicious vessel is in fact a phantom ship. This solution is sim-
ple, cheap, and likely to be highly effective in locating phantom vessels.
Shipowners and shipping companies are responsible for adopting antipiracy
security measures, including relatively cheap physical-security measures like
“safe rooms” and the installation of locks and bolts on cargo holds, in addition
to satellite-based global positioning systems to track their shipments around the
globe. Some shipping companies have invested in antipiracy devices like
ShipLoc or Secure-Ship, or even cheaper methods, such as high-pressure water
hoses or security lights. But most do not, apparently because they calculate that
the risk of loss is not worth the cost of prevention.
Shippers have long-established norms of working outside national bound-
aries. They have to contend with import quotas, embargoes, and restrictions im-
posed by states for political reasons, to the commercial detriment of the shipper.
Shippers may even obtain bigger profits in making prohibited goods available.
In these restricted areas, it may be convenient to shipowners for their vessels to
be out of radio contact or undetectable.
Another persistent problem for combating piracy is institutional insularity. A
good deal of useful information about piracy is contained in the computers and
files of police, coast-guard, customs, immigration, military, intelligence, and
other national authorities. However, even within one national government, “in-
formation is readily available but it is locked away in ‘silos’ or ‘stovepipes’—in-
stitutional frameworks that distribute critical information vertically but not
horizontally.”29 Sharing information horizontally among governments is much
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more difficult. Doing so very quickly—for example, when a suspect ship is first
sighted—is even more difficult.
Hence, a number of factors impede coordinated antipiracy efforts: uncer-
tainties over legal jurisdiction, disputed sovereignty, and uncoordinated efforts
at the recovery of crews, cargoes, or ships. Even when pirates are detected, hot
pursuit across national boundaries has seldom been attempted. When coordi-
nated surveillance (like the recent MALSINDO patrols) has reduced piracy at-
tacks, pirates have generally responded by increasing their attacks in less
protected areas of the region. State and market stakeholders have made only lim-
ited progress in coordinating and sustaining antipiracy security measures for
the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS, OVERLAPPING INTERESTS
Piracy is often dramatized by the news media, spreading the impression that it is
more of a problem than it really is. Piracy is difficult to define and measure. It
appears to be related to other forms of crime, on land and at sea. Hence, any
antipiracy response must be a coordinated effort—on land and at sea. But this
coordination is difficult to achieve. As a result, there is still no effective gover-
nance, or burden sharing in the provision of security, of the sea-lanes transiting
the South China Sea. Coastal states don’t want to give up any sovereign controls.
Shippers don’t want to impose restrictions or costs on their operations. Major
user states have not offered sufficient support to establish the necessary mea-
sures. The current situation is far from the highly ambitious proposal by the
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the IMO to con-
struct a “Marine Electronic Highway,” a shipping traffic control system similar
to the global air traffic control arrangement, with comprehensive, integrated
electronic information, navigation, and control systems.
Whatever their conflicting claims and mutual suspicions may be, political
leaders in the coastal states are beginning to understand that they must cooper-
ate in order to manage the increase in shipping traffic, to use the resources of the
South China Sea sustainably, and to address maritime security threats, including
piracy. While some progress has been made, there is as yet no durable agreement
on how to share the burden for providing safety and security from piracy in the
region. The nation-states of Southeast Asia that have only recently extended
their sovereignty and resource claims to EEZs in the South China Sea are in no
rush to negotiate them away, and shippers who traverse the busiest sea-lanes in
the world are reluctant to impose any stringent or expensive security measures.
All these regional and international stakeholders share many overlapping in-
terests—for example, in promoting safe navigation for commercial shipping.
On antipiracy or antiterrorist enforcement measures, however, they have had
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conflicting views. Littoral states are insistent that the process of achieving re-
gional maritime security should be locally initiated and led. They are willing to
accept external assistance, but they contend that ultimately they must have the
authority and capability to provide that security. For example, Tokyo’s financial
contributions, technical assistance, and joint training are welcomed by the litto-
ral states. These measures not only increase the pool of available resources for
maritime security but also diversify sources of assistance, avoiding sole reliance
on the United States. However, regional states and shippers have yet to put aside
their individual stakeholder interests and then negotiate and implement an ef-
fective regional maritime antipiracy security system. Unfortunately, it may take
an event equivalent to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, a
spectacular collision, or a devastating oil spill to overcome contending stake-
holder interests and institutional inertia and to galvanize the political will
needed for effective antipiracy security measures.
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THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
Tokyo’s Nuclear Option
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Will Japan go nuclear? Doubtful—but what if it does? It is possible to envi-sion circumstances that would impel Tokyo and the Japanese populace
to cast aside their long-standing dread of nuclear weapons and to construct an
arsenal of their own for the sake of national survival. Menacing strategic sur-
roundings or a collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty are two such circum-
stances. If some nightmare scenario did come to pass, the common wisdom has
it, Japan could build a working bomb in short order. In 1991, Richard Halloran
averred that “Japan is N minus six months,” although he saw no evidence that Ja-
pan entertained any ambition to tap its latent weapons capability.1 In 2007, Gary
Sick, a well known commentator on Middle East affairs, reported having been
privately told that Japan “could do it, sort of, over a long weekend.”2 Japan, that
is, may now qualify as a “threshold state,” a term “commonly understood to
mean possession of the indigenous ability to acquire nuclear weapons within a
relatively short time frame, ranging from a few hours to several months.”3
Japan inhabits a tough neighborhood, while the U.S. military position in Asia
looks increasingly wobbly. Nearby North Korea con-
ducted a nuclear test in 2006 and paid no penalty for
defying the “six party” framework. In January 2009, in
fact, Pyongyang announced it has assumed an “all-out
confrontational posture” toward rival South Korea
and has “weaponized” enough plutonium for four or
five implosion-type nuclear warheads.4 Japanese
thinkers have studied the rise of China closely and
what it portends for Japan, positioned just off the
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Asian seaboard. Beijing has mounted an aggressive naval buildup over the past
decade, gaining confidence in its capacity to subdue Taiwan militarily if need be
while holding U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier task forces at bay. Taiwan adjoins Japan’s
southern strategic frontier, meaning that Tokyo could not look with equanimity
on a cross-strait war or a return of the island to mainland rule. Indeed, Japanese
imperialist expansion more than a century ago was designed precisely to secure
its southern strategic flank, the back door to its Ryukyu island chain, which
stretches to the coast of Taiwan.5 Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan
has been in “friendly hands” for over a century. Accordingly, Japanese policy
makers do not take lightly a forcible Chinese acquisition of Taiwan.
To complicate matters, as Chinese strategists look to the “day after Taiwan”
they are considering how to exert influence on the sea lines of communication
connecting Chinese ports with vital resources in the Middle East and Africa.
China’s turn toward the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean may give Beijing
not only more control over its own maritime security but also more control over
the maritime communications on which the resource-dependent Japanese
economy relies.
Seen in realist terms, then, China’s maritime rise threatens to degrade Japan’s
strategic position in the region. Tokyo may ultimately conclude that self-help
represents the only way to shore up its position. Skyrocketing costs of develop-
ing and procuring weaponry are driving the force structure of the American
military inexorably downward in numbers. Just one example: the Pentagon’s es-
timates of future U.S. Navy fleet size now run as low as 150 ships, a fraction of the
nearly six-hundred-ship navy of the 1980s.6 Even the 313-ship fleet espoused by
the Navy leadership now appears fanciful, with 283 ships currently in active ser-
vice and little prospect of accelerating shipbuilding rates enough to increase the
inventory by thirty vessels.7 Allies like Japan monitor such trends closely. A pre-
cipitous decline in conventional U.S. military capacity in the theater could have
major diplomatic ramifications, undercutting American staying power in the
western Pacific, giving rise to Japanese fears of abandonment, and unsettling the
entire Asian security architecture. More to the point, Tokyo would likely inter-
pret such a decline as foreshadowing an end to the American nuclear guarantee.
Accordingly, an effort to discern, as through a glass darkly, Tokyo’s nuclear
options and their likely consequences is not only worthwhile but imperative for
analysts and practitioners of Asian affairs. First, we briefly consider the motives
that would induce Japan’s leadership to make such a radical break with the
antinuclear sentiments of the postwar era. Second, we consider the prospect of
Japanese “nuclear hedging,” an approach under which Tokyo would build up a
capacity to develop nuclear weapons, keeping its strategic options open while
remaining in formal compliance with its commitments under the Nuclear
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Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Third, we consider the technical feasibility of
a swift Japanese nuclear breakout, paying particular attention to assumptions
that Tokyo could stage a breakout within a year of deciding to do so.8 Fourth, we
identify possible force structures and strategies available to Japan should the is-
land nation’s leadership indeed decide it is in the national interest to cross the
nuclear-weapons threshold. We close by identifying areas for future research,
with the aim of generating a literature of immediate use to policy makers in
Washington and Tokyo.
WHY GO NUCLEAR?
Debate has swirled around prospective Japanese nuclear aspirations at least
since 1958, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi told the Diet that the nation’s
postwar “peace constitution” did not forbid a strictly defensive nuclear arsenal.
Successive governments, however, disclaimed the words of the hawkish Kishi. By
1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was spelling out “Three Non-Nuclear Princi-
ples,” informing lawmakers that his government would not manufacture, pos-
sess, or “allow the introduction of ” nuclear arms into Japan. Sato’s principles
earned him the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize and have remained the gold standard for
Japanese nonproliferation policy ever since. However, it is noteworthy that even
Sato was acutely aware of Japan’s vulnerability in the dangerous Cold War secu-
rity environment. Following China’s nuclear breakout in October 1964, Sato
quickly sought reassurances from the United States that Washington would ex-
tend its nuclear umbrella to Japan.9 In a conversation with Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara during a state visit to the United States, Sato declared,
“Should a war break out [between Japan and China], we expect the United States
to immediately launch a retaliatory nuclear strike [against China].”10 Presum-
ably, America’s extended deterrence was a critical precondition to Sato’s
willingness to forgo the nuclear option.
In any event, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” persists to the present day. Matake
Kamiya explains Tokyo’s self-imposed injunction against bomb making in terms
of the general pacifism codified in Japan’s peace constitution, lingering memo-
ries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and antimilitary senti-
ments dating from the interwar years.11 As a result, concludes Kamiya,
opposition to nuclear weapons “is deeply embedded in postwar Japanese culture
and society. . . . [I]t is still far stronger, even today, than those who warn of im-
pending Japanese nuclear armament realize.”12 The vast majority of observers in
Japan and in the West are inclined to agree with Kamiya, if for different reasons.
Indeed, very few scholars have lent credence to rationales for a nuclear
buildup.13
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Tetsuya Endo, a former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of
Japan, argues that while Japan possesses the technical capabilities to stage a nu-
clear breakout, the material costs combined with the prospects of international
isolation would deter Tokyo from pursuing such an option.14 Brad Glosserman
cautions that Japan likely would not survive intact as a nation-state following a
nuclear exchange—even a limited one—owing to its lack of strategic depth and
the extremely high population density throughout the Japanese Archipelago.15
Llewelyn Hughes identifies a series of domestic institutional constraints, rang-
ing from constitutional to informal, that have anchored Tokyo securely to the
U.S. nuclear guarantee.16 Others believe that Japan is actively pursuing other
strategic options, including strengthening its own conventional military capa-
bilities and deepening its alliance ties to the United States, as substitutes for an
independent nuclear deterrent.17 In sum, normative, material, geographic,
institutional, and strategic considerations militate against going nuclear.
There is no denying these constraints. Yet the logic of national security—of
threat and response—is not so readily dismissed, even under the special circum-
stances prevailing in postwar Japan. The prevailing skepticism, moreover, has
precluded serious discourse on practical and critical steps—including the devel-
opment of nuclear doctrine, command and control, and force structure—that
Tokyo would have to implement should it embark on a breakout. Therefore, it is
useful to postulate strategic rationales and chart a road map for Japanese
nuclearization.
Scott Sagan outlines three hypotheses to explain why nation-states seek nu-
clear weapons. First, according to Sagan’s “security” model, governments “build
nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially
nuclear threats.” George Shultz memorably summed up the security approach:
“Proliferation begets proliferation.”18 Two policies are possible when threats
arise, says Sagan. Sounding a Thucydidean note, he maintains that “strong states
do what they can . . . adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing
their own nuclear weapons.” Weak states, by contrast, “do what they must: they
can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear
retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence.”19 Doubts about the
credibility of a nuclear ally’s security guarantee presumably bring pressure on
even weak states—or on states that, like Japan, rely on alliances for other
reasons—to seek nuclear capability. This is the logic of self-help.
Second, Sagan’s “domestic politics” model “envisions nuclear weapons as po-
litical tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.”
Three protagonists in nuclear policy making are typically the nuclear energy es-
tablishment, the armed forces, and politicians. The former two actors may have
bureaucratic interests in going nuclear, as it would give them leverage in
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budgetary processes, allowing them to attract resources. “When such actors
form coalitions that are strong enough to control the government’s
decisionmaking process . . . nuclear weapons programs are likely to thrive.” Con-
versely, when a coalition opposes nuclear weapons or the various actors find
themselves at loggerheads on this question, more ambiguous results are likely.20
A clash among domestic interests seldom yields neat, entirely rational policies.
Finally, under Sagan’s “norms” model, “nuclear weapons decisions are made
because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an
important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity.” Government
decisions are driven “not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national security
interests or parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and
shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international
relations.” A nuclear arsenal is a token of modernity, legitimacy, and great-power
status. As Sagan points out, an interactive relationship exists between norms and
the bureaucratic actors of his second model. As norms mature over time, they
tend to be written into bureaucratic procedures and practices, influencing calcu-
lations vis-à-vis important matters like whether to seek nuclear capability.21 Be-
liefs and convictions color rational cost-benefit analyses.
In the Japanese case, it appears, one of Sagan’s models is in tension with the
other two. Rational security calculations point to a growing threat, an ally in rel-
ative decline, and thus a weaker position for Japan in Asia. Those who incline to
this way of thinking tend to see a nuclear breakout as potentially unavoidable.
But foreign policy, observe Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, represents “the
extension of politics to other realms.”22 They liken foreign policy to a collage, an
amalgam of bargains struck, compromises reached, and coalitions formed on a
variety of issues—often under pressure.23 Proponents of Japanese nuclear-
ization will inevitably encounter deep-seated resistance, both from the elector-
ate and from bureaucratic institutions in which antinuclear attitudes are
entrenched.
Discord is the product of this societal indecision. Applying Allison and
Zelikow’s metaphor in the context of Sagan’s three models, Japanese policy
makers will incline strongly to some middle way between pro- and antinuclear
factions. If successful, they will maximize their liberty of action, appease im-
portant parties with stakes in the outcome, reinforce American support for the
security alliance, and avoid setting off a public outcry.
OPTION ONE: NUCLEAR HEDGING
If we have interpreted events correctly, Tokyo will hedge its bets on whether to
go nuclear—if indeed it has not already embarked on such an approach.24 Ja-
pan’s leadership, that is, will postpone a decision for as long as possible,
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monitoring its security surroundings while quietly building up the planning
and strategy-making processes, expertise, infrastructure, and materiel that
would make possible the fielding of a modest arsenal within a reasonable
amount of time. This is not an uncommon approach for governments. Notes
Ariel Levite, “Would-be proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the
bomb or for that matter to give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before
they are on the verge of attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then.”
Having a “nuclear ‘option’” often makes sense in pure realpolitik terms.25
Evelyn Goh defines hedging in general terms as “taking action to ensure against
undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple alternative positions.” This
makes sense, says Goh, when the leadership cannot decide on “more straightfor-
ward alternatives,” rating the costs of such alternatives as too high or the payoffs
too low.26 More to the point, Levite defines “‘nuclear hedging’ as a national strat-
egy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback.”27 John F. Kennedy fa-
mously predicted that fifteen to twenty nuclear-weapon states would emerge by
the end of the 1960s.28 That clearly did not happen. It nevertheless appears that
hedging offers the middle way that embattled Japanese makers of policy and strat-
egy will be looking for as they try to satisfy the interests that Scott Sagan identifies.
In this scenario, much of the hedging will take place within the domestic arena.
Moving beyond mere calls for debate on the nuclear question, the Japanese policy
community would begin a more serious discourse on breaking out. For example,
the prime minster could openly and formally revisit and reaffirm the constitu-
tionality of nuclear armament, perhaps by appointing a blue-ribbon commission
of some type. Such a move would be as much about shaping public opinion and
expectations as about developing concrete plans to be implemented.
A gradual, transparent, and deliberate analytical process thus would aim to
move the nuclear issue inside the bounds of routine political discourse for the
Japanese state and society. Llewelyn Hughes astutely observes that recent insti-
tutional reforms have centralized power in the prime minister’s office, bolster-
ing that body’s ability to set and impose Japan’s national security agenda. This
and other reforms, Hughes concludes, have “ensured that the formal barriers to
nuclearization are surmountable.”29 It is therefore conceivable that future efforts
to strengthen executive authority further would signal the will and expected ca-
pability to overturn constraints on pursuing an independent nuclear option.
Persuasive rhetoric toward important audiences will be critical to any hedg-
ing strategy. Japanese leaders will need to navigate among the domestic interests
examined by Scott Sagan, reassure the watchdog International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the international community that Japan has no desire to
break its NPT commitments, and concurrently apply pressure on the United
States not to draw down its conventional military commitment to Japan or,
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worse still, fold up the nuclear umbrella under which Japan shelters. Indeed,
added pressure on Washington to make its processes for making nuclear strategy
and decisions more transparent to Tokyo would implicitly signal that Japan’s
nonnuclear posture is not absolute.
In other words, if the United States fails to integrate Japan more meaning-
fully into its nuclear plans, Tokyo might have no choice but to pursue an inde-
pendent option. Alternatively, Tokyo might modify its Three Non-Nuclear
Principles, lifting its self-imposed ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons
onto Japanese territory. This would represent a precursor to limited deploy-
ments of U.S. nuclear weapons to strengthen deterrence.30 The deployment of
Pershing intermediate-range missiles in Europe during the 1980s offers a use-
ful precedent. Such a move might eventually open the way for joint manage-
ment of nuclear weapons positioned in the home islands, similar to existing
U.S.-NATO arrangements.31 A strategy of calculated ambiguity that at once
played up Japanese capacity to go nuclear and remained noncommittal on Jap-
anese intentions of doing so would offer Tokyo its best diplomatic option
should security conditions continue to decay in East Asia.
OPTION TWO: BLACK SWANS AND NUCLEAR BREAKOUT
What would it take to empower adherents of Sagan’s security model, allowing
their views to win out over domestic interests opposed to nuclear weapons and
over norms of decades’ standing? A central feature of Japan’s security strategy is
the nation’s utter dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. As Yukio
Satoh succinctly explains, “The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence will continue
to be Japan’s only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear
and other strategic threats.”32 That is, even barely perceptible signs of weakness
in the U.S. nuclear posture (either perceived or real) could trigger alarm and
overreactions in Japan.
Japanese concerns over the Obama administration’s recent moves to advance
nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such sensitivities. Specif-
ically, Japanese policy makers fret that “extended deterrence could weaken if
Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these [global dis-
armament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a
latent North Korean nuclear capability in exchange for safeguards against prolif-
eration.”33 In 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test compelled the Japanese govern-
ment to seek public reassurances from the United States that extended
deterrence remained intact.34 Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter of
Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could
fundamentally reshape the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Re-
search Service forcefully contends that “perhaps the single most important
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factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S.
guarantee to protect Japan’s security.”35 The causes and processes by which U.S.
extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo’s eyes are beyond the scope
of this article. Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the
nuclear umbrella would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese
nuclear breakout.
Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the
proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference
to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of
weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to
break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear
heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Pen-
insula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were
not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons,” despite the presence of
tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park
Chung Hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters,
President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nu-
clear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an
independent deterrent.
Similarly, China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be
wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent de-
struction.”37 This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled
Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rap-
prochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist
leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under
the Shanghai Communiqué, which began the normalization process, the United
States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the
Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting them-
selves,” including nuclear weapons.38 Recently declassified materials document
growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island
throughout the decade.39
In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances,
persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese
and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to prolifer-
ation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, height-
ened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States.
While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these
two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the
possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.
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As noted above, analysts and Japanese politicians evince conviction that Japan
could erect a nuclear deterrent in a relatively short period of time. We are unper-
suaded by this apparent optimism and conventional wisdom. It is true that Japan
possesses all the trappings of a nuclear power. Yet the path to a credible nuclear
status is likely to be long and winding. Above all, Japan needs the material capacity
to develop a bomb.40 With fifty-five nuclear-power plants in operation around the
country and the nuclear sector’s large reserves of reactor-grade plutonium, Japan
enjoys a readily available supply of fissile material. According to Sankei Shimbun,
Japan possesses enough plutonium on its own soil and in reprocessing plants
overseas to produce 740 bombs.41 How usable this reactor-grade material would
be for weapons purposes, however, remains a matter of dispute among technical
specialists. An internal government report unearthed by Sankei Shimbun report-
edly concluded that Japan would need several hundred engineers, 200–300 billion
yen (or $2–$3 billion), and three to five years to fabricate a serviceable nuclear
warhead.42
The real question would be timing. It is doubtful in the extreme that Japan
could circumvent its safeguards agreement with the IAEA undetected for
long.43 While the cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that it is possible
to bypass the IAEA, Japan holds itself to much higher, more stringent stan-
dards, having assented to one of the most intrusive, regular inspection pro-
grams in the world.44 Furthermore, think of the diplomatic blowback: one can
only imagine the uproar if such an effort on the part of Japan, a consistent, sin-
cere opponent of nuclear weapons, were exposed to public and international
scrutiny.
Thus, Japanese policy makers must consider the extent to which Tokyo
could withstand mounting external pressure to cease and desist while its nu-
clear complex amassed enough bomb-making material for a viable arsenal. To-
kyo cannot expect to deceive the international community long enough to
present the world a fait accompli. It would probably have to make its intentions
clear—and endure international opprobrium—well before reaching the
breakout threshold, if not at the outset.
Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an
arsenal, its engineers would still have to leap over several technical barriers.
First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct
route would be to arm Japan’s existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear
bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force (SDF) inventory,
however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes
while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no
strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en
route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated
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integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is
surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the
Asian mainland.
In light of this, ballistic or cruise missiles would likely rank as Japan’s weapon
of choice.45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile
delivery system, it would have to produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear war-
head that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a
feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant
lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the
U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field,
takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert
some of its civilian space-launch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would
have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for
long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself—unless it could
purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf from the United States, a doubt-
ful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the politi-
cal sensitivity of such a sale—compelled to start from scratch. Procuring and
integrating satellite guidance, terrain-contour matching, and other specialized
techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese
weapon scientists.
There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety
and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual
nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the
credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too
small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted there safely—even
leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given the memories of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near
some Japanese-held island in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again,
the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) would be intense, while the Japanese populace would think back to the
Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need only re-
call the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBT’s entry
into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal
but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan.
The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bomb-making
efforts.
The technical dilemmas reviewed above demonstrate that there is no shortcut
to a nuclear breakout, even for a technological powerhouse of Japan’s standing.
The Congressional Research Service notes, “If one assumes that Japan would
want weapons with high reliability and accuracy, then more time would need to
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be devoted to their development unless a weapon or information was supplied
by an outside source.”47 Kan Ito, a commentator on Japanese strategic affairs for
nearly two decades, concurs, considering observers who predict a rapid break-
out “utterly presumptuous.” Declares Ito, “It is dangerous to believe such a mis-
conception. It will take 15 years for Japan to build up its own autonomous
nuclear deterrence capability that is truly functional.”48 While one may quibble
with his fifteen-year timeline, which seems unduly pessimistic, the period re-
quired to develop and field a credible deterrent would probably be measured in
years rather than the weeks or months cavalierly bandied about.
STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE
Beyond technical and tactical decisions associated with breaking out, Japan
would need to develop comprehensive policies and processes to harness its nu-
clear arsenal. As noted above, strategic ambiguity over Japanese intentions and
capabilities is probably impossible. As a nation that has long cherished its demo-
cratic institutions and unquestioned civilian control of the military, Tokyo
would need to issue formal public statements and official documents regarding
Japanese nuclear doctrine. Intended for public and international consumption,
such declarations would presumably predate the SDF’s deployment of a deter-
rent force, helping reassure Japan’s neighbors, friends, and allies, especially the
United States.
Japanese officials would probably frame their doctrine strictly in terms of Ja-
pan’s unique strategic position and local circumstances. Geostrategic realities
would dictate that Japan renounce the war-fighting utility of nuclear weapons,
hold fast to an unconditional no-first-use policy, and adopt an exclusively retal-
iatory nuclear posture. Japan is simply too small and vulnerable to contemplate
any but the most minimal deterrent options. The goal of Japanese nuclear strat-
egy would be to threaten credibly limited nuclear strikes against one or several
countervalue targets, deterring first use by an adversary. Such a punitive ap-
proach has long underwritten the doctrines of such smaller nuclear powers as
France and China.
None other than former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has expressed
confidence that a defensive, minimalist nuclear posture would suffice for Japan.
With candor rare among Japanese politicians, he states:
I believe it is constitutional for Japan to possess small-size nuclear weapons as long as
we use them only for the purposes of defending our country. A small-size nuclear
weapon has a strength that is less than one-third of the power of the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima. Even the U.S. Congress allows research on such small-size
nuclear weapons. In order to raise Japan’s defense capability in case of emergency,
our Constitution should allow Japan to possess small-size nuclear weapons.49
Y O S H I H A R A & H O L M E S 6 9
74
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:44:28 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
75
War College: The Full Summer 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
While Nakasone does not stipulate the size he prefers for Japan’s nuclear arse-
nal, he clearly believes that the destructive power of low-yield weapons would
generate sufficient deterrent effects vis-à-vis would-be enemies. Keishi Saeki of
Kyoto University articulates a similar logic for an independent Japanese
deterrent:
Possession of retaliatory nuclear arms consists of a means to retaliate against nuclear
attacks by other nations. In other words, we must resign ourselves to accepting the
initial nuclear attack. And, such conditions should alleviate to a certain degree threats
against other Asian nations. Moreover, the option of retaliatory nuclear arms re-
quires preventive preemptory strikes against imminent potential (very highly proba-
ble) nuclear attacks from other nations. Accordingly, aside from possession of
nuclear arms, probably necessary will be the procurement of precision guided weap-
ons and a missile defense system, and intelligence-gathering activities.50
Saeki provides a useful framework for matching means to his proposed retal-
iatory option. Other Japanese analysts have also offered surprisingly concrete
proposals for a credible, defensively oriented deterrent. A former member of the
Ground Self-Defense Force, Nisohachi Hyodo, argued as early as 1996 for an un-
dersea deterrent, persuasively and methodically discounting the utility of land-
and air-launched delivery systems, as well as of systems deployed in the surface
fleet.51 Fixed silos would be most vulnerable to preemptive strikes, he argues,
while Japan is too small to make maximum use of rail- or road-mobile launch-
ers. Aircraft could be destroyed on the airfields in a first strike, while surface
combatants could be tracked and sunk with little warning by nuclear attack sub-
marines. As such, Japan’s only option is to deploy conventionally powered sub-
marines armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs. For
Hyodo, two submarines, each carrying only one missile and “roaming in
separate sea zones,” would be adequate to deter one target country.
In contrast, a former deputy minister under the Koizumi administration,
Kenzo Yoneda, is less quick to dismiss the possibility of fitting surface warships
with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Yoneda postulates that land-attack cruise
missiles with a range of a thousand kilometers—akin to the American Toma-
hawk but with shorter range—deployed on board the Maritime Self-Defense
Force’s Aegis destroyers would constitute an important component of Japan’s
nuclear posture.52 While Yoneda furnishes no specific estimates of how many
missiles it would take to constitute a credible seaborne deterrent, his emphasis
on cruise missiles, which carry far smaller payloads than intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, dovetails with Nakasone’s call for “small-size nuclear weapons.” The
relatively short ranges Yoneda envisions, moreover, imply a modest regional
deterrent force for Japan.
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Kan Ito argues that Japan must possess two or three hundred nuclear-armed
cruise missiles deployed on “small destroyers and submarines” to establish min-
imum deterrence.53 Ito presumably supports using existing platforms like Aegis
destroyers and the latest diesel submarines as launch platforms. He also makes a
compelling case against ballistic missiles, contending that they are far more
destabilizing than cruise missiles because of sharp differences in speed and de-
structive potential. Relatively slow, single-warhead, low-yield cruise missiles
would signal Japan’s determination to blunt opponents’ preemptive strategies
while remaining in an unmistakably retaliatory posture. This approach, Ito con-
cludes, would be more conducive than a ballistic-missile force to a stable Asian
military balance.54 Clearly, then, even hard-liners and proponents of nuclear-
ization embrace a defensive-minded nuclear doctrine.
The aforementioned options are not mutually exclusive. Japan could very
well adopt a mix of delivery systems, or the SDF could phase in more sophisti-
cated weaponry and platforms as they become available. It is therefore worth ex-
ploring the risks, rewards, and technical feasibility of some of the proposals
reviewed above. First, Japan would be hard pressed to choose SLBMs as the
backbone of its deterrent. The Maritime SDF’s existing conventional subma-
rines are too small to carry such missiles. While a fleet ballistic-missile subma-
rine, or SSBN, would represent the ideal platform for a guaranteed second-strike
capability, the technological hurdles would severely challenge even Japan’s
top-notch scientific and engineering community. To name just one such hurdle,
the SDF possesses no naval reactors. Developing and building the propulsion
plant for an SSBN would be enormous undertakings in themselves. The finan-
cial cost of building, maintaining, and deploying multiple SSBNs—the Mari-
time SDF would need two to three boats to keep one on patrol at any given
time—would tax a defense budget already under strain. Tetsuo Sawada of the
Tokyo Institute of Technology estimates that a single SSBN armed with ballistic
missiles would cost Japan a breathtaking five billion dollars, while a credible de-
terrent force involving several submarines would reach an astronomical ten
trillion yen, or in excess of $100 billion.55
We therefore judge an undersea ballistic-missile deterrent improbable for Ja-
pan unless the security outlook is truly dire, justifying an effort of such magnitude
and duration. Cruise missiles, in comparison, are cheap and easy to develop. In-
deed, much of the technology is readily available off the shelf in the marketplace.
Since Japan would aim retaliatory strikes at large cities, its cruise missiles would
not need to be particularly accurate. Major Asian metropolises like Pyongyang,
Beijing, and Shanghai are near the coast, making penetrating enemy airspace rela-
tively easy. The target set would fall well within the range of missiles like those es-
poused by Kenzo Yoneda. In theory, only one bird would need to get through for
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Japan’s minimum deterrent to be credible. Ito’s call for two to three hundred mis-
siles thus may be somewhat excessive, even assuming high attrition rates due to
malfunction or enemy interception.
In all probability, Japanese cruise missiles, which are far smaller than medium-
range ballistic missiles, would be fired from conventional submarines—presumably
from torpedo tubes, given how difficult it would be to retrofit these boats with verti-
cal launchers—to maximize the survivability of the deterrent force. We forecast that
Tokyo would need time to perfect techniques and procedures for launching cruise
missiles from submerged conventional submarines. In the meantime, once the mis-
siles became available in sufficient quantities, they could be deployed in vertical-
launch canisters on board Aegis destroyers as a stopgap measure. Two or three de-
stroyers could cruise simultaneously in disparate locations in the Pacific, enhancing
redundancy and survivability. Cruise missiles could also be fired from fighter air-
craft at long distances. For instance, missiles launched from an F-2 based in Oki-
nawa would be able to reach most of China’s major coastal economic centers. Such
redundancy at sea and in the air might meet Japan’s strategic requirements tempo-
rarily until the undersea option was fully functional.
We acknowledge the drawbacks to deploying cruise missiles aboard conven-
tional submarines. They are slow by comparison to their nuclear-powered
brethren, their range is limited by fuel capacity, and they can remain on patrol
for only a short period. SDF conventional submarines thus would likely find
themselves confined to patrol grounds near Japanese coasts, rendering them
vulnerable to detection. Even so, air-independent propulsion will offset the de-
tection problem once installed in Japanese boats, allowing them to remain un-
derwater for longer stretches. The availability, number, and modest cost of these
proven vessels far outweigh their technical shortfalls.
Keeping two boats on station at all times would likely meet Japan’s deterrent
needs. SDF boats would presumably operate from the existing submarine bases
at Kure and Yokosuka. This would allow easy access to patrol grounds in the Sea
of Japan and along the Asian seaboard south of the Japanese home islands. Kure
in particular makes for an ideal base, offering a central location in the Inland
Sea, ready egress into both the Pacific and the Sea of Japan, and easily defensible
approaches. Coastal metropolises would be within reach of Japanese boats on
station, especially once technical improvements increased SDF cruise missiles’
range to rival that of the TLAM-N. The Maritime SDF could diversify its portfo-
lio, as it were, operating in different zones to threaten different targets and com-
plicate adversaries’ antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problems. Tokyo could surge
additional submarines at any given time, moreover, straining the ASW capabili-
ties of prospective adversaries. Up to eight boats could conceivably be sent to
sea, according to the back-of-the-envelope calculations provided below. In light
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of the Chinese navy’s inattention to ASW, this “limited” nuclear capability
represents a potent one indeed.
Finally, there is the matter of budgeting and force sizing. With over forty de-
stroyers and nearly twenty submarines, Japan doubtless already boasts one of
the largest and most advanced navies in the world. Nevertheless, undersea deter-
rent patrols would likely demand substantial, though not prohibitive, increases
in the size of the submarine fleet. We assume that the Maritime SDF would de-
ploy a separate submarine group dedicated exclusively to nuclear strike, while
maintaining adequate numbers for traditional operations, such as sea-lane se-
curity and sea denial. Such a decision would remove the nuclear-armed boats
from potentially risky frontline duties along the Asian littoral environment, per-
mitting crew members to accumulate hard-earned experience and sharpen the
specialized skills needed for deterrent patrols in the Pacific.
How would Tokyo finance a new arm of its submarine force? In order to
maintain its qualitative edge in undersea warfare, the Maritime SDF has tradi-
tionally decommissioned submarines unusually early, introducing more ad-
vanced boats to replace older ones. To support the nuclear mission, accordingly,
the maritime service could easily extend the service life of its fleet by at least ten
years, allowing for the conversion of existing boats and the introduction of new
submarines without undermining Japan’s overall undersea prowess. The U.S.
Navy’s conversion of four Ohio-class SSBNs to serve as cruise-missile platforms,
or SSGNs, offers a precedent for this sort of effort.
What about numbers? We believe a deterrent force of twelve cruise-missile
submarines would let the SDF keep two boats on patrol at all times. How do we
arrive at this figure? While Japanese mariners understandably divulge few de-
tails about the technical specifications of SDF submarines, we estimate—very
conservatively—that their fuel capacity would permit Japanese diesel boats to
remain on patrol for one month. (As a crude measuring stick, the endurance
for the ubiquitous, German-built Type 209 is advertised at fifty days at the out-
side.)56 If so, approximately six boats would be necessary for the SDF to keep
one on station. Consider:
• One boat would be deployed at any given time, with three others undergo-
ing routine upkeep, crew training, and local operations between deterrent
cruises. This would permit a four-boat rotation, with each vessel making
three patrols annually. This is a leisurely operating tempo by U.S. Navy
standards and thus sustainable indefinitely for the SDF.
• Using the U.S. Navy rule of thumb that it takes three units to keep one in
full readiness for deployment, we further assume that an additional two
boats would be in extended overhaul at any time, subtracted from the
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rotation. This leaves us with our six-to-one ratio between boats in the Mar-
itime SDF inventory and those actually at sea. Again, this may overstate
matters, as the American thumb rule assumes six-month deployments,
with all the wear and tear that extended cruises impose. Japanese units face
fewer demands, and so the SDF could well get by with less.
Multiplying by two—again, with one squadron presumably based at Kure and
another at Yokusuka—yields a total of twelve boats. Should Japan’s strategic po-
sition continue to deteriorate, Japanese strategists may conclude a bigger mar-
gin of deterrence—and thus a bigger undersea fleet—is necessary to national
defense.57 If so, additional six-boat increments could lie in store. But the more
modest fleet sketched here, we believe, would provide more than ample retalia-
tory capacity for “minimal deterrence with Japanese characteristics.”
Such a fleet would be affordable despite the real and nettlesome budgetary
constraints Tokyo confronts. Modest increases in the defense budget as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP) would generate sufficient resources
(in absolute terms) to pay for such a buildup. If the Japanese government came
to see the security environment as menacing enough to warrant a nuclear break-
out, it would likely reprogram funds to support a naval buildup to support nu-
clear deterrence. Tokyo has long fixed its defense expenditures at about 1 percent
of GDP, amounting to over forty billion dollars a year. The Japanese government
would certainly have to shatter this self-imposed, somewhat arbitrary ceiling. If
Tokyo were to increase the defense budget by 20 percent—that is, to 1.2 percent
of GDP—the additional eight billion dollars per annum could furnish the finan-
cial foundation for a major modernization and expansion of the submarine
fleet. The average cost of a single conventional submarine on the world market
(anywhere between $200 and $400 million per boat) suggests that Japan pos-
sesses the financial clout to meet these new force-structure requirements.
UNTHINKABLE BUT VALUABLE ANALYSIS
In closing, it is worth reemphasizing that this study eschews any assessment of
the likelihood of Japan’s going nuclear. Ample work already exists on the pros
and cons of nuclearization. As noted in the introduction to this essay, we concur
in general that it is highly unlikely that Tokyo will pursue an independent nu-
clear arsenal for the foreseeable future. The U.S.-Japanese alliance is arguably in
the best shape ever, while mainstream Japanese policy makers remain confident
in the credibility of American extended deterrence. However, we believe that this
largely valid consensus on the improbability of a nuclear breakout has precluded
constructive discourse on practical American policy alternatives should Tokyo
undertake a radical change of course. While it may be distasteful to contemplate
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such a scenario, we are convinced that there is genuine analytical utility in think-
ing about the unthinkable. Chief among our findings through this mental exer-
cise is that Japan will not “break out” in the literal sense of the term. Rather, it
will proliferate in slow motion, if it makes a decision to go nuclear.
This study by no means constitutes an exhaustive exploration of Japan’s nu-
clear options and their possible consequences. Four main areas of research
would be worth pursuing further. First, a comparative analysis of historical
models—particularly the British and French experiences during the Cold
War—might offer fruitful insights and potential models for Japan to emulate.
Findings regarding the extent to which these smaller nuclear arsenals comple-
mented or fit within the broader U.S. nuclear strategy would be particularly
useful for Japanese policy makers.
A second and closely related point is that this study has focused exclusively on
a potential Japanese nuclearization process. It would be useful to make an effort
to foresee the plausible range of impacts such a momentous decision could have
on the U.S.-Japanese alliance on the “day after” a breakout. We incline to doubt
that the security partnership would collapse overnight, especially if Tokyo initi-
ated open, constructive consultations ahead of time. Even so, the transpacific al-
liance would never be the same. Would Washington withdraw its nuclear
umbrella in a fit of pique? Or would Tokyo and Washington transcend the initial
discord, integrating their nuclear strategies and developing a transpacific deter-
rent, much as the U.S.-British alliance formulated a transatlantic deterrent to
Soviet aggression?
Third, a Japanese nuclear breakout would certainly release shock waves
across Asian capitals. How would Japan’s retaliatory posture and forces inter-
act with the Chinese nuclear doctrine and North Korea’s nuclear program?
Would Tokyo’s entry into the nuclear club spur both horizontal and vertical
proliferation?
Fourth, but certainly not least, there are technical questions to resolve. As
noted before, the timing of any Japanese effort to breach the nuclear threshold
would depend on large part on the availability of weapons-usable fissile mate-
rial. How easily could Japanese nuclear engineers put the nation’s stockpile of
reactor-grade plutonium to use for manufacturing nuclear warheads? It seems
reasonable to suppose that Tokyo could convert this material for use in nuclear
payloads over time; the main question is when.
These are questions eminently worth pondering. We make no pretense of of-
fering the last word on the subject of Japanese nuclear options. We hope it is a
useful first word in a sorely needed discussion of naval strategy and deterrence
in Asia.
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Commander Todd A. Hofstedt, U.S. Navy
The recent expansion of Chinese activity in Africa has raised several concerns,ranging from control over energy resources to exploitive economic practices
and support of rogue or corrupt regimes, perpetuating instability and under-
mining international pressure for reform. These issues, however, represent only
a fraction of China’s broadly based engagement in Africa. In fact, the most egre-
gious examples of China’s behavior commonly cited are unsustainable and even
counterproductive to its long-term interests in Africa. China’s involvement is
thus evolving, as government and ever more influential business interests in that
nation recognize the advantages of political and economic stability in Africa.
These interests support U.S. security objectives in Africa, encouraging more ef-
fective governance and mitigating grievances against the status quo. Conse-
quently, in the furtherance of its mission “to promote a stable and secure African
environment,” the newly established U.S. Africa Com-
mand (AFRICOM) would do well to support the pro-
ductive, responsible activities of Chinese actors in
Africa.1
In its inaugural white paper on Africa, China’s Afri-
can Policy, issued in January 2006, China identified its
“general principles and objectives” as “Sincerity,
friendship and equality”; “Mutual benefit, reciprocity
and common prosperity”; “Mutual support and close
coordination”; “Learning from each other and seek-
ing common development”; and “The one-China
principle . . . [as] the political foundation for the
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establishment and development of China’s relations with African countries.”2
The somewhat nebulous nature of these “objectives” (with the exception of the
One-China principle) and the fact that they were intended for an international
audience necessitate the examination of China’s actual activities with respect to
Africa in order to assess the practical meaning of these objectives and the degree
to which they have been achieved.
CHINA’S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
Chinese involvement in Africa is broad both geographically and in nature. Of the
fifty-three countries in Africa, China maintains official diplomatic relations with
all but Burkina Faso, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gambia, and Swaziland, which
maintain official relations with Taiwan.3 Those four states excepted, China has an
embassy and ambassador in each of the African nations but Somalia (due to secu-
rity issues), and all except Comoros maintain embassies in Beijing.4 Moreover, of-
ficial contacts include frequent high-level visits by President Hu Jintao, Premier
Wen Jiabao, and numerous ministers, particularly the foreign minister, whose first
foreign visit each year since 1991 has been to Africa.5 In a November 2006 summit
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China hosted political
leaders from forty-eight African states, including forty-one heads of state or gov-
ernment.6 (Founded in 2000, the FOCAC meets annually, with summit-level talks
every three years.)7 China is also actively engaged with the African Union (AU),
pledging $100–$150 million for the construction of a permanent headquarters
and attending AU summits in 2006 and 2007.8 The chairperson of the Commis-
sion of the African Union, Jean Ping, commended China in January 2009 for its
contributions to Africa and identified China as Africa’s key strategic partner.9 In
February 2009, China dramatically broadened its diplomatic support for Africa at
a plenary session of the UN General Assembly, during which the Chinese ambas-
sador declared: “In the reform of the Security Council, priority should be given to
the greater representation of developing countries, in particular African ones.”10
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of Chinese activity in Africa is eco-
nomic. China has provided considerable development aid, in the form of
low-interest loans, including thirteen billion dollars to Angola, nine billion to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and $2.5 billion to Ethiopia.11 This is on
top of 10.5 billion yuan ($1.3 billion) in debt relief provided to twenty-seven Af-
rican countries between 2000 and 2003 and an additional ten billion yuan in
debt cancellation for thirty-three African countries announced in 2006.12 China
also contributes to the African Development Bank, hosting the bank’s annual
meeting in May 2007, in Shanghai.13 Additionally, China is a member of the
West African Development Bank, has signed agreements with the East African
Development Bank and with the Eastern and Southern African Trade and
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Development Bank, and is engaging the Economic Community of West African
States, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the South Af-
rican Development Community.14
China-Africa trade in recent years has grown dramatically, from forty billion
dollars in 2005 and $55.5 billion in 2006 to seventy billion in 2007 (when China,
overtaking Britain and France, became Africa’s second-largest trading partner)
and an anticipated excess of $100 billion in 2010, at which point it would surpass
the United States to become Africa’s single largest trading partner.15 In fact, this
target was achieved two years early, with trade in 2008 reaching $106.8 billion,
despite trade actually declining in December as the global financial crisis inten-
sified.16 This is particularly noteworthy given that the rate of Africa’s export
growth to China (exceeding an average of 40 percent annually) and import
growth from China (exceeding an average of 35 percent annually) are both con-
siderably higher than the rate of growth in either world trade (14 percent) or
commodity prices (18 percent).17 China’s balance of trade with Africa has
shifted from a surplus of $940 million in 2007 to a deficit of $5.16 billion in
2008.18 China has expanded the list of duty-free imports from Africa from 190 to
440 items and is discussing a free-trade agreement with the Southern Africa
Customs Union.19 Trade relations are further fostered by “commercial counselor
offices in 40 African countries and seven consulates-general in five of them.”20
Despite the common perception of Chinese exploitation of African natural re-
sources, Chinese trade is actually no more exploitive than that with the West:
“The similar composition of goods traded between Africa and its main trading
partners suggests that the recent surge in Africa-China trade largely reflects the
comparative advantages of each partner, given their stage of economic develop-
ment, rather than any unilateral interest by China in exploiting natural
resources.”21
While still relatively small, Chinese direct investment in Africa is growing and
diversifying. Though published values vary considerably, as late as 2007 China
had invested, by one measure, thirteen billion dollars in Africa, primarily in ex-
tractive industries, about six billion of that in the oil sector of Sudan alone.22 In
October of that year, however, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
purchased a $5.6 billion stake (representing 20 percent) in the Standard Bank
Group of South Africa, Africa’s largest bank.23 By 2005 China had established
over eight hundred enterprises in Africa, and in 2006 it announced plans for a
five-billion-dollar China-Africa Development Fund to promote African invest-
ment by Chinese firms.24 Additionally, “special economic zones” have been cre-
ated to provide Chinese firms preferential “incentives, tax breaks, and reliable
power services to mitigate investment risk” and to “link disparate and frag-
mented African producers and markets in China.”25
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Though frequently criticized in the West, Chinese economic aid is very popu-
lar in Africa, since its unconditionality (the sole prerequisite being acceptance of
the One-China principle) respects sovereignty, in regional eyes, and avoids the
protracted negotiation process that, in contrast, can significantly delay the re-
ceipt of aid from the West.26 Africa thus sees China as a valuable alternative to
the West, whose aid it also perceives as frequently paternalistic and as tending to
impose Western values.27 Moreover, Nigerian officials, for example, despite “cer-
tain reservations about Chinese intentions,” have noted that “collaboration with
the West . . . had left Africa impoverished despite half a century of aid.”28 China
also funds high-profile projects that provide tangible benefits, including proj-
ects eschewed by Western donors for their difficulty.29
In particular, Chinese, like African, leaders generally favor infrastructure
projects, while Western donors prefer to avoid them.30 Chinese firms complete
them less expensively than their Western counterparts and have a reputation
for rapid completion and acceptable (if not Western-level) quality.31 Chinese
firms have also proved more tolerant of financial and security risk, going into
areas of conflict and instability generally avoided by Western companies,
thereby facilitating a greater range of operations.32 Technology transfer from
these projects is generally more readily exploitable for African users as well,
since their technological gap with respect to China is much smaller than that
with the West.33 Finally, a number of Chinese companies are electing to remain
in Africa after the initial projects that brought them there have been com-
pleted, indicating their perception of ongoing economic opportunity and
making them readily available for follow-on projects.34
The current global economic crisis and its concomitant decline in commod-
ity prices have raised questions about the future direction of Chinese economic
involvement in Africa. Some observers believe an economic retrenchment—if
not retreat—is under way, citing the fact that in the last two months of 2008,
over sixty Chinese mining firms departed the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and more than a hundred left Zambia.35 They also point to the in-
activity associated with the 2007 offer of several billion dollars in loans to the
DRC, the repayment of which was to be partially based on copper-mining con-
cessions.36 Resource-based loans to Guinea and Gabon are experiencing similar
delays.37
A broader view, however, discredits this conclusion. First of all, the possible
waning of Chinese interest is not the only factor impeding the DRC loan pack-
age; Western donors have threatened to withhold relief from the DRC’s
eleven-billion-dollar foreign debt if the DRC does not renegotiate the terms of
the Chinese financing.38 In the case of Guinea, the December 2008 coup and its
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associated political instability undoubtedly created concerns about both the
physical security of Chinese investment and, more fundamentally, whether
agreements with the current sitting government will have lasting economic and
diplomatic value.39 Second, though many small private Chinese mining firms
are leaving Africa, large state-owned mining firms are expanding in Africa to
take advantage of the low commodity prices.40 “Mining executives say that with
no need to answer to shareholders, many state-backed companies can take a
long-term view on the country’s demand for metals.”41 Examples include
Jinchuan, which has acquired a nickel mine in Zambia; the China Non-Ferrous
Metals Corporation, which is opening a copper-smelting plant in Zambia; and
China Union, which has signed a contract to mine iron in Liberia.42 Third, Presi-
dent Hu personally visited Africa as recently as February 2009, meeting with
leaders in Mali, Tanzania, Senegal, and Mauritius.43 This trip followed January
visits by China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, to Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi, and
South Africa, and the commerce minister, Chen Deming, to Kenya, Angola, and
Zambia.44 Finally, China has affirmed that despite the global economic crisis, it
will fully satisfy all commitments it made at the 2006 FOCAC.45 Additionally, in
just the first two months of 2009, China announced agreements with thirteen
African countries totaling over $15.9 billion in new loans and grants.46
Beyond these burgeoning financial relationships, China is expanding its
training and educational assistance to Africa, of which there is a long history;
such aid almost doubled in the 1990s.47 China maintains educational relation-
ships with fifty African countries and convened a Sino-African Education Min-
ister Forum in 2005.48 More African students now attend school in China than
ever before (5,900 in 2007), most on Chinese-government-provided scholar-
ships.49 China has pledged to “double the number of such scholarships by 2011,”
“build 100 rural schools in Africa by 2009,” and “establish 10 agricultural tech-
nology centers.”50 Between 2000 and 2003 China trained six thousand African
professionals in such fields as agriculture, medicine, engineering, and educa-
tion, and from 2004 through 2006 China claims to have trained 14,600 more.51
In addition to providing training, the Chinese Ministry of Health is develop-
ing “a long-term Chinese health strategy for Africa,” one that includes “collabo-
ration with the international community.”52 Approximately a thousand Chinese
medical professionals (over half of them senior physicians or surgeons) are cur-
rently working in thirty-eight African countries.53 At FOCAC in 2006 China
pledged, by 2009, to “build 30 hospitals . . . [and] provide about $40 million in
grants for anti-malarial drugs, prevention, and construction of model treatment
centers.”54 Having already constructed a number of hospitals in Africa, China is
planning to build ten more, as well as thirty malaria clinics, in the next three
years.55
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China’s political presence in Africa is also growing but is in many ways less
pervasive and less sophisticated than its economic presence. The International
Department of the Communist Party of China maintains relationships “al-
most exclusively with ruling parties in one-party dominated states,” eschewing
with few exceptions (most notably South Africa’s Democratic Alliance) inter-
action with “opposition parties for fear it will disturb its relationship with the
government in power.”56 China has established four Confucius Institutes in Af-
rica (with eight more to be completed soon), to teach the Chinese language,
history, and culture, and to “promote an understanding of its view of the
world.”57 Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, maintains offices across Af-
rica, not only to report news but to gather information for the government.58
Xinhua also trains African journalists, both in Africa and in China; a recent
two-week seminar in China drew more than forty attendees from thirty Afri-
can states.59 A specialized China African News Service was launched by Xinhua
in December 2007.60 Interestingly, the Chinese press center distributed at the
November 2006 FOCAC the book China and Africa 1956–2006, which presents
democracy “as a scourge because it ‘exacerbates’ tensions inside African coun-
tries”; “Fortunately,” the work observes, “the wave of democratization has
started weakening.”61
By comparison to both the economic and political, China’s military ties in Af-
rica are rather underdeveloped and static. Though China maintains security re-
lationships, of some sort, with all forty-nine African countries with which it
maintains diplomatic relations, it stations only between nine and fourteen mili-
tary attachés in Africa and has never conducted a joint military exercise with an
African state.62 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has, however, trained mili-
tary personnel from at least eighteen African countries and established ex-
change agreements with twenty-five.63 Almost 1,500 Chinese military personnel
(primarily observers, engineers, police, and medical and transportation person-
nel) support seven of the eight United Nations peacekeeping operations in Af-
rica, exceeding those of any other permanent member of the UN Security
Council.64 Some have criticized China’s failure to provide substantial combat
forces for actual peacekeeping, but deployment of support personnel may reflect
a conscious policy to demonstrate support for Africa without appearing mili-
tarily threatening.65 Furthermore, the emphasis on engineering and medical as-
sistance is consistent with aspects of China’s economic involvement. China also
provides financial support to the African Union to support peacekeeping in
Darfur and Somalia.66
China ranked third in arms exports to Africa from 2003 to 2006, behind Ger-
many and Russia, providing approximately 15.4 percent ($500 million) of total
sales to the continent.67 Though relatively small in magnitude, the destinations
8 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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of arms shipments have drawn international criticism. China has become not
only Zimbabwe’s leading arms supplier but its second-largest trading partner.68
With Zimbabwe under sanctions by both the United States and European Union
(EU), China sold it fighter aircraft, air-defense systems, military vehicles, radio
jamming equipment, and electronic surveillance gear.69 In the case of Sudan,
Chinese assistance in establishing three weapons factories has undermined the
effectiveness of a UN arms embargo.70 China also provided arms to both sides in
conflicts between (and within) Ethiopia and Eritrea.71
The expansiveness of this activity appears consistent with the objectives
stated in China’s Africa Policy, though the broad wording of that document
could be interpreted as encompassing virtually anything. Although there are few
consistent themes from which to infer more precise intentions, the diversity of
the engagement is in itself suggestive and, taken together with what few themes
there are, indicates at least some of the specific objectives being promoted in
Africa.
CHINESE OBJECTIVES
From these diverse activities, then, a handful of fairly concrete objectives in Af-
rica can be deduced: ensuring access to natural resources, expanding export
markets, enhancing China’s prestige as a rising global power, and protecting its
international freedom of action.72 These theater-level strategic objectives sup-
port China’s national strategic objectives, which in turn are driven by a domestic
political need for economic growth and social stability:
Economic development rather than military supremacy is the primary objective for
China’s international engagement for a host of reasons—not the least of which are to
raise the living standards of its enormous population, to dampen social disaffection
about economic and other inequities, and to sustain regime legitimacy after the de-
mise of communist ideology as an acceptable organizing principle.73
Rapidly expanding Chinese interest in African natural resources, particularly
oil, has driven much of the recent international concern regarding China’s activ-
ities in Africa. China currently imports one-third of its oil from Africa; Angola
now surpasses even Saudi Arabia as China’s leading supplier.74 However, despite
this considerable growth, China still only imports 9 percent of Africa’s total oil
production, compared to 33 percent exported to Europe and 32 percent to the
United States.75 Also, China’s per capita oil consumption is only 7.4 percent of
that of the United States, though economic growth in China will certainly drive
significantly higher consumption over time.76 Most of the worry about Chinese
acquisition of sources of supply appears to ignore the fact that China’s tremen-
dous economic growth, coupled with its massive foreign currency reserves, will
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put it in an increasingly better position than virtually any other country to buy
oil on the world market, whatever the ownership of the source. Nevertheless,
“Beijing would like to secure this supply through ownership and investments,
partly to avoid the price and supply uncertainty associated with buying such
commodities on spot markets. These resources are deemed critical for Beijing to
maintain the country’s economic growth.”77 Moreover, unless China exhibits
some elasticity of demand—that is, unless assurance of access alters consump-
tion—Chinese use of oil from national investments overseas would reduce de-
mand on global markets by an equivalent amount, yielding no net change. To
the extent that China opens new sources of oil (such as in Sudan), global sup-
plies actually increase. Most telling, perhaps, is the observation that “although
approximately half of China’s equity oil production worldwide comes from Af-
rica . . . , the majority of that equity production is not shipped to China but sold
on the world market.”78
The comprehensive Chinese approach to economic development in Africa,
focusing on infrastructure and increased diversification and encompassing
training, education, and medical care, strongly suggests a balanced and
long-term approach to promoting African economic growth. This is consistent
with recognition that considerable growth in African economies over an ex-
tended period of time will be required if Africa is to overcome its tremendous
poverty and generate the economic resources necessary for a substantial
long-term Chinese export market. Whether this ongoing expansion into new
markets is driven by a saturation of Chinese domestic markets or merely by the
desire to supplement them is a subject of debate, but in either case the ability of
expanded exports to foster economic growth while generating foreign currency
reserves remains unquestioned.79 In this manner, not only is economic growth
supported (both current and long-term), but future access to the natural re-
sources required for sustained performance is facilitated as well.
Manifestations of China’s aspirations for global prestige take many forms,
but perhaps the most obvious is the consistent demand that the People’s Repub-
lic of China be accepted as the one and only China, of which Taiwan is only a
subordinate province. This sole condition is imposed on virtually all diplomatic
and economic relations between China and the countries of Africa, and it has
proved remarkably effective: currently only four African countries recognize
Taiwan, down from over twenty in the early 1990s.80 Economically, China’s em-
phasis on high-visibility projects not only ingratiates itself with African leaders
but also culminates in lasting public testaments to Chinese largess and engineer-
ing prowess.81 “If the growth in its power is to proceed unhampered over time,
China will have to make its presence felt beyond its immediate environs.”82
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If it is true that “to the extent that China may exploit its soft power for strate-
gic ends, it is to forestall possible ‘containment’ rather than to pursue expan-
sion,” ensuring freedom of action can be seen as fundamentally linked to China’s
myriad activities in Africa.83 Strategically, legal ownership over sources of widely
traded global commodities is largely irrelevant to a country able to outbid virtu-
ally any competitor in the global marketplace—unless a hostile international
community colluded to impose mechanisms restricting sales to China. Simi-
larly, aggressive expansion and development of export markets in Africa tend to
forestall a catastrophic loss of trade should the West for any reason collectively
elect to restrict Chinese trade.
In pursuit of sustainable economic development, China also is seen to have placed a
priority in keeping stable and relatively tension-free relations with its primary export
market, the United States, and with other countries and regions. . . . [E]ven the ap-
pearance of a more overt pursuit of its regional and global interests could prompt the
United States and other countries to strengthen their alliances or form other group-
ings to counterbalance and deter China’s international outreach. Such a development
in turn could fetter China’s economic growth.84
In addition to protecting crucial elements of sustained economic growth,
freedom of action is also intrinsic to the other perceived prerequisite to the con-
tinued rule of the Communist Party of China: its ability to impose social order
domestically. This implies an international community in which national sover-
eignty is accepted as preempting international standards of human rights. Ac-
cording to China’s African Policy, China would, for African states accepting the
One-China principle, “coordinate positions on major international and re-
gional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and human rights.”85 Such a
policy has manifested itself through Chinese activity in the UN Security Council
in support of Sudan and Zimbabwe.86 Since African states constitute over
one-fourth of the UN General Assembly, courting their favor can yield substan-
tial international clout, and it has already proved advantageous to China: “Afri-
can states have been pivotal in preventing Taiwan from joining the World Health
Organization and in tabling a condemnation of Chinese human rights practices
at the U.N.’s Commission on Human Rights.”87
The current global economic crisis raises questions about the sustainability
of Chinese engagement in Africa. In the event of prolonged global economic
stagnation, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will likely experience increas-
ing pressure to redirect resources from African development to domestic devel-
opment so as to assuage discontent stemming from rising unemployment and
stalled improvement in living standards. However, while segments of the
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Chinese population may resent the continued provision of foreign aid during a
period of domestic need, the CCP will likely resist any major reductions, as it ap-
pears to recognize that its diplomatic clout will contribute to Chinese influence
in shaping the eventual postcrisis global economic framework. In a February
2009 speech delivered in Tanzania, President Hu announced his desire to
“deepen cooperation with African countries in such multilateral organizations
as the UN and the World Trade Organization to address global challenges like
climate change, food security, poverty alleviation and development. We also
hope to participate jointly with them in developing international economic, fi-
nancial and trade rules and pushing forward the international economic order
in a fair and just manner.”88 Realizing this ambition would support, at least to
some extent, all four of China’s objectives in Africa.
Viewing Chinese activities in Africa in terms of these four principal objectives
provides a useful framework within which to devise an appropriate theater-level
response. However, inconsistencies between the long-term consequences of some
actions and the objectives being sought become immediately apparent and re-
quire consideration.
COMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
Though seemingly in the ascendant, China’s pursuit of its objectives in Africa
has become increasingly problematic, in that many of its activities are under-
mining achievement of its own long-term objectives. Several Chinese economic
practices, for example, are significantly degrading China’s popularity and
threatening its long-term economic access. Heavy reliance on imported Chinese
labor despite generally high unemployment among indigenous populations has
drawn widespread criticism. Also, Chinese indifference to workers’ rights does
little to encourage recruiting or retention and instead has led to several highly
publicized incidents.89 In September 2002, a fire at a Chinese-owned factory in
Nigeria killed at least thirty-seven Nigerians “after a factory foreman reportedly
locked the building doors”; in early 2008, striking Chinese workers clashed with
police in Equatorial Guinea, resulting in two deaths and several injuries.90 An
explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine in Zambia in April 2005 killed over
fifty people and led to demonstrations amid accusations that safety regulations
had been ignored.91 Anti-Chinese sentiment in that country reached such a level
that opposition to the Chinese presence became the primary issue in the opposi-
tion campaign for the presidency in September 2006; five months later, Presi-
dent Hu “was forced to abandon plans to visit the ‘Copper Belt’ due to fears that
the workers would revolt again.”92
Another major economic issue raising widespread local ire is the undercut-
ting of the market for local manufactured goods by the importation of
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inexpensive products from China, particularly textiles.93 In 2004, shopkeepers in
Senegal protested against Chinese businesses, setting several on fire and
prompting the president to suspend virtually all further issuance of visas to Chi-
nese citizens.94 The closure of uncompetitive local textile mills in several African
countries, including Nigeria and South Africa, has incited protests and, in 2007,
prompted the South African president to warn that Africa was in danger of be-
coming a Chinese colony.95 Other economic complaints include the cancellation
of, or failure to complete, several major projects and concerns that construction
quality is not up to Western standards and may prove inadequate over time.96
Also, in 2006, Gabon suspended a Chinese firm’s oil drilling operations “due to
its environmentally unsafe practices.”97
Chinese military support to rogue regimes has also created friction between
China and several African countries. A shipment of arms and ammunition in-
tended for Zimbabwe in April 2008, in the midst of a disputed presidential elec-
tion in that country, met with “the refusal of dockworkers in South Africa to
offload the arms for overland shipment to Zimbabwe. The president of Zambia
publicly criticized the shipment while the governments of Mozambique,
Namibia, and Angola refused to allow the arms to be offloaded for transship-
ment to Harare.”98
With Chinese attention focused on African heads of government and the po-
litical and business elites that support them, China makes correspondingly “lit-
tle effort to cultivate Africans affiliated with civil society, labor unions,
non-governmental organizations, opposition political parties, etc.”99 By largely
isolating itself from local public opinion, China appears to exhibit a disregard
for its significance until damage has already occurred. Ironically, as noted
above, China is interested enough in public opinion to establish Confucius In-
stitutes throughout Africa to promote its worldview but not enough to make
an effort to understand public opinion before attempting to change it. Overall,
“China seems to have difficulty maneuvering in countries more democratic
than itself.”100 A prime example of this clumsiness is an assertion in the People’s
Daily of 30 December 2007 that Kenya was unsuitable for democracy and that
its imposition by colonial powers was to blame for the postelection violence in
that country—accusations immediately denounced by Kenyan media and
civic organizations.101 All of these diverse affronts to public opinion seriously
jeopardize the prestige and influence sought by China in Africa.
Perhaps the greatest contradiction between current activities and long-term
objectives lies in China’s exploitation of conflict and rogue regimes. Though
some observers claim, for example, that “China wants to keep political risks high
enough to ensure that Chevron, Total, and Shell—companies that once had
operations in Sudan—do not jump back in,” such instability precludes
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development of a robust market for its own exports and ultimately threatens
Chinese investment and access to resources.102 Chinese oil facilities in both Ethi-
opia and Sudan have been attacked by rebel forces; the Justice and Equality
Movement in Sudan is specifically attempting to expel the Chinese for their sup-
port of the Sudanese government.103 Furthermore, activity perceived as perpetu-
ating or exacerbating instability diminishes China’s prestige both in Africa and
globally.
Also complicating a sustained prioritization of short-term political objec-
tives is the ever-broadening range of Chinese actors and interests involved in Af-
rica.104 Moreover, resolution of conflicts between these diverse groups,
particularly between government policy objectives and business profit incen-
tives, is hindered by bureaucratic barriers.105 In addition, direct government in-
fluence is waning, as “trade, investment, and other commercial activities
combined have outpaced official development assistance (ODA) and become
dominant in financial terms.”106 Despite an increase in annual ODA to Africa
from $310 million in 1989–92 to $1–$1.5 billion in 2004–2005, the ratio of ODA
to trade dropped from 20 percent to 3–4 percent over the same period.107 This
growth in trade and investment will create an increasingly powerful influence
favoring long-term political and economic stability over short-term political
opportunism.
Finally, successful economic growth and development, such as that fostered
by Chinese activities, effectively makes such African countries less beholden to
China. “Ironically, because of early help from the Chinese, Luanda may now
have the means to avoid getting trapped in a relationship with a partner as vora-
cious and demanding as China.”108 Moreover, African leaders are beginning to
exploit China, offering contracts to China not with any intention of fulfilling
them but rather to induce desired Western partners into offering more generous
terms.109 Niger, for example, successfully used such a strategy in negotiating ura-
nium rights with a French company.110
Exploitive economic practices that generate political opposition and diplo-
matic approaches that favor one country over the combined opposition of the
others in the region are clearly contrary to both the broad, stated objectives and
the more specific, deducible objectives of China in Africa. In fact, they jeopar-
dize China’s political influence and economic access. At the same time, barring
an event that generates a strong nationalistic response in China, the growing
economic influence of both Chinese businesses and recipient countries will in-
creasingly marginalize China’s ability to act for purely political purposes. This
fortuitous confluence of diverse factors creates a tremendous opportunity for
AFRICOM to leverage Chinese initiatives in the furtherance of its own
objectives.
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A RECOMMENDED AFRICOM RESPONSE
Most of the literature examining China’s involvement in Africa recommends co-
ordinating aid, training, and other forms of assistance between China and West-
ern donors so as to maximize its effectiveness in Africa. However, such
recommendations are merely theoretical, in that they fail to address complica-
tions associated with practical implementation; most of all, they do not consider
Chinese interests. Not only does the United States not control China, but it has
very little direct influence over China, since deference to U.S. interests would
undermine China’s highly prized autonomy and prestige. Potentially, direct
pressure applied to China could even be counterproductive, as China may feel
obligated to take an opposing stance so as to avoid even the appearance of acqui-
escence to U.S. demands.
Therefore, China must be indirectly influenced by shaping the environment
in such a way that its actions taken to advance its objectives simultaneously sup-
port American interests. Fortunately, a stable, secure Africa is in the long-term
best interest of not only the United States and Africa but China as well. Recent
political missteps aside, China’s attainment of its objectives in Africa ultimately
depends on a stable, secure environment for trade and the reliable flow of criti-
cal resources.
Consequently, Africa Command would do best not to oppose or undermine
Chinese activities in Africa. Pressuring countries to choose between the United
States and China would be a losing proposition: first, the United States would
not always win (and where the United States did not win, its influence would de-
cline precipitously, while that of China would rise proportionately); second,
where the United States did win, China would be encouraged to subvert the sys-
tem (if not the local political system, at least the existing international order);
and third, since many African states favor ties with both China and the United
States, such an action would create resentment and send the message that the
United States was not really interested in supporting Africa, only in countering
China, likely resulting in a sweeping reduction in U.S. influence across the conti-
nent.111 At the same time, any attempts to impede Chinese activities or access
would be seen by Beijing as highly threatening and would likely provoke it to
adopt a stance subversive of the established international order if not outright
hostile to the West. Conversely, because Chinese economic growth shows little,
or even negative, correlation with that of the United States (or of the West as a
whole), significant trade with both the United States and China could moderate
economic cycles in Africa, thereby improving economic stability and thus con-
tributing to political stability.112
Accordingly, even in cases of destructive or disruptive Chinese behavior,
AFRICOM would appear well advised to avoid confronting Chinese actors
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directly (particularly unilaterally) but rather to support the desired local re-
sponses of affected states and regional organizations. In other words, the most
fruitful approach for Africa Command would seem to be not attempting to in-
hibit China from taking actions that degrade China’s own influence and inter-
ests but in allowing them, while supporting the regional response to those
actions—without usurping local leadership or imposing narrow U.S. interests.
In the context of Africa, however, China has shown increasing willingness to
work with the international community. China has contributed to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund–sponsored African Capacity Building Foundation, and
in November 2004, it worked with the UN Development Program to establish
the China-Africa Business Council.113 Though China likely would not want to
work directly with the United States, or probably even the EU, because it would
not want to be (or be seen as) a junior partner, responsible Chinese initiatives
should be publicly praised and supported wherever possible. The greater China’s
incorporation into the international community, the less it will need to main-
tain ties with rogue regimes, the more it will see the value of complying with ac-
cepted norms of international behavior, the more it will benefit from a stable
international environment, and therefore the more likely that China will oppose
destabilizing activities, in its own interest. China would simply have no reason to
ignore or subvert an international system of which it was a major beneficiary
and on the verge of becoming a significant leader. With China embracing stabil-
ity, rogue African regimes will have few alternative sources of support and there-
fore experience greater pressure to reform. Recent moderation of Chinese
stances toward Sudan (including persuading the government to accept an ex-
panded UN presence and pressuring the government to alter its behavior and
negotiate a solution to the conflict in Darfur) and Zimbabwe (including prohib-
iting Robert Mugabe’s attendance at the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony and
pressuring him to negotiate with the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change) may indicate growing Chinese recognition of its evolving role in the in-
ternational community.114
The recent, well publicized deployment of Chinese warships to the Gulf of
Aden to counter the piracy threat, however, only superficially demonstrates par-
ticipation in multilateral approaches to Africa. Fundamentally, these operations
only tangentially address Africa’s problems; they primarily serve to help secure
Chinese commerce (primarily imports), though the Chinese warships have es-
corted, and responded to distress calls from, several foreign vessels.115 These op-
erations may also be reflective of both an emerging expeditionary capability and
growing fear of a burgeoning Indian sea-denial capability in the Indian
Ocean.116 Finally, while this deployment does indicate a willingness on the part
of China to take on new roles in the region, it also appears to indicate a
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preference for independent action vice incorporation into existing Western-
generated constructs, such as Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, with which the
Chinese exchange e-mail but have expressed no interest in joining.117 This is
consistent with both the value the Chinese place on autonomy and their desire
to eschew any position that could cause them to appear subordinate to the West.
Moreover, such a deployment enables China to demonstrate great-power status
and prestige through its willingness and ability to act unilaterally and operate
independently. Thus, China is unlikely to be particularly receptive to U.S. over-
tures for joint action.
There is, however, a potential exception: were the United States publicly to re-
quest that China take the lead on a particular issue of interest to Africa, China
would be under substantial pressure to do so. Such an approach could be politi-
cally palatable to China, since the United States would be publicly treating China
as a great-power peer vice a subordinate or a second-class power. More impor-
tant, Chinese refusal of such a request could be seen as an abdication of global
and regional leadership, as well as a lack of concern for Africa’s problems, result-
ing in a significant degradation in influence regionally and globally. Obviously,
this approach would have to be applied sparingly, so as to retain its impact and
prevent the appearance of American abdication of leadership.
Local threats to Chinese influence in Africa appear to have sparked in China
emerging recognition of the value of moderating its behavior toward the conti-
nent. In his February 2009 speech in Tanzania, President Hu declared, “The Chi-
nese government encourages and supports the competitive Chinese businesses
to invest in Africa, create more jobs for the local people, increase technology
transfer to the continent and urge[s] them to shoulder greater social responsi-
bilities and live in harmony with local communities.”118 Diplomatically, growing
realization of the threat to its economic interests, combined with international
pressure, particularly from the AU and Chad, convinced China essentially to
play the “good cop” to the rest of the world’s “bad cop” toward Sudan.119 This ap-
proach earned China praise from Andrew S. Natsios, former U.S. special envoy
to Sudan, and Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and
proved broadly advantageous to China: “It increased its moral influence, reas-
sured its partners in Africa and the West, safeguarded its oil empire in Sudan and
uphold [sic] its prerequisite of sovereignty and state consent.”120 Similarly, it was
African pressure (especially from Ethiopia) that prompted China to propose a
peacekeeping mission in Somalia to the UN Security Council in 2006.121 China,
declared President Hu in his Tanzanian speech, will “play a constructive role of
settling conflicts and hot issues and maintaining peace and security in Africa.”122
Of course, there is no guarantee China will act in its own long-term best in-
terest. However, should China refuse to remain productively engaged in Africa,
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it will likely forfeit prior investment; jeopardize its own export market; betray its
indifference to the states and people of Africa, costing itself international sup-
port; and effectively hand regional leadership to the West. The resulting sacrifice
of economic strength and global prestige would be a considerable loss for China,
and in that regard it may well serve as an incentive for China to continue along
its current path of increasingly productive involvement.
Supporting responsible Chinese initiatives in Africa, however, does not mean
abdicating theater leadership to China. Africa Command can actively promote
American influence by demonstrating the benefits of American goodwill at the
continental, regional, national, and local levels. Instead of previous approaches
that alienated Africa by narrowly emphasizing counterterrorism and democracy
building at the expense of local needs, recognition of the common long-term
objectives of stability and security would further the AFRICOM mission while
bolstering the American reputation in Africa by focusing on Africa’s own priori-
ties.123 For example, the African Union’s need for training, equipment, and fi-
nancing is substantial, between its “massively under-resourced” Peace and
Security Council and its request for international support to “stand up” an Af-
rican Stand-by Force (“five regional brigades with rapid deployment capabil-
ity”).124 Africa Command can provide or arrange for this support, possibly
through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance pro-
gram (ACOTA).125
Africa Command should also push to have administration of ACOTA trans-
ferred from the State Department Bureau of African Affairs. Replacing the current
State Department civilian-contractor training staff with AFRICOM military per-
sonnel would not only allow continued training in peace enforcement and coun-
terinsurgency skills but would also provide additional avenues for advancing U.S.
security interests in Africa. In particular, this expanded military-to-military con-
tact could be employed to enhance local military professionalism (with special
emphasis in the areas of ethics, international law, and respect for civilian author-
ity) and to develop rapport, cultivating positive, productive, and lasting working
relationships with U.S. military personnel.126 AFRICOM should then actively
maintain these relationships to evaluate the effectiveness of the training pro-
vided and identify measures to improve its training program, to recognize when
additional specialized training might be beneficial, and to facilitate coordina-
tion between AFRICOM and local military forces during a domestic crisis or
regional peacekeeping operation (whether the United States is formally partic-
ipating or not).127 This broadened engagement would better improve African
operational effectiveness and military professionalism while enhancing
AFRICOM’s credibility and influence.
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Though extensive formal collaboration with China is unlikely, at least over
the near term, Africa Command should attempt to work closely with all the
other major actors in Africa. First of all, the command should leverage its Euro-
pean Command origins to facilitate coordination with EU initiatives and
thereby garner European support while improving effectiveness and preventing
redundancy. Second, AFRICOM should develop mechanisms to allow effective
coordination with—and support for—both UN institutions and UN peace-
keeping missions in Africa, whether or not the United States is formally partici-
pating in any particular program or mission. This could help improve UN
effectiveness while increasing international support for AFRICOM. Third, Af-
rica Command should request a permanent AU presence at AFRICOM head-
quarters to improve coordination, bolster AU credibility, and strengthen the
command’s legitimacy in the eyes of Africans. Fourth, Africa Command should
meaningfully engage all the countries of Africa, not just those generating media
coverage, with special attention paid to those in which the United States does
not maintain an embassy, including Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Comoros, and
São Tomé and Príncipe.128 Since traditionally U.S. diplomatic engagement in Af-
rica has been highly selective, more broadly based engagement could help allevi-
ate lingering concerns over U.S. intentions and prior self-serving policies.129
Fifth, Africa Command should proactively engage—and attempt to work
with—other countries expanding their presence in Africa, including India, Rus-
sia, and Brazil, to foster their stable, efficient integration while attempting to
prevent future sources of conflict. Finally, Africa Command should indicate its
receptiveness to working with China if and when China decides to do so. Positive
Chinese relationships with the U.S. Coast Guard and the United Kingdom’s De-
partment for International Development could allow these organizations to
serve as conduits by which AFRICOM could engage China and eventually help
build upon the very limited collaboration demonstrated in Liberia, Ethiopia,
and the Gulf of Aden.130
In addition, Africa Command can mobilize interagency support for African
efforts to improve economic and political governance, such as the New Eco-
nomic Partnership for Africa’s Development, the African Peer Review Mecha-
nism, and the West African Civil Society Forum.131 AFRICOM should
proactively assist in the implementation of recommendations from these civil
organizations wherever possible—without attempting to insert itself into the
decision-making process. Promotion of such governance initiatives would serve
the dual purpose of promoting long-term social and political stability while si-
multaneously countering the effect of Chinese support for authoritarian or cor-
rupt regimes.
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Another crucial area of African need is medical care. AIDS is a major focus of
the South African Development Community, and AIDS and infectious diseases
have been identified by Africans in polls as the “leading global threat.”132 There
are an estimated twenty-five million HIV-infected people in Africa, represent-
ing 7.5 percent of fifteen-to-forty-nine-year-olds.133 The majority of those dying
from HIV-related diseases are “between 20 and 50 years of age, the most impor-
tant group for a well-functioning economy, polity and society.”134 A conservative
estimate places economic losses from HIV/AIDS at 2.6 percent of gross domes-
tic product annually.135 The greatest mortality, however, is from malaria, which
kills an average of three thousand Africans every day.136 AFRICOM would be
well advised to redouble the efforts of military medical teams and interagency
groups to address these issues. Simply making inexpensive family-planning op-
tions widely available could help limit the spread of HIV/AIDS while simulta-
neously contributing to controlling population growth and eventually
eliminating the youth bulge.137 This assistance would be particularly appreciated
in the region if anticipated economic and demographic changes in China curtail
the future availability of that nation’s medical teams.138
These represent only a few examples of innumerable pressing African needs
that can be at least partially addressed by Africa Command. The specific needs
themselves, however, are not as important as the fact that AFRICOM would be
advancing the common long-term objective of stability and security in Africa by
responding to Africa’s needs instead of narrowly promoting a U.S. agenda. By
approaching our common objective from the African perspective vice our own,
we demonstrate our goodwill toward the region and ultimately encourage the
states and organizations of Africa to prefer the United States to China as a
partner.
The fact that a stable and secure African environment is in the long-term best
interest of the United States, Africa, and China means that AFRICOM can en-
hance U.S. influence in Africa while promoting U.S. objectives by actively sup-
porting African interests, including those that involve Chinese economic
development activities. Consequently, Africa Command should support pro-
ductive, responsible behavior on the part of China in Africa, taking care neither
to impede nor co-opt Chinese endeavors that further long-term American ob-
jectives in Africa.
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CLOSE ENCOUNTERS AT SEA
The USNS Impeccable Incident
Captain Raul Pedrozo, JAGC, U.S. Navy
On 23 March 2001, the hydrographic survey ship USNS Bowditch (T-AGS62) was conducting routine military survey operations in China’s claimed
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Yellow Sea when it was “aggressively con-
fronted” by a Chinese Jianheu III–class frigate and ordered to leave the EEZ.1 Be-
ing an unarmed naval auxiliary vessel, Bowditch changed course and left the area
as instructed. A few days later, the U.S. embassy filed a strongly worded diplo-
matic protest with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bowditch re-
turned to the area of the encounter, this time with an armed U.S. escort, to
continue its mission.2
Eight years and a new U.S. administration later, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) has once again taken aggressive, unsafe, and unprofessional ac-
tion against an unarmed naval auxiliary vessel—this time the ocean surveil-
lance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23)—that was engaged in lawful
military activities in China’s claimed EEZ. On 8 March 2009, five PRC ves-
sels—a navy intelligence ship, a government fisheries-patrol vessel, a state
oceanographic patrol vessel, and two small fishing trawlers—surrounded and
harassed Impeccable approximately seventy-five
miles south of Hainan Island in the South China
Sea.3 The fishing trawlers maneuvered within
twenty-five feet of Impeccable and then intentionally
stopped in front of it, forcing Impeccable to take
emergency action to avoid a collision.4 The U.S. gov-
ernment protested the PRC’s actions as reckless, un-
professional, and unlawful. China responded that
Captain Pedrozo is a member of the Naval War Col-
lege’s International Law Department, in the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies. Previously he was the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Com-
mand. He has also served as a Special Assistant to the
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the Navy’s International and Operational Law
Division.
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Impeccable’s presence in China’s claimed EEZ had been in violation of Chinese
domestic law and international law.5 Impeccable returned to the area the next
day under escort of a guided-missile destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG
93).
The PRC position with regard to coastal-state control over foreign military
activities in the EEZ is threefold: national security interests, resource/environ-
mental protection, and jurisdiction over marine scientific research (MSR). As
discussed in detail below, the PRC’s position is inconsistent with international
law (including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and state prac-
tice. The PRC’s position is also somewhat disingenuous, as PRC naval units rou-
tinely conduct submarine operations, military survey operations, and
surveillance/intelligence-collection operations in foreign EEZs throughout the
Asia-Pacific region.
In short, nothing in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) changes the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military
activities in the exclusive economic zone. Moreover, prior to and subsequent to
the adoption of UNCLOS military forces have routinely conducted military ac-
tivities seaward of the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea without coastal-state
notice or consent. These activities include task-force maneuvering, flight opera-
tions, military exercises, weapons testing and firing, surveillance and reconnais-
sance operations (and other intelligence-gathering activities), and military
marine data collection (military surveys).
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
All coastal states may claim a two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ (article 57). Com-
bined, these EEZ claims encompass a large area of the world’s ocean—nearly 30
percent—that twenty years ago was considered to be high seas.6 The EEZ is a crea-
ture of UNCLOS, which created it for the purpose of giving coastal states greater
control over the resources adjacent to their coasts out to two hundred nautical
miles (articles 56 and 57). Coastal states were also granted jurisdiction in the EEZ
over artificial islands and structures, MSR, and protection and preservation of
the environment (article 56). Unfortunately, over the years some coastal states
like China have sought to expand their jurisdiction in the EEZ by attempting to
exercise control over non-resource-related activities, including many military
activities. These illegal coastal-state restrictions in the EEZ take many forms, in-
cluding prohibitions on military marine data collection (military surveys and
hydrographic surveys), requirements of prior notice or consent to conduct mili-
tary activities, environmental constraints on sovereign immune vessels and air-
craft, and national-security restrictions. These excessive claims have no basis in
customary international law or in UNCLOS, and they have been diplomatically
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107
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:44:42 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/20
protested by the U.S. government and operationally challenged by the U.S. Navy
and Air Force under the Freedom of Navigation Program since 1979.
Military Activities in the EEZ
Military uses of the seas are clearly a recognized right under international law.
For centuries, the navies of the world have operated and trained in waters sea-
ward of other nations’ territorial seas without constraint or the consent of
coastal states. This extensive state practice confirms that military activities at sea
are lawful under customary international law and consistent with article 2(4) of
the UN Charter. UNCLOS reaffirms this conclusion by limiting military activi-
ties in only a few narrow circumstances: while ships are engaged in innocent
passage, transit passage, and archipelagic-sea-lanes passage (ASLP) (articles 19,
20, 39, 40, 52, and 54). Other international instruments also support the posi-
tion that military activities at sea are lawful. For example, the International Mar-
itime Organization/International Hydrographic Organization World-wide
Navigational Warning Service specifically recognizes military activities at sea,
such as naval exercises and missile firings, as proper, for which “naval area”
warnings are to be issued.7 Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention regarding Aero-
nautical Information Services similarly provides that military exercises that
pose hazards to civil aviation are appropriate subjects for notices to airmen.8
Nothing in UNCLOS or state practice changes the right of military forces of
all nations to conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone without
coastal-state notice or consent. The EEZ was not created to regulate military ac-
tivities. Proposals during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) to include residual coastal-state security interest rights in the
EEZ were considered and rejected.9 UNCLOS article 56 makes clear that coastal
states have limited sovereign rights in the EEZ for the purpose of exploring, ex-
ploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources of the zone and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone. The coastal state also has limited jurisdiction with regard to the establish-
ment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures, marine scientific
research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In ex-
ercising its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal state is to have
due regard to the rights and duties of other states and act in a manner compati-
ble with the provisions of UNCLOS.
Pursuant to article 58 of UNCLOS, all states have the high-seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight referred to in article 87 of UNCLOS and other inter-
nationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associ-
ated with the operation of ships and aircraft. As evidenced by long-standing
state practice, the term “other internationally lawful uses” does not refer solely
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to navigation and overflight rights but includes all lawful military activities. This
point was clearly articulated by the American delegation to the UNCLOS III
1983:
All States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms of navigation
and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which remain qualitatively
and quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone.
Military operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct such activities will continue to be en-
joyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone.10
The only limitation on the user state’s rights and freedoms is a reciprocal due-
regard requirement. In this regard, one can envision limited situations where
legitimate military activities may be adjusted to respect coastal-state resource
rights in the EEZ—for example, a proposed weapons exercise in close proxim-
ity to an active offshore oil platform. But these situations are the exception, not
the rule, and cannot be dictated unilaterally by the coastal state. As discussed
below, although foreign sovereign-immune vessels do not have to comply with
coastal nations’ domestic environmental regulations, U.S. Navy vessels operate
with due regard for the marine environment. For example, when operating
low- and midfrequency sonar systems anywhere around the world, U.S. Navy
vessels voluntarily apply marine-mammal mitigation measures that provide
extensive protection for the environment based on the best available science.
The PRC has recently indicated that sonar use may harm marine mammals and
fish stocks in its EEZ. However, there is no evidence that the Navy’s sonar use,
while applying these scientific protective measures, impacts either marine
mammals or fish.11 These measures are designed to allow the Navy to train re-
alistically without harming the environment, and they far exceed the “due re-
gard” requirement of article 58. In short, the PRC has no right under
international law to force training restrictions or mitigation measures on for-
eign sovereign immune vessels operating in its EEZ.
Although coastal states enjoy environmental jurisdiction in the EEZ, appli-
cation of environmental controls on foreign warships, naval auxiliaries (like
Impeccable and Bowditch), and other government-owned or -operated non-
commercial vessels and aircraft operating in the EEZ is strictly limited. Article
236 makes clear that the provisions of UNCLOS “regarding the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval
auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a state and used, for
the time being, only on government non-commercial service.” The only re-
quirement is that such vessels and aircraft are to act in a manner consistent
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with the environmental provisions of UNCLOS, so far as is reasonable and
practicable to do so, and to the extent that it does not impair the operations or
operational capabilities of such vessels and aircraft.
It is also important to note that while UNCLOS does place certain limitations
on military activities at sea, these restrictions are limited to ships engaged in in-
nocent passage, transit passage, and ASLP. For example, article 19 limits certain
military activities in the territorial sea, such as threat or use of force, use of
weapons, intelligence gathering, acts of propaganda, launching and landing of
aircraft and other military devices, and marine data collection (hydrographic
surveys and military surveys). Article 52 applies these same limitations to
archipelagic waters. Articles 20 and 52 provide that submarines must navigate
on the surface when in innocent passage in the territorial sea or archipelagic wa-
ters. Articles 39 and 54 prohibit the threat or use of force when ships are engaged
in transit passage or archipelagic-sea-lanes passage. Finally, articles 40 and 54
prohibit survey activities for ships engaged in transit passage or ASLP. No simi-
lar limitations are included in part V of UNCLOS and therefore they do not ap-
ply to foreign warships, military aircraft, or other sovereign, “immune” ships
and aircraft in and over the EEZ. This conclusion is confirmed by the negotiat-
ing history of UNCLOS: efforts to include “security interests” as a protected
coastal-state interest in the EEZ failed.12
Chinese reliance on the “peaceful purposes” provisions of UNCLOS (articles
88, 141, and 301) to regulate military activities in the EEZ is also clearly mis-
placed. Article 301 provides that “in exercising their rights and performing their
duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law em-
bodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” Identical language can be found in
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in UNCLOS article 19.2(a). State practice
since the adoption of UNCLOS confirms that the “peaceful purposes” provi-
sions do not create new rights or obligations, nor do they impose restraints on
traditional military operations at sea that are consistent with international law,
including the UN Charter. These provisions simply require states to exercise
their rights and perform their duties under UNCLOS in accordance with their
duty under article 2(4) of the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Mili-
tary surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international airspace, how-
ever, do not equate to a “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.” Long-standing state practice, as well as
UNCLOS, supports the conclusion that such operations are lawful and consis-
tent with the UN Charter. In this regard, UNCLOS article 19 makes a clear
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distinction between a “threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal state” and “any act aimed at
collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal
state.”13 Both are prohibited in the territorial sea for ships engaged in innocent
passage, but they are clearly distinct and independent activities. UNCLOS arti-
cle 19(2) makes a similar distinction between “threat or use of force” and other
military activities at sea that are consistent with article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
such as military exercises, weapons testing, use of ordnance, and military marine
data collection (military surveys and hydrographic surveys).
Marine Data Collection in the EEZ
Although coastal states can clearly regulate marine scientific research in the ex-
clusive economic zone, marine data collection is much broader. “Marine data
collection” is a general term referring to all types of collection activities at sea,
including MSR, military surveys, and hydrographic surveys. UNCLOS applies
different rules to each of these activities, depending on where the activities take
place.
“Marine scientific research,” in contrast, indicates activities undertaken to ex-
pand scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its processes. Classes of
data collected could be related to oceanography, marine biology, fisheries re-
search, scientific ocean drilling or coring, or geological or geophysical studies. The
data is usually shared among the public and scientific communities. Hydro-
graphic surveys, on the other hand, are conducted to support safety of navigation.
The data collected is normally used to produce nautical charts and similar prod-
ucts. That is, hydrographic survey is not MSR. Neither is military survey consid-
ered to be MSR, because it is conducted for military, not scientific, purposes. The
data collected may be either classified or unclassified; it is normally not released to
the public or scientific community unless it is unclassified and was collected on
the high seas. Such collected data could be oceanographic, hydrographic, marine
geological or geophysical, chemical, acoustic, or biological. Although the means of
data collection are often similar and to the coastal state may appear indistinguish-
able from marine scientific research, it is the military or safety use to which the
data is put that distinguishes military surveys and hydrographic surveys from
MSR.
On the basis of these distinctions and the plain language of UNCLOS, military
surveys and hydrographic surveys remain high-seas freedoms and may be con-
ducted in foreign EEZs and on foreign continental shelves without coastal-state
notice or consent. Coastal-state consent is only required for such survey activities
in territorial seas and archipelagic waters. The following provisions of UNCLOS
support this conclusion:
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• Research or survey activities are inconsistent with innocent passage (article
19[2][j]).
• Ships in transit passage or archipelagic-sea-lanes passage may not carry out
research or survey activities (articles 40 and 54).
• Part XIII applies only to MSR and does not refer to survey activities.
WHY THIS IS IMPORTANT: THE EP-3 INCIDENT
In order to avoid conflict and potential miscalculations at sea and in the air be-
tween U.S. and Chinese forces, both sides need to have a clear understanding of
their respective rights in and over the EEZ as coastal and user states. We certainly
do not want a repeat of the EP-3 incident.14 On the morning of 1 April 2001, a
week after the Bowditch incident discussed earlier, two Chinese F-8 fighter air-
craft intercepted a U.S. EP-3 that was conducting a routine reconnaissance flight
about seventy miles south/southeast of Hainan Island. After making several
close approaches to the American aircraft, one of the F-8s lost control and col-
lided with the EP-3. The F-8 was chopped in half; the nose cone and number-one
propeller of the EP-3 were severely damaged. The Chinese pilot ejected but was
never found and was presumed dead. The EP-3 was forced to make an emer-
gency landing at the Lingshui military airfield on Hainan. The cause of the colli-
sion is still a matter of dispute. The PRC claims that the EP-3 swerved into the
flight path and rammed the F-8. The United States claims that the F-8 ran into
the larger, slower, and less maneuverable EP-3. I will not go into the details here
but would only suggest that the laws of physics do not support the Chinese posi-
tion—and leave it at that.
Some of the legal issues raised by the PRC following this incident included
the validity of coastal-state security interests in the exclusive economic zone, the
legality of surveillance and reconnaissance flights over the EEZ, and the applica-
bility of the due-regard requirement when conducting air intercepts.
As previously discussed, coastal states lack security interests in the EEZ.
Nothing in UNCLOS supports the PRC position. Similarly, the Chinese position
that the freedom of overflight reflected in UNCLOS article 58 is a narrow right,
including only the right to transit the airspace above the EEZ, is not supported
by UNCLOS, other international agreements, or state practice. On the contrary,
the negotiating history of UNCLOS and state practice before, during, and after
UNCLOS support the conclusion that freedoms of navigation and overflight in
the EEZ are broad freedoms; it is coastal-state rights in the EEZ that are narrowly
limited. As we have seen, UNCLOS article 58 is quite clear: all states enjoy the
freedoms of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of
the seas related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of
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ships and aircraft. Long-standing state practice supports the position that sur-
veillance and reconnaissance operations conducted in international airspace be-
yond the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea are lawful activities. Since the end
of World War II, surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international
airspace have become a matter of routine. Many nations, including the PRC, en-
gage in such activities on a routine basis. Moreover, as previously discussed,
UNCLOS article 19.2(c) prohibits intelligence-gathering activities by ships en-
gaged in innocent passage through the territorial sea—as noted above, no simi-
lar prohibition is contained in part V of UNCLOS, and therefore, surveillance
and reconnaissance activities are permitted in the EEZ. The PRC has an obliga-
tion under UNCLOS article 56 to exercise its limited resource-related rights in
the EEZ with due regard for the rights of other states to engage in lawful military
activities, including surveillance and reconnaissance operations, in the zone.
With regard to surveillance and reconnaissance flights over the EEZ, it is also
important to note that coastal states lack competence to regulate military activi-
ties in the airspace above the EEZ. Articles 2 and 49 of UNCLOS make clear that
the airspace above the territorial sea and archipelagic waters is national airspace,
subject to coastal-state/archipelagic-state sovereignty. Similar language is found
in article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (known as
the Chicago Convention) with regard to the territorial sea. Beyond the
twelve-mile limit, however, is international airspace. Neither UNCLOS nor the
Chicago Convention grant coastal states any authority over military aircraft op-
erating in international airspace above the EEZ. Coastal-state sovereign rights in
the zone are limited to the seabed, its subsoil, and the waters superjacent to the
seabed, with one exception—the coastal state has sovereign rights with regard to
the production of energy from the winds (UNCLOS article 56). Therefore, noth-
ing in UNCLOS provides a legal basis for regulating military activities in the air-
space above the EEZ. UNCLOS does, however, clearly provide that in the EEZ all
states enjoy, among other things, freedom of navigation and overflight and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea. The only caveat is that in exercising their
high-seas freedoms in the EEZ, states shall have “due regard” to the rights and
duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and regulations
adopted by the coastal state in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS and
other rules of international law “in so far as they are not incompatible” with part
V of UNCLOS (article 58, emphasis added). Similarly, the provisions of the Chi-
cago Convention do not apply to state aircraft, which include all aircraft used in
military, customs, and police services. The only requirement is that state aircraft
fly with “due regard” for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.15
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THE WAY FORWARD
The PRC can expect U.S. warships, military aircraft, and naval auxiliaries like
Impeccable and Bowditch to continue to operate in its claimed EEZ, in accor-
dance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all nations under interna-
tional law. If the PRC has an issue with continued American military presence in
its EEZ, the PRC should raise its concerns not via bridge-to-bridge communica-
tions, in the open press, or via diplomatic protests but directly with the United
States and attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution within the context of
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA).16 Some have sug-
gested that it may be time for the United States to negotiate an INCSEA-like
agreement with China to avoid confrontations of this nature.17 However, I do
not believe such an agreement is necessary, as the MMCA was specifically estab-
lished to facilitate consultations between the U.S. Department of Defense and
the PRC Ministry of National Defense for the “purpose of promoting common
understandings regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime
and air forces when operating in accordance with international law.”18 Unfortu-
nately, MMCA has failed to live up to expectations in this regard, primarily be-
cause of the PRC’s unwillingness to engage in a serious debate on this important
issue. A solution can be reached if both sides act in good faith and apply them-
selves, but as the saying goes, “it takes two to tango.” I would point to the 1989
Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Pas-
sage, agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union after a 1988 Black Sea
“bumping” incident, as an example of how two nations with differing views can
reach a mutually acceptable solution to a politically charged national-security
issue. (In the 1988 case, the issue was the right of innocent passage of warships
through the territorial sea without prior notice to or consent of the coastal
state.)19
Until a mutually acceptable solution is reached, PRC ships and aircraft should
immediately cease their aggressive, unlawful, and unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity
of U.S. ships and aircraft, as was recently witnessed near Impeccable. In addition to
complying with their legal obligations under the Collision Regulations, Chinese
ships and aircraft should—as has been suggested by the United States on numer-
ous occasions—also abide by internationally recognized codes and signals. The
Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea, or CUES, issued by the Western Pacific Na-
val Symposium, offers safety measures and procedures, as well as a means to limit
mutual interference and uncertainty and to facilitate communication when war-
ships, submarines, public vessels, or naval aircraft make contact. Standard safety
procedures are contained in part 3, standard communications procedures in
part 4, and “Selected Signals Vocabulary and Basic Maneuvering Instructions”
in part 5. The NATO publication Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions
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and Procedures, MTP 1(D), vol. 1, provides doctrine, tactics, instructions, and
procedures governing the command, control, and maneuvering of all maritime
units. Position, movement, and maneuvering are addressed in chapter 2, com-
munications in chapter 3.
The proliferation of excessive coastal-state restrictions on military activities in
the exclusive economic zone should be a growing concern to all maritime na-
tions. Such restrictions are inconsistent with the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea and customary international law, and they erode the balance of
interests that was carefully crafted during the nine-year negotiations that led to
the adoption of UNCLOS. All nations must remain engaged, both domestically
and internationally, in preserving operational flexibility and ensuring that the
balance of interests reflected in UNCLOS is not eroded any further. The bottom
line is that while UNCLOS grants coastal states sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources in the
EEZs, it does not authorize them to interfere with legitimate military activities,
which include much more than just navigation and overflight. Accordingly, U.S.
warships, military aircraft and other sovereign immune ships and aircraft will
continue to exercise their rights and freedoms in foreign EEZs, including
China’s, in accordance with international law.
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GRASPING “THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER”
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Over the past two decades international maritime law has evolved from a setof rules designed to avoid naval warfare, by keeping maritime powers
apart, toward a new global framework designed to facilitate maritime security
cooperation, by bringing naval forces together to collaborate toward achieving
common goals. The effects of this change are far-reaching—for the first time,
law is a force multiplier for pursuing shared responsibilities in the maritime do-
main. In a departure from the past hundred years of state practice, the contem-
porary focus of international maritime law now is constructive and prospective,
broadening partnerships for enhancing port security, as well as coastal and in-
shore safety, extending maritime domain awareness, and countering threats at
sea. In contrast, the predominant influence of law on sea power from the first
Hague conference in 1899, through two world wars, and continuing until the
end of the Cold War, was focused on developing naval arms-control regimes, re-
fining the laws of naval warfare, and prescribing con-
duct at sea to erect “firewalls” that separated opposing
fleets. The maritime treaties were designed to main-
tain the peace or prevent the expansion of war at sea
by controlling the types and numbers of warships and
their weapons systems and by reducing provocative or
risky behavior.
Today treaties do more than reduce friction and
build confidence: contemporary international mari-
time agreements spread safety and security through
networks or coalitions. Laws and international
Commander Kraska is a professor of international law in
the International Law Department, Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, and a Guest
Investigator, Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Ocean-
ographic Institution. Previous assignments include three
tours in the Pentagon and two in Japan. A graduate of
the University of Virginia School of Law, Indiana Uni-
versity School of Law, and the School of Politics and Eco-
nomics, Claremont Graduate University, Commander
Kraska also is an elected member of the International In-
stitute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy. He
may be reached at james.kraska@gmail.com.
© 2009 by James Kraska
Naval War College Review, Summer 2009, Vol. 62, No. 3
118
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:45:14 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
119
War College: The Full Summer 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
institutions have become catalysts for fostering coordination among states and
distributed maritime forces and spreading the rule of law at sea, and as a conse-
quence, the strategic, operational, and political “landscapes” of the oceans have
decisively changed.
The remainder of this article is divided broadly into four sections. First, it is
essential to describe briefly the major features of historical international mari-
time law, which traditionally focused on the law of naval warfare and naval
arms control. This survey extends from the beginning of the Hague Law, at the
turn of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, to the Jackson
Hole Agreement between the superpowers at the end of the Cold War. Along
the way, high points in the terrain include the treaty system negotiated by the
five greatest naval powers at the Washington Conference in 1921–22, the naval
arms-limitations agreements that were extended at the London Naval Confer-
ence of 1930, and the several Cold War treaties, such as the Seabed Treaty and
the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement.1 The dean of this school of tradi-
tional international maritime law was the late New Zealand scholar D. P.
O’Connell, who published his influential The Influence of Law on Sea Power in
1975.2 O’Connell passed away in 1979, and since that time both international
maritime law and naval warfare have been transformed to reflect changing
patterns in the distribution of power within the world system and in the role of
naval forces. O’Connell delineated the function of international law in naval
planning by focusing largely on the law of naval warfare, and his seminal vol-
ume epitomizes the relationship between sea power and international law over
the previous century.
In the second section the article shifts toward an explanation of the relation-
ship between law and sea power since the fall of the Berlin Wall and highlights
the primary characteristics of international maritime law today. In doing so, this
analysis fills a void by connecting the major legal initiatives for maritime secu-
rity to the prevailing world political system, just as O’Connell did for a very dif-
ferent world more than thirty years ago. Recently emerging maritime treaties
and partnerships have transformed international maritime law and thereby re-
configured the nature of sea power by creating agreements to unite collective ef-
forts to enhance global shipping and combat maritime piracy, terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics trafficking. These
new regimes presage an integrated and cooperative approach, and their develop-
ment over the past two decades has shaped the diplomatic space to such extent
that they now may be seen as collectively the principal impetus for the 2007 U.S.
maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.3 In that
sense, the new maritime strategy was not a revolutionary document but a lag-
ging indicator of the changes in the legal and policy frameworks evolving in the
1 1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
119
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:45:14 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
120
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/20
global maritime system, and to that extent the document merely leveraged the
emergence of new cooperative relationships. For the first time, international law
is serving as a force multiplier for sea power, promoting maritime security both
globally and regionally, by broadening maritime partnerships and developing
emerging norms.
Third, the article turns to offer a roadmap of the most important interna-
tional maritime security treaties, agreements, and partnerships. These treaties
and agreements include the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which
entered into force in 1994 and is the umbrella framework for international law
in the maritime domain, as well as such post-9/11 updates to older agreements
as the 1948 Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
recent revisions to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. Further-
more, the authorities contained in the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and especially the 2005
protocols thereto, and even the applicability of enforcement action in the mari-
time domain under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the Security
Council, have all been expanded in recent years. These and other agreements are
creating a network of complementary and interlocking legal and policy authori-
ties that form the basis for the new maritime order.
Having placed these agreements and partnerships in an analytical context,
the article provides a brief description of some of the principal initiatives. The
depth of the new measures and the creation of the self-perpetuating legal and
policy networks that propel them mean law now plays a defining role with re-
spect to modern notions of sea power. International law is becoming just as im-
portant as—indeed more important than—aircraft carriers and submarines for
ensuring global maritime security, because it unites the international
community in pursuit of common goals.
Finally, the article concludes that because international maritime law has
risen in importance, the United States should adopt a more savvy approach to
maritime diplomacy. Competing narratives or contending visions of interna-
tional maritime law and contests with competitor states over how to shape the
future order of the oceans should move from relative obscurity to the front
burner. The aggressive Chinese “swarming” ship maneuvers against the military
survey vessel USNS Impeccable while it was operating in the East China Sea in
early March 2009 demonstrate how inextricably these issues are connected to di-
plomacy and national security. This will require national-level leadership from
the National Security Council to ensure that all agencies and departments are
aligned on these issues and strongly advocate legal and policy positions that
clearly prioritize American security interests over other U.S. interests in the
oceans, such as the preservation of the marine environment and climate change.
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The United States was the primary impetus for developing the new international
maritime law, but it remains to be seen whether it will be the most influential
country in the shaping of the future maritime order.
HISTORICAL INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW
Early maritime law was designed to ameliorate conflict at sea. Perhaps the first
law directly affecting sea power was the set of customary rules governing the
law of “prize”—that is, the capture of vessels in wartime. Prize arose under the
concept of neutrality and of neutral goods that are exempt from capture by a
belligerent anywhere on the high seas. The rule was recognized as early as 1164
and subsequently included in the Consolato de Mare, widely adopted by Medi-
terranean city-states in the High Middle Ages. Early prize law evolved continu-
ously throughout the early modern era, with its greatest prominence
stretching from the mid-fifteenth century to mid-nineteenth. In 1618, the
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius cogently set forth the natural-law doctrine of “free-
dom of the seas,” a concept that preserved access to the seas for all nations and
thereby fueled an explosion in international trade. Grotius’s law setting forth
the legal divisions of the oceans was validated in the mid-seventeenth century,
when the Bourbon and Hapsburg rivalry engulfed central Europe in the Thirty
Years’ War. The conflict was brought to a close with the peace of Westphalia in
1648. The Treaty of Westphalia was an epochal document, recognizing sover-
eignty over land areas under individual autonomous rulers and ushering in the
era of the modern nation-state. Whereas the complex treaty recognized that
states exercise complete authority over and are responsible for maintaining se-
curity inside their borders, it was manifest that no nation could exercise sover-
eignty over the oceans. For four hundred years, international law regarding
land areas was governed principally by the canon of state sovereignty reflected
in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and the rules pertaining to the oceans derived
from the complementary doctrine of freedom of the seas.
In addition to promoting freedom of the seas, British and, later, American
governments championed international law and international institutions as
necessary for the foundation of an effective world system of stability and con-
flict avoidance. In doing so, “the United States and Great Britain looked at the
world in a different way than have most of the European countries,” writes
Walter Russell Mead. “The British Empire was, and the United States is, con-
cerned not just with the balance of power in one particular corner of the world
but with the evolution of what we today call ‘world order.’”4 Over the last two
hundred years the singular leadership roles of the United States and the United
Kingdom in advancing a security paradigm based on both sea power and inter-
national law have been critical for international security. In developing and
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maintaining the order, the United Kingdom and the United States have had, be-
tween them, outsized influence on the shape of maritime law and its effect on
war prevention, naval warfare, and grand strategy.
Law of Naval Warfare
By 1758, the Swiss lawyer and diplomat Emmerich de Vattel had expounded two
fundamental principles of the law of neutrality that had gained widespread ac-
ceptance: belligerents were obligated to respect the neutrality of states remain-
ing neutral, and a neutral state had a duty to remain impartial. In 1856, at the
end of the Crimean War, the plenipotentiaries adopted the nonbinding Declara-
tion Respecting Maritime Law, in conjunction with the Treaty of Peace.5 The
1856 declaration abolished the practice of privateering and provided that a neu-
tral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband that could support the war ef-
fort, and furthermore that neutral goods, except contraband, are exempt from
enemy capture.
Prize courts applied the doctrine of “continuous voyage” and “ultimate desti-
nation” to look beyond the stated destination of a vessel or goods to ascertain
whether the final destination was an enemy state. A proposal for an interna-
tional prize court, reduced to writing in the Convention of an International
Prize Court 1907 (Hague No. XII of 1907), never entered into force because it
did not secure any state ratification. In 1909, however, the Declaration of Lon-
don Concerning the Laws of Naval War adopted the doctrine of ultimate desti-
nation, which permitted capture of absolute contraband whether its route to an
ultimate destination in enemy territory was direct or indirect and circuitous,
through neutral state waters or ports.6 Aside from its rules of prize and capture,
the Declaration of London was the definitive code of naval warfare for its day. It
was observed by several nations during World War I, although the document
never entered into legal force.
The first Hague Peace Conference, which met in 1899, adopted the Conven-
tion for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of 1864 (Hague III).7 The 1868 Additional Articles Relating to the
Condition of Wounded in War provided protections for certain categories of
persons at sea.8 The second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 adopted seven trea-
ties relating to naval operations, which include the Convention (No. VI) Relat-
ing to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities; the
Convention (No. VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-
ships; the Convention (No. VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines;9 the Convention (No. IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time of War; the Convention (No. X) for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention;10 the Convention (No. XI)
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on Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War;
and the Convention (No. XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Case of Maritime War. This corpus of Hague law was complemented
by the Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, which codified the
rules applicable to the relations between parties to a conflict and provided that
neutral states should be governed by the law of peace, not war.11 For example, ar-
ticle 2 reduced to writing the customary law permitting belligerent states to in-
tervene in neutral waters against another party to the conflict if the neutral
coastal state either allowed or tolerated the misuse of its territorial sea.
For most of this period, international law influenced naval power through
normative restraints on methods and means of warfare, such as proscribing un-
restricted antisubmarine warfare during World Wars I and II and shaping naval
force structures through ceilings on warship type and tonnage. At sea this meant
controlling the application of force in interstate conflict throughout the
oceans—by, for example, rules governing naval bombardment and mine war-
fare—and calibrating the exercise of naval self-defense. Customary interna-
tional law and the 1936 London Protocol prohibited destruction of enemy mer-
chant vessels unless the passengers and crew were first disembarked and their
safety assured.12 This rule did not apply if the merchant vessel resisted the bellig-
erent’s right of visit and search to determine the enemy character of the vessel.
During World War II, however, both the Axis and the Allies routinely disre-
garded this rule and intentionally targeted the merchant ships of the enemy, in
campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare.
Finally, the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 restated customary rules for
international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflict at
sea.13 The humanitarian principles of common article 3 prescribe rules pertain-
ing to the treatment of surrendered, wounded, and shipwrecked sailors.
Law of Naval Arms Control
While the law of armed conflict sought to reduce the effects of war upon those
placed out of combat, the law of naval arms control sought to restrict the devel-
opment of ever-greater instruments of war at sea. During the period between
the two world wars, the Washington Treaty of 1922 fixed battleship ratios for all
the major maritime powers.14 Following the abrogation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles by Germany in 1935, Germany and the United Kingdom concluded the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement, limiting the German navy to 35 percent of the
Royal Navy and requiring Germany to conform to the rules of the Washington
Treaty.15 Despite cheating among some of the parties, the agreement actually did
slow the construction and size of capital warships. Perversely, however, the pact
also provided incentives for states to redirect naval ambitions into other systems,
such as submarines, that were not explicitly controlled.
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During the Cold War, Western security ultimately was dependent upon
strategic deterrence. The primary function of international law was to prevent
superpower conflict, in particular to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. In
that setting, international law took the form of nuclear and conventional
arms-control regimes, which were important parts of the broader equation of
managing superpower competition. The 1971 Seabed Treaty, for example,
slowed the spread of nuclear weapons by banning their emplacement on the
floor of the ocean beyond twelve nautical miles from the coastline. Similarly,
the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water sought to stop the introduction of nuclear capabilities
into new areas of the global commons. One of the few agreements that repre-
sented a departure from the law of naval war and the naval arms-control para-
digm was an August 1944 agreement, Coordinated Control of Merchant
Shipping, in which the Allied powers agreed to pool and cooperatively manage
shipping resources under their jurisdiction as the war was winding down in
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Europe and the Far East.16 Law also served a channeling function to guide be-
havior toward less confrontational conduct, as illustrated by the INCSEA agree-
ment of 1972, designed to avoid an unintended conflict between American and
Soviet naval forces.
Today, in contrast to the past “build-out” in the law of naval warfare and naval
arms control, the new international maritime law is inclusive rather than exclu-
sive, inviting any country to cooperate; it is progressive rather than conservative,
seeking to promote and integrate international maritime networks rather than
capture and restrict the activities of the major maritime states. Made possible by
the end of the Cold War, the new international maritime law experienced its
greatest growth in response to global cargo-chain security and maritime home-
land security after the attacks of 9/11.
THE CONTEMPORARY ERA
International law has experienced dramatic growth and change since the 1970s,
both becoming more diffuse and exerting a more powerful influence on the
world system than in previous time. Over the past twenty years, seismic changes
in the world system—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks
of 9/11—have caused international law to evolve quickly in order to accommo-
date, and even influence, the shape of the international system. In contrast, be-
cause it takes years to design and construct modern warships and aircraft, and
since those platforms remain in service for decades, naval force structure and
doctrine progress more slowly. So it is that in recent decades naval power and na-
val theory have lagged as indicators of change in the nature of power in the inter-
national system, but international law has been at the vanguard, driving those
changes. For instance, these legal trends predated and catalyzed the conceptual-
ization of the Cooperative Strategy, the legal and policy networks created arising
in new forms of international law influenced naval strategy, rather than the
other way around. The release of the Cooperative Strategy in 2007 reflected a
shift in theoretical approach to sea power away from the concept of command of
the sea, the linchpin of geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, and toward the no-
tion of constabulary sea control, which was promoted by British historian Sir
Julian S. Corbett. Mahan envisioned naval forces taking command of the seas
through large-scale engagements between battle fleets. For Corbett, however,
naval force structure should include not only ships of the line with focused com-
bat power but globally distributed engagement forces, such as frigates, that are
capable of exercising control of the seas.
“Sea power” encompasses both naval power and maritime power. Naval
power combines strategy and doctrine with warships and aircraft in order to de-
ter maritime threats, win war at sea, and project power ashore. The more
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inclusive concept of “maritime power” applies all components of diplomatic, in-
formational, military, and economic aspects of national power in the maritime
domain. The expanded notion of sea power as against purely naval power is de-
pendent upon the regimes created by progressive maritime law. The primary
beneficiaries of this phenomenon in the United States are the Coast Guard and
Marine Corps, which share a history of maritime constabulary opera-
tions—positioned at the seam between peace and war and embracing the geo-
graphic dimensions of land and sea. In contrast, for decades the Navy
marginalized amphibious warfare; only in the last decade has this mind-set
changed. It is no coincidence, however, that while the Coast Guard and Marine
Corps have become more relevant, the Navy still struggles to find its place
amid a network of new regimes that enable coalition maritime constabulary
operations and the building of maritime security capacity and partnership.
The Cooperative Strategy of 2007 attempts to serve as a framework to fill this
void, but problems of adapting to the new approach persist. Four years after in-
troducing the “thousand-ship navy” concept and a year after soliciting inputs
from American embassy posts, the Pentagon still has yet to implement its vi-
sion for the Global Maritime Partnership.17 Furthermore, the new legal net-
works and partnerships that facilitate maritime coalitions should have been
central to the Cooperative Strategy; instead, the document barely mentions in-
ternational law, obliquely noting that “theater security cooperation” requires,
among other things, “regional frameworks for improving maritime gover-
nance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law,” at sea.18 Although the
strategy correctly suggests that “trust and cooperation cannot be surged,” it
fails to promote America’s great strength in broadening the rule of law in the
oceans. The lack of a specific reference to the global network of international
laws that implicitly underlie the Cooperative Strategy represents a missed op-
portunity to play to the core U.S. strength, focus the purpose and goals of na-
tional maritime security, and reassure states skeptical of American intentions.
The emerging global maritime security regime is inclusive, multilateral, and
consensual. In contrast to the disparate and competing national perspectives on
international law concerning the initiation of war and the conduct of armed
conflict (in Iraq beginning in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006, and in Georgia in 2008),
there is great accord on the legal framework necessary for ensuring maritime se-
curity. Since the United States was the principal sponsor of the international sys-
tem developed in the wake of World War II, the evolution of sea power as an
outgrowth of international maritime law plays to a unique American strength.
The trend converts traditional competition arising from naval power—a “strug-
gle for power”—to a contest to interpret and shape the legal regimes of the
global maritime partnership—a “struggle for law.”
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The United States has become the world’s leader in advancing these positive
relationships, which include such nonbinding political arrangements as the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Department of Energy’s megaports
initiative (to detect radioactive sources inbound to the United States from for-
eign ports), and the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security
Initiative (CSI), which seeks to screen, though not necessarily inspect, every
container entering the country. The United States has also been a principal pro-
ponent and organizer of multilateral binding legal instruments, including UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, which requires states to enforce effec-
tive measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
as well as several post-9/11 updates to important treaties under the rubric of the
IMO.
THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME SECURITY
This narrative on the importance of international law at sea is at odds with much
of the conventional wisdom that characterizes the oceans as an ungoverned legal
vacuum.19 The global order of the oceans springs from the architecture of the in-
ternational law of the sea and of the IMO, and the new maritime security re-
gimes fall within those frameworks. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was
the first—and remains the foremost—international instrument for realizing
collaborative approaches to maritime security. Attempts in 1930, 1958, and 1960
at developing a widely accepted multilateral framework on oceans law had either
ended in utter failure or achieved only modest gains. In contrast, UNCLOS con-
tributes directly to international peace and security, by replacing abundant con-
flicting maritime claims with universally agreed limits on coastal-state
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The treaty is anchored in a set of navigational re-
gimes that establish common expectations, delineating the rights and duties of
flag, port, and coastal states. Even though some state parties occasionally pro-
pose rules that evidence unorthodox misreadings of the convention—such as
China’s bogus security claims in the East China and Yellow seas—UNCLOS has
served as a stabilizing force, a framework that protects and promotes the princi-
pal American interest in freedom of the seas. In doing so the multilateral agree-
ment, which now has more than 155 state parties, picked the international
community out of what D. P. O’Connell once described as an “intellectual mo-
rass” in which competing opinions and views served as a substitute for law. As a
result, the number of controversies in the oceans has declined.20
UNCLOS contains provisions relating specifically to maritime security. Arti-
cle 99 pertains to trafficking in human slaves, articles 100–107 address piracy,
and article 111 contains provisions for hot pursuit from the high seas into a
coastal state’s territorial sea. The convention also provides for the control of the
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illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, in article 108, international maritime drug traf-
ficking having become more prevalent during the decade of the treaty’s negotia-
tion. Article 110 incorporates the customary norm in international law that
warships may exercise the right of “approach and visit” of merchant vessels. The
convention permits a right of visit or boarding on the high seas by warships of all
nations, even without the consent of the flag state, for the purpose of disrupting
certain universal crimes, such as human slave trafficking.21 Whereas the right of
visit and search in the law of naval warfare has largely become an anachronism,
the right of approach and visit is employed on a daily basis in maritime security
operations.
The IMO, as a specialized agency of the UN recognized in the law of the sea
as the “competent international organization” for the setting of worldwide
shipping standards and approval of coastal-state regulations affecting interna-
tional shipping, is the key institution for the development of international
maritime law. With 167 state parties, the organization is consensus oriented
and broadly inclusive. Since its inception under the 1948 Convention on the
Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the organization
has proved remarkably effective in promoting safe, clean, and efficient ship-
ping. There is a refreshing absence of the political posturing that too fre-
quently marks the proceedings of some other UN agencies. The IMO member
states have adopted nearly fifty treaties and hundreds of codes, guidelines, and
recommendations that address nearly all aspects of shipping. These regimes
are now applicable to almost 100 percent of global tonnage.22
Global Cargo-Chain Security
Given especially the increasing reliance on “just in time” delivery, countries have
become closely bound together by maritime shipping; more than 90 percent of
global trade is conducted over the sea-lanes. Ensuring maritime security re-
quires a concerted effort among littoral and coastal states, landlocked and port
states, and especially flag states, working in conjunction with international orga-
nizations and the maritime industry. Nearly every maritime security scenario
involves multiple states and stakeholders—all with an interest in collaborative
decision making. A vessel hijacked by pirates or engaged in smuggling most
likely is registered in one nation (such as Greece), owned by a corporation lo-
cated in another nation (perhaps South Korea), and operated by a crew
comprising nationals of several additional countries (say, the Philippines or Pa-
kistan). Furthermore, the vessel may well be transporting either containerized
cargo or bulk commodities owned by companies in one or more additional
states, like Singapore. Finally, port officials or naval forces from several nations
may become involved in intercepting the ship, and each is likely to operate
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within its own rules of law enforcement and the use of force. Consequently, in-
ternational law constitutes the “language and logic” for facilitating cooperation
among these stakeholders.23
Specifically, the 1974 SOLAS Convention is the cornerstone for cooperation
regarding merchant fleet security. The treaty applies to 98 percent of world ship-
ping, and it reflects comprehensive safety standards for construction, design,
equipment, and manning of vessels. Ship subdivision and stability, fire protec-
tion, lifesaving appliances and arrangements, radio communications, safety of
navigation, carriage of cargoes and dangerous goods, and safe management
practices are all part of the package. In 2002, in the wake of the attacks of 9/11
the IMO convened a diplomatic conference to adopt amendments to Chapter XI
of SOLAS, called the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. The ISPS
Code launched a worldwide public-private partnership for maritime security,
designed to enable national governments to develop better oversight of their
commercial shipping and port facility industries. The code contains mandatory
requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies, as
well as a separate (nonmandatory) set of guidelines. In force for 158 states, ac-
counting for over 99 percent of the world’s merchant-fleet gross tonnage, the
ISPS Code provides a standardized framework for evaluating risk. By assisting
governments in synchronizing changes in the threat level with security mea-
sures, it reduces the vulnerability of assets and infrastructure.
Another set of SOLAS amendments has also enhanced the security of the
global cargo chain by bringing greater transparency to the maritime domain.
Using technology to pinpoint the location of merchant shipping, these amend-
ments provide commercial fleet, port, coastal-state, and flag-state authorities
with a greater level of “maritime domain awareness.” Situational awareness de-
pends on the ability to monitor activities so that trends can be identified and ir-
regularities distinguished. Data must be collected, fused, and analyzed;
computer data-integration and analysis algorithms can assist in handling the
disparate data streams. By understanding where legitimate shipping is located,
states can focus scarce resources on anomalous contacts and sort civil commerce
from suspicious activity.
Two systems for collecting and sharing information are attached to the
SOLAS Convention—the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and the
emerging, satellite-based Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) sys-
tem. AIS was originally designed in the 1990s to make transit through the Pan-
ama Canal safer. Vessels equipped with AIS continuously transmit size and
heading data; because of the signal’s limited range and the system’s open-access
architecture, however, AIS has substantial limitations. By way of developing a
next-generation approach to maritime situational awareness, in May 2006 the
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IMO adopted LRIT as an additional amendment to SOLAS Chapter V. More se-
cure than AIS and favored by the U.S. Coast Guard, LRIT is a global, satellite-
based vessel-identification system. When fully operational in 2009, LRIT will
make information on vessel location and identity available worldwide. Flag and
port states will be able to collect information on vessels flying their flags or
bound to their ports, and coastal states on vessels passing within a thousand
nautical miles of their coastlines. Vessels will transmit position reports periodi-
cally to cooperating national, regional, or international LRIT data centers. The
new system will be mandatory for ships three hundred gross tons or greater
making international voyages.
As early as 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, then Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, called for creation of a “maritime NORAD,” a maritime analogue of the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration or an international Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF) signal, by which states would carefully plot and track every vessel.
After all, it was reasoned, ships are both slower and larger than aircraft; if aircraft
can be tracked in real time, why not vessels? But maritime situational awareness
is not an unmitigated public good. Both coastal states and rogue nonstate mari-
time groups, such as terrorists or pirates, could misuse data; coastal states could
use the information to impede the exercise of freedom of navigation and over-
flight; and international criminal organizations might employ it to attack or dis-
rupt shipping. In November 2008, for example, Somali pirates reportedly used
AIS to locate and hijack the thousand-foot-long supertanker Sirius Star, which
was passing 450 miles off the coast of Kenya.
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at Sea
Since the destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) was attacked in Yemen in 2000, remark-
able maritime terrorist incidents have included the attack on the French tanker
Limburg off the coast of Yemen in 2002 and the deadly bombing in the Philippines
of Superferry 14 in 2004 by the Abu Sayyaf group. These attacks and others illus-
trate the vulnerability in the maritime domain; in addition, the development of
new rules to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation at sea has been a center-
piece of the emerging international law of maritime security. Concern over the
threat of catastrophic terrorist attack from the sea galvanized efforts to strengthen
port and vessel security after 9/11. In no other area of international law have na-
tions so effectively and seamlessly combined elements of the law of armed conflict
and law enforcement into a unified approach.
One of the first efforts to develop new norms against proliferation of WMD
was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Frustrated by the inability of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain to seize lawfully the MV So San in
December 2002, a group of nations collaborated to form PSI. The So San was
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permitted to continue into port to unload its dangerous consignment (Scud
missiles intended for North Korea), but the effect throughout the maritime se-
curity community was indelible—and work began immediately on a new initia-
tive to tighten nonproliferation rules.24
Speaking in Kraków, Poland, in May 2003, President George W. Bush un-
veiled PSI as a partnership activity to counter proliferation and trafficking of
WMD in accordance with international law and under the guidance of a set of
interdiction principles. Originally eleven core members launched the initia-
tive. More than ninety states have joined the informal network to work to-
gether in a more coordinated and effective manner, and PSI was endorsed by
the UN Secretary-General.25 Participants include some of the nations with the
largest shipping registries in the world, such as Panama, Liberia, and Malta.
Nine states have signed PSI ship-boarding agreements with the United
States.26 The agreements do not constitute authority by one state to board the
vessel of the other, but they offer a mechanism for expedited review of requests
to board, and some provide for presumed consent if a request is not denied by
the flag state within a few hours.
Only months after the initiative began, British and American intelligence ser-
vices discovered that the German-registered vessel BBC China was transporting
uranium-enrichment equipment from Malaysia to Libya, via Dubai. With the
consent of the German government the vessel was diverted to the Italian port of
Taranto, where Italian authorities searched the vessel and seized centrifuge ma-
terials, which were not listed on the cargo manifest. Two months later Libya an-
nounced that it was abandoning its ambition to develop a uranium-enrichment
capability.27 The BBC China interdiction has been followed by additional PSI
successes, conducted quietly to avoid attention.28 Efforts by Iran to procure
goods for its nuclear program have been disrupted, and a country in another re-
gion of the world has been prevented from receiving equipment for a ballistic-
missile program.29
In separate European regional initiatives, the European Union (EU) and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken action against the mari-
time terrorist threat. Following 9/11, NATO embarked on Operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR (OAE) in October 2001, the only operation ever conducted by the or-
ganization under the mutual-defense clause of article 5 of the NATO charter.30
Under OAE naval forces have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, monitoring
shipping and conducting escort operations and boardings. Warships from Russia
and Ukraine also have participated. At the Thessaloníki European Council in June
2003, the EU began to establish effective policies for the disruption of interna-
tional shipments of WMD and related materials. In August 2004 the EU issued a
strategy against WMD proliferation.31 The cornerstone of the EU’s approach to
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combating WMD is effective multilateralism, which means that international
regimes should be able to detect violations and enforce prohibitions. The EU
also advocates strengthening the role of the UN Security Council as the final ar-
biter on the consequences of noncompliance.
Seven months after the introduction of PSI, the Security Council adopted a
historic resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to address terrorism
and the maritime transport of WMD. Unanimously adopted in April 2004, Res-
olution 1540 is binding on all nations under article 49 of the UN Charter. The
resolution asserts that proliferation of WMD to nonstate actors constitutes a
threat to international peace and security within the meaning of article 39 of the
UN Charter and promulgates new rules to address that threat.32 The resolution
calls on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD, of-
fering a foundation for counterproliferation law. That WMD proliferation poses
a threat to international peace and security was reiterated in Security Council
Resolution 1718, which was directed at North Korea following Pyongyang’s nu-
clear test of October 2006.33 The resolution also called upon all states to prevent
North Korea from obtaining material that would support its nuclear, WMD, or
missile programs, or even substantially replenishing the country’s stock of con-
ventional weaponry.
As a complement to Resolution 1540 and reflecting the philosophy of PSI, the
International Maritime Organization adopted in 2005 two major protocols that
collectively represent a breakthrough in maritime security cooperation. The
year after the 1985 hijacking by Palestinian terrorists of the Italian-flag cruise
ship Achille Lauro and the brutal murder of a disabled American passenger, Leon
Klinghoffer, Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed that the IMO prepare a conven-
tion on crimes against the safety of maritime navigation. The goal was a compre-
hensive set of rules to ensure cooperation among states for the suppression of
unlawful acts at sea. The IMO promptly drafted a treaty, and in 1988 a confer-
ence in Rome adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).34 The prohibited acts include
seizing “control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intim-
idation” (article 3), acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the plac-
ing of devices on board a ship that are likely to destroy or damage it. The
convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute
offenders.
Today 149 states are party to the SUA Convention, and these states represent
about 92 percent of the world’s merchant shipping tonnage. In 2005 a diplomatic
conference at the IMO adopted two protocols to the convention, one on strength-
ening the rules for the safety of vessels, the other on the safety of fixed platforms
on the continental shelf. The 2005 protocols add several new offenses, including
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attempts to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international
organization. Specifically, the 2005 protocols criminalize such perilous activities
as using any explosive, radioactive material, or a biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapon on or against a ship; knowingly transporting such material on a ship; or
operating a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage. The
protocols also prohibit the transport of “dual use” or source materials that might
find their way into chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
With PSI, Resolution 1540, and the amended SUA Convention, nations are
establishing a global, and increasingly effective, network of legal and policy au-
thorities to synchronize intelligence and operations against terrorists and WMD
in the maritime domain. Some believe the SUA protocols may end up eclipsing
PSI, notwithstanding the value of an interlocking network of formal and infor-
mal arrangements. First, the era of “coalitions of the willing” may be coming to a
close, the concept having been badly bruised by the experience of Iraq. For all
the groundbreaking (and frankly astonishing) successes of PSI, some countries
are wary of its informal nature and process. Second, shipping commerce is a
global industry, one that relies on a common framework of international con-
ventions and treaties; the industry can operate efficiently only when regulations
applicable to a particular ship are identical at the port of departure, on the high
seas, and at the port of arrival. Since PSI focuses on enlarging national authori-
ties rather than global rules, it is more likely to create inadvertently a web of in-
consistent national laws than is the standardized international legal regime of
SUA. The shipping industry is hopeful that the amended SUA 2005 will attract
widespread support and enter into force quickly.
Counterpiracy
Maritime piracy has returned as a major security issue only in the last decade. In
2008 maritime piracy doubled in the Horn of Africa, with Somali pirates hijack-
ing more than forty vessels and taking nearly nine hundred seafarers hostage. Pi-
ratical attacks in the Gulf of Aden expose civil shipping to dangers not
experienced since the Iran-Iraq “tanker war” of the 1980s. The law of the sea de-
fines maritime piracy as an illegal act of violence or detention committed for
private ends; on the high seas, anywhere else outside the jurisdiction of a state,
and in such ungoverned areas as Somalia’s territorial sea, any nation may take
action against piracy. Customary international law provides, in fact, that any na-
tion may assert jurisdiction over piracy, including the state of registry or flag
state of the attacked vessel, nations whose citizens are victims, and in some cases
coastal or port states.
In 1986 the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO adopted Circular 443
promulgating measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crew on
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board ships.35 The circular applied to passenger ships on voyages of twenty-four
hours or more and to port facilities that service those vessels. After a minor surge
in piracy in the early 1990s, the IMO released two circulars, 622 and 623, to
counter the threat.36 The first detailed recommendations to governments for
preventing and suppressing piracy, and the second offered guidance to the mari-
time commercial sector. In 1999 both circulars were revised.37 The revision to
Circular 622 sets forth investigative protocols for use after a pirate attack, as well
as a draft regional agreement on counterpiracy.38 The revised Circular 623 lists
measures by which the shipping industry can reduce vulnerability to piracy,
such as enhanced lighting and alarms.39 In 2008 Denmark proposed that both
circulars be reviewed and again updated in light of the recent attacks in the Horn
of Africa, and that review is under way.
In 2008, after prompting from Mr. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, the Secretary-
General of the IMO, the Security Council took action against piracy in the Horn
of Africa by adopting four key resolutions under Chapter VII, authorizing “all
necessary means.” The resolutions enhance counterpiracy collaboration among
nations, strengthen operational capabilities, remove sanctuaries in Somalia, and
support criminal prosecution.
Resolution 1816 of 2 June allowed naval forces cooperating with the Transi-
tional Federal Government of Somalia to pursue pirates into Somalia’s ungov-
erned territorial waters. Resolution 1838, adopted in October, expressed
concern over the threat of piracy to World Food Program shipments to Somalia,
called upon states to deploy naval vessels and aircraft to the Gulf of Aden and
surrounding waters, and affirmed that UNCLOS embodies the rules applicable
to countering piracy. Resolution 1846 of 2 December 2008 suggested that the
1988 SUA Convention could be applied in the extradition and prosecution of pi-
rates. Two weeks later, Resolution 1851 authorized states to take action against
safe havens used by pirates ashore in Somalia (an authority likely to be imple-
mented only cautiously). It also invited states with maritime forces in the area
and regional states to conclude arrangements to embark local law-enforcement
officials on board their warships patrolling the area. Finally, Resolution 1851 en-
couraged formation of a multinational Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia. More than thirty countries and organizations, including the EU,
NATO, and the African Union, responded, forming working groups to develop
collective action for various aspects of the effort against Somali piracy.
Following the adoption of these four UN Security Council resolutions, the
United Kingdom and the United States signed counterpiracy cooperation agree-
ments with Kenya, and the United States made the first transfer of captured pi-
rate suspects to Kenya in March 2009.
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Based on language developed at an IMO meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
in April 2008, eight coastal states situated on the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and
the western Indian Ocean, plus Ethiopia, met in January 2009 and concluded the
Djibouti Code of Conduct to combat acts of piracy against ships. The agreement
is based on a sixteen-nation counterpiracy treaty known as the Regional Coop-
eration Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP), which has been remarkably successful in reducing piracy at-
tacks in East Asia. Just as ReCAAP was the first Asian agreement dedicated to
counterpiracy, the Djibouti Code of Conduct is the first such regional agree-
ment between Arab and African countries, although the Djibouti accord is not
legally binding.
Counternarcotics
Decades before UNCLOS entered into force, states were negotiating in earnest to
counter maritime drug trafficking. These efforts represent windows into early
instances of effective collaboration in the maritime domain. Today,
internationally organized criminals operate illicit maritime networks for drug
trafficking, and the ocean is the preferred medium for moving multi-ton loads
from producers in the Andean Ridge and South Asia to black markets in Europe
and North America. Drug traffickers exploit related illicit networks to facilitate
additional crimes, including money laundering, transnational corruption, hu-
man trafficking, and terrorism.
Three widely accepted international treaties, which enjoy near-universal ac-
ceptance, call on states to cooperate in counterdrug activities and operations.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) has been in force since 1964
and has 180 state parties; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
entered into force in 1976 and has 175 state parties; and the UN Convention on
Illicit Traffic of Narcotics and Psychotropic Drugs (1988) has been in force since
1990, with 170 state parties. These treaties are mutually supportive and comple-
mentary. An important purpose of the first two was to codify internationally ap-
plicable control measures in order to ensure the availability of lawful narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes while
preventing their diversion into the black market. The third treaty regulates pre-
cursor chemicals used in manufacturing drugs controlled by the Single Conven-
tion and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and it also strengthens
provisions against money laundering and other drug-related crimes.
States often fulfill their obligations under the multilateral treaties through
bilateral or regional maritime counterdrug agreements. The United States has
negotiated twenty-six such bilateral agreements, mostly with Caribbean states.
Under these arrangements, states permit other nations to operate in waters
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under their jurisdictions in accordance with preplanned actions or responses.
The agreements often define specific parameters, such as geographical areas,
time periods, frequency, or potential targets or suspects. Operational coopera-
tion may include exchange of information or cooperative patrolling or en-
forcement actions. Typically state parties prescribe procedures for designating
on-scene commanders and mutually acceptable rules of engagement for mari-
time counterdrug operations. States also may reach agreement on whether a
party may board vessels of another party, and if so, under what circumstances.
The agreements accelerate real-time decision making, allowing determina-
tions on boarding and seizure to be made more quickly.
NEW NOTIONS OF SEA POWER
Threats to maritime security flourish at the “seams” of globalization, where ju-
risdiction can be unclear and the inherent isolation of vessels and nations can be
exploited. International law has become the most effective tool for closing these
seams. The emerging international rules have had a transformative effect upon
how maritime security is thought about and implemented.
The new international maritime law increases coordination among con-
cerned partners and improves the readiness of all states to act effectively. The de-
velopment of the law is regional and global, bilateral and multilateral. The
sweeping nature of this development—in its application to all oceans, narrow
seas, and coastal areas; the depth of the measures for which it provides; and the
self-perpetuating nature of the legal and policy networks that propel them—has
given law a defining role with respect to notions of sea power. Collectively, the
initiatives described here have completely renovated international maritime law
and now presage a new, cooperative approach to sea power.
The widespread consensus throughout the world regarding maritime secu-
rity has been notably absent in other security contexts, such as the debate over
whether counterterrorism operations on land constitute law enforcement or
warfare. The principal manifestation of this dispute is the debate over whether
captured terrorists should be treated as criminals or some stripe of unlawful
combatant under the laws of war. The United States has been incapable of deal-
ing with the issue, dissatisfied with the ability of the criminal-law model to en-
sure security but uncomfortable with the application of the law of armed
conflict. Even the nation’s highest court has been unable to resolve the matter
clearly.40 Meanwhile, maritime international law has moved purposefully and
confidently toward a middle path, recognizing that though maritime law arises
in a peacetime framework it must be responsive to conventional, asymmetric,
and hybrid threats at sea. Informed by centuries of progress and shared
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experience in the struggle with piracy, maritime international law quite com-
fortably straddles the divide between criminal law and the law of war.
Many misunderstand the interface between international law and domestic
authorities. This intersection is the sphere of foreign-relations law, and it is the
critical bridge between international commitments and treaties and their im-
plementation by individual states. Most international agreements are not
self-executing; in the United States and many other countries, international ob-
ligations must be implemented by domestic legislation to be given effect. The
nuances of this interface have real consequences for naval forces. The fact that an
activity like piracy is a universal crime in customary international law does not
mean a state can take enforcement action if it has not criminalized piracy under
its domestic law. Foreign-relations law fuses sea power and maritime-security
operations to international legal regimes.
The U.S. Coast Guard has been much more sensitive to recognize and capital-
ize on this new state of affairs than the Navy, perhaps because it is simulta-
neously a law-enforcement agency and an armed force, and because it leads the
American delegation to the IMO. The Coast Guard takes a holistic “systems”
view of maritime governance, in terms of regimes, awareness, and operations;
the Navy’s approach to these issues is not as well developed. For example, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard has championed the SOLAS amendments that
will create the LRIT system; for their part, few naval officers are familiar with the
system, though it is the future of unclassified information sharing for maritime
domain awareness. Moreover, international maritime law is too often viewed
within the Navy through an outdated prism, particularly by officers who rose
during the Cold War. That is, the Navy tends to see international maritime law as
comprising the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (which reflects the core Ameri-
can interest in freedom of navigation) and the law of naval warfare (which has
enjoyed only sporadic relevance since World War II). The new treaties and part-
nerships are unfamiliar to many naval officers.
But this will change as these initiatives continue to reconfigure sea power it-
self. Consequently it is not surprising (but unfortunate) that the Cooperative
Strategy failed to promote international law of the sea as the organizing principle
and principal goal of U.S. maritime strategy. This glaring omission has been
noted by numerous friends and allies, who time and again reminded the United
States of the centrality of international law in their responses to the original
thousand-ship-navy concept. Writing separately, naval commanders from
France, Ghana, India, Portugal, and Spain all made reference to the importance
of international maritime law in their comments on the thousand-ship navy
published in 2006 by the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute.41 A year later,
many of the same chiefs of service were asked to respond to Admiral Michael G.
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
137
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:45:23 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
138
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/20
Mullen’s plan for a new U.S. maritime strategy. Once again, international law
was a prominent feature of their replies; the leaders of the naval forces of Brazil,
Peru, Portugal, Colombia, Uruguay, Lebanon, and Spain urged the United States
to ensure that maritime security is rooted in multilateral legal frameworks.42 It is
especially important that the vigorous expansion of maritime partnership inte-
gration propelled by international law be maintained. The maritime domain
awareness provisions of the SOLAS Convention, the counterproliferation and
counterterrorism elements of the SUA 2005 protocols, and PSI, with its informal
nature, and Security Council action against piracy, constitute the greatest pack-
age of multilateral maritime-security commitments since the interwar period of
the 1930s. The United States led each of these efforts, but there is a widespread
perception that the American “brand” has suffered since and that the diplomatic
influence of its friends and allies in Europe has diminished.43 Meanwhile, that of
China and Russia is expanding. The upshot is a degree of doubt about the ability
of the West to shape the future direction of international maritime law toward a
shared vision of the rule of law at sea. This means that we should be prepared to
make even greater investments in cooperation, and the development of
international maritime law and institutions, to realize the goals of the Coopera-
tive Strategy.
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Commander Steven C. Boraz, U.S. Navy
Maritime Domain Awareness is where it all begins. We cannot conduct
the operations that we must if we don’t have a good sense of what’s out
there, moving on, above or under the sea.
ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, IN RHUMB LINES, 20 AUGUST 2007
It was not long after the attacks of September 11th that government officials be-gan discussing other avenues that terrorists might use to attack American citi-
zens, particularly in the maritime domain. In a speech delivered in January 2002,
President George W. Bush noted, “The heart of the Maritime Domain Aware-
ness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional
maritime boundaries.”1 By November 2002 Congress had passed the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002.2 The National Security Council and the
president continued to explore issues surrounding the safety and security of the
U.S. maritime environs. In December 2004, the president signed National Secu-
rity Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13,
which established policy guidelines. It also directed the secretaries of Homeland
Security and Defense to lead the federal effort in developing a comprehensive
national strategy that would better integrate and syn-
chronize existing department-level strategies and en-
sure their effective and efficient implementation. The
interagency Maritime Security Policy Coordinating
Committee was established to serve as the primary fo-
rum for coordinating government maritime security
policies; it delivered a National Strategy for Maritime
Security in September 2005.3 Eight additional plans,
including the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Do-
main Awareness, buttress the national strategy.4
Commander Boraz, an eighteen-year veteran of the
U.S. Navy’s intelligence community, is currently the
Assistant Program Manager for Maritime Domain
Awareness at Program Executive Office, Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelli-
gence in San Diego, California. He served as a Federal
Executive Fellow at the RAND Corporation from 2004
to 2005. He has published in several professional jour-
nals and is coeditor of Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles
to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2007).
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In response, the departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and De-
fense identified executive agents to lead their efforts toward achieving maritime
domain awareness (MDA): the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and
the Navy, respectively.
The Coast Guard has recently established the Nationwide Automatic Identifi-
cation System, a robust command-and-control network designed to improve
maritime safety and security at the nation’s highest-priority ports and coastal
zones. Customs and Border Protection, another Homeland Security agency, has
the Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership against
Terrorism (C-TPAT).5
The Maritime Administration helped develop the Maritime Safety and Secu-
rity Information System (MSSIS), participates in the MDA executive steering
committee, and is tasked by Congress to be the “Information Advocate of the
Marine Transportation System.”6
The Navy, for its part, has pushed the concept of the “thousand-ship navy”;7
at least one senior advocate has declared that “it is virtually indisputable that
MDA is the enabling mission supporting Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing,
and is a primary focus of what FORCEnet will ultimately do.”8 MDA is a key
component in the Navy’s new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower, which notes, “To be effective, there must be a significantly in-
creased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA). . . . Mari-
time forces will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and
energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our
shores as possible.”9
The Secretary of the Navy has deemed MDA important enough to direct the
service to develop a “cross-functional team” from the operational staff and ac-
quisition communities to implement an initial MDA capability in the Central
and Pacific Command areas of responsibility and on the west coast of the United
States by August 2008; the secretary committed more than $300 million to doing
so.10 There are literally hundreds more public and commercial MDA-related ac-
tivities being developed.
MDA is also a contemporary debate topic. This journal, for example, has pro-
vided ample space to the maritime strategy and MDA, and it routinely publishes
articles regarding maritime security.11 Also, maritime security figures promi-
nently in literature issued by think tanks.12
Even without such extensive and varied activity, it would be clear that MDA is
a cornerstone of national security, as more than 80 percent of the world’s trade
travels by water.13 Nonetheless, operators, acquisition professionals, defense
contractors, and policy makers still find maritime domain awareness a difficult
idea. This is the case because of widespread misperceptions about what it takes
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to achieve MDA, who should implement it, where, and how. This article is in-
tended to address and clear away some of those stumbling blocks.
Myth: “The Navy Has Always ‘Done’ MDA”
The reality is that navies of the world, both ancient and modern, have always
gathered data on their maritime environments to gain situational awareness
that their missions required, whether basic navigation or finding an enemy ar-
mada and stopping it before it could attack. Many argue that there has simply
been a change in the details; in fact, however, that would be akin to saying hu-
manity had been “doing” physics before Isaac Newton—the context of the MDA
we’ve been “doing” and that of the MDA we need to achieve are vastly different.
This is true for three reasons.
First, the scale of “doing” MDA has dramatically expanded; massive
amounts of data on all aspects of maritime activity must be collected, then
cross-referenced, “fused” (generally speaking, correlated across sources), and
analyzed, in order to detect anomalies that may indicate threat-related behav-
ior.14 The computing power required is inordinately greater than the capacity
of the “grey matter” of those keeping watch. For example, during the Cold War
probably fewer than a thousand ships were tracked globally at any one time. To-
day, hundreds of thousands of ships need to be tracked and the links among
their cargoes, crews, and financial transactions sorted out. The November 2008
seaborne attacks on Mumbai represent a vivid case in point. The attackers hi-
jacked an Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber, which routinely traveled to Mumbai
from a port in Gujarat State near the India-Pakistan border. Approximately 950
trawlers, carrying eight thousand fishermen, come to Mumbai every year, over
an eight-month period beginning in August.15 Making the connections between
these trawlers and the terrorists who may take advantage of such logistics net-
works requires much more than “what we’ve always been doing.”
Second, the U.S. Navy has let the arts of understanding regional maritime ac-
tivity and determining trends therein atrophy. For years, this was a mission as-
signed to Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facilities and Centers (FOSIFs
and FOSICs). Staffed with naval intelligence professionals, “operators,” and ci-
vilian analysts, they provided in-depth analysis of the activities of the navies
(and some air forces) in all the maritime environs in which the U.S. Navy oper-
ated.16 In the restructuring that resulted from the demise of the Soviet Union
and a new U.S. emphasis on joint structures, the missions that FOSIFs and
FOSICs had once met were transferred to Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs).
Whether because the maritime environment has changed so drastically—that is,
no Soviet navy—or because, as some contend, the centers simply ignore mari-
time issues and focus their intelligence support on combatant commanders (i.e.,
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of unified, or interservice, regional or functional commands) rather than op-
erational forces, is immaterial. The result is less support to naval forces. The
emerging “Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers”
(MHQ/MOC) concept may fill the gap. MHQ/MOC envisions a global network
of Navy-maritime organizations in support of national requirements.17 The ini-
tial plan establishes MHQs for each of the “numbered fleets” (e.g., the Seventh
Fleet in the western Pacific Ocean, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, etc.). A
“concept of operations” argues:
A key element of both homeland defense and maritime security overseas is achieving
and maintaining global maritime intelligence integration (GMII) and maritime do-
main awareness (MDA), which will require integrating various local and regional es-
timates within a global context. Maritime forces are a key element in this layered
defense of national interests, both in the forward regions and in the approaches to
the continental United States, where the objective is “to detect, deter, and, if neces-
sary, defeat threats en route—before they reach the United States.”18
Applied regional MDA expertise, then, is urgently needed. Imagine, in a
war-fighting context, having to determine the intention of a particular mer-
chant ship for the commander of the Seventh Fleet, or of the entire Pacific Fleet,
and “turning on the MDA switch” to do so—only to find the circuit not con-
nected. When the Soviet navy was at sea, teams kept checklists on its specific ac-
tivities, past and present; they knew what each one meant and had a very good
idea as to what would follow. Today, in contrast, the U.S. Navy does not have the
intelligence, operational, intellectual, or technical capacity to support MDA-
related missions at the operational level of war. Part of the shortfall is being ad-
dressed by new programs, as well as by the reestablishment of the Advanced
Maritime Operational Intelligence Course at the Center for Naval Intelligence in
Dam Neck, Virginia, but these very initiatives are evidence that the gap exists.
Third, the way the Navy views commercial merchant traffic (traditionally
color coded as “white”) has changed. White shipping used to be a navigational
and watch-keeping problem—something not to collide with or at which not to
direct missiles. Now it is a potential threat as evinced by the al-Qa‘ida attacks on
the USS Cole in 2000 and the crude-oil carrier M/V Limburg in 2002, the
Mumbai attacks, and numerous acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa, in the
Malacca Strait, and elsewhere.
Myth: “MDA Is All about ‘White’ Shipping”
In reality, maritime domain awareness is about considerably more than white
shipping. As we have seen, it puts white shipping in an entirely different light;
however, MDA is “the effective understanding of anything associated with the
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global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or envi-
ronment of the United States.”19 Maritime domain awareness means finding the
ships and submarines of friends and foes, understanding the entire supply chain
of cargoes, identifying people aboard vessels, understanding the infrastructures
within or astride the maritime domain, and identifying anomalies and potential
threats in all these areas. Naval officers, however, focus more often than not on
security aspects; for them, MDA boils down to a maritime targeting issue. “Tar-
geting,” in this sense, does not always involve a “kinetic effect” (a weapon strik-
ing an object). It may mean pointing out to a boarding team a merchant vessel
that it should strike up a conversation with; identifying a cargo carrier as suspect
so it can be held offshore for inspection; understanding the flows of personnel
and cargo at a shore facility; or, when a kinetic targeting solution is required,
picking out the wheat from the chaff.
Myth: “MDA Is Too Amorphous a Concept to Be Useful”
In reality—and while maritime domain awareness certainly has different mean-
ings for Captains of Ports, masters of ships, and everyone in between—the com-
mon requirements of safety, security, the economy, and the environment
resonate among all its stakeholders. This was evident at the MDA Connectivity
Workshop conference held in Newport, Rhode Island, in August 2007 and at-
tended by representatives of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, NATO, New
Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The interna-
tional attendees agreed that “maritime domain awareness” was a flawed rubric
and that implied links to the U.S. global war on terror were worrisome. But their
primary maritime-security concerns were surprisingly similar: terrorism, illegal
migration, piracy, illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in pro-
tected areas, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and the need for security and en-
vironmental protection. That is, admittedly, a broad range of issues, but the fact
that so many disparate nations share them testifies to the importance of mari-
time domain awareness and the prospects for partnerships to achieve it.
Myth: “MDA Is All about the Blips on My Monitor”
The reality is that MDA is not just about the blips; it’s about whether the blips
matter. Aggregating disparate data sets to generate a useful operational picture is
an increasingly complex task because of the massive amounts of data available
on all aspects of maritime activity. Fusing and analyzing those data may find
anomalies that point to threat activity of interest to decision makers. The Navy’s
formal MDA concept lays it out as an equation: that maritime domain awareness
equals global maritime situational awareness (the blips) plus maritime threat
awareness (whether the blips matter).20
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Myth: “All We Need for MDA Is AIS”
The Automatic Identification System, or AIS, is indeed a reality. It uses a sig-
nal—a transponder-based collision-avoidance system that transmits and re-
ceives real-time navigational information via VHF line-of-sight radio—that can
be shared freely at the unclassified level. The International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) mandates its use on all passenger ships, tankers, and all other ships
of three hundred gross tons and above.21 AIS is a critical technology that en-
ables MDA. Its use has spawned navigational information networks and
“clearinghouses” in many nations; it is a key component of MSSIS; and it is
available commercially.22
However, the Automatic Identification System has its weaknesses. It can be
spoofed, its use is loosely enforced (if at all), and it provides information only on
ships mandated by the IMO; potential foes know how to use it, or not use it, so as
to hide their whereabouts. Moreover, due to the nature of the underlying com-
munications protocol (known as “time-division multiplexing”) that AIS em-
ploys, signal degradation in high-density environments limits the usefulness of
the system as well as the value of its proposed use on smaller ships. Strategic
partners have produced technical solutions that overcome this liability, by
means of the Global Packet Radio Service, a system in use for many mobile
phones.
The underlying issue is that neither AIS nor any other “silver bullet” will
achieve maritime domain awareness. MDA requires all manner of sensors, data-
bases, data sharing, decision aids, displays, etc. Without databases that can be
rapidly and adaptively searched to develop trends on specific ships, AIS does lit-
tle more than “spam” the maritime “common operational picture” with more
and more blips.
Myth: “MDA Can Be Done Entirely at the Unclassified Level”
The reality is that our ability to find, fix, track, and target is considerably enhanced
when classified or sensitive information is applied. There is no doubt that much of
the information available to achieve maritime domain awareness is unclassified.
Programs like the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT, MSSIS, and of course
AIS have been of considerable benefit to safety and security in the maritime do-
main. But how often will operational decisions be made on the basis of what is es-
sentially a navigational-hazard and ship-avoidance system? As Vice Admiral John
Morgan and Commander Bud Wimmer point out, “Maritime Domain Awareness
is all about generating actionable intelligence, the cornerstone of successful
counterterrorist and maritime law enforcement operations.”23 While unclassified
information can contribute significantly to “awareness” per se, producing
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actionable intelligence generally requires classified or sensitive information not
available in the public domain.
Myth: “We Can Just Build Something like ICAO for the Maritime Domain”
In reality, the maritime domain has unique compliance challenges, based on cul-
ture and competitive advantage. The International Civilian Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), a United Nations agency, codifies principles and techniques and
sets standards to facilitate border crossing for international civil aviation.24 Ac-
cording to some, the IMO should be able to do the same for the maritime
environment.
ICAO standards are based on the Chicago Convention of 1945–47, a docu-
ment that was agreed upon only two decades after the birth of international air
travel and so influenced its formative years. To speak of something similar in the
maritime domain fails to take into account that freedom of the seas has been a
critical aspect of commercial trade and an international standard for well over
two millenniums.
Moreover, commercial practice makes the analogy between the maritime and
air domains a poor one. Airplanes file flight plans, take off, and land. Ships file
sailing plans and depart but then, in a single extended voyage, may change flags,
change owners, change names, sell cargo, change their destinations, all in an at-
tempt to make, or not lose, money in a volatile, highly competitive shipping
market, and while other ships are trying to do the same.
While the development of international standards for the maritime domain
based on those now in effect for the air is a laudable goal and may be possible
someday, those who argue for them tend to forget that cultural change takes
time, usually proportionate to how long a culture has been in place. Further, the
cost would likely meet with substantial resistance from many nations. Establish-
ing ICAO-like standards in the maritime domain is simply not achievable in the
near term.
Myth: “MDA Can Be Done Virtually”
The reality is that much of what the United States has learned since the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001 points to the legal and cultural restrictions that ham-
per its ability to share information. There is little doubt that no single entity or
agency can be responsible for, or has the capacity to coordinate, all MDA-related
activity. That fact, coupled with modern network-centric information capabili-
ties, leads to a strong argument that “nodes” generating maritime situational
awareness must be linked and that some MDA functions must be done virtually.
The present approaches that have worked best include those of the National
Counterterrorism Center (in McLean, Virginia), the National Counterprolif-
eration Center (in Washington, D.C.), and the Joint Interagency Task Forces (West
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and South), because they put people and systems from different agencies into the
same physical structures. This enables (in fact, forces) information sharing while
ensuring that information does not cross information-security boundaries.
This brick-and-mortar solution might be applied to MDA in the form of
what might be called “maritime interagency task forces.” They would combine
elements of MHQ/MOCs, numbered-fleet command centers, the U.S. Coast
Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, and unified combatant com-
mands and might initially be staffed by those entities. They would also need ap-
propriate operations and intelligence specialists from various government
agencies (some of them already in the combatant commands), selected allied na-
tions, and commercial liaisons. The mission would be to deliver regionally fo-
cused expertise and operational support, for areas of responsibilities roughly
coinciding with those of the numbered fleets.
This would require a hard look at existing structures both within and outside the
continental United States, in particular the relationship among MHQ/MOCs, Joint
Intelligence Operation Centers in each of the combatant commands, and Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers. For instance, the maritime security mission of the Joint
Intelligence Operation Center significantly overlaps that of the MHQ/MOC, espe-
cially overseas. Given today’s resource constraints, combining people and missions
is worth considering. The same can be said for centers within the United States itself,
where the Coast Guard fusion centers would need to be accounted for as well.
Aside from the need for increased information sharing and better support to
operational forces, new tactics, techniques, and procedures would naturally flow
from these maritime interagency task forces. While technology will certainly
help, increased maritime domain awareness is virtually meaningless without the
tools needed by the decision makers who must carry out operational responses.
This is a key point, one that cross-functional teams have repeatedly made.
To be sure, “federation” across maritime stakeholders (that is, a division of la-
bor) will continue to be required. It is also of utmost import to get “reachback”
capabilities right—the ability of deployed forces to call, very quickly, upon the
full informational and analytical resources of intelligence commands back
home. That reachback needs to be as responsive to fleets as the FOSICs and
FOSIFs once were. Setting up regional “centers of maritime excellence” with the
right people, equipment, and training would be a step in the right direction.
Maritime domain awareness is neither tracks on a screen, systems that monitor
white shipping, (unachievable) international standards, nor something mari-
time security forces have always done. Nor is it easily achieved. But achieving
maritime domain awareness is critically important in today’s geopolitical con-
text, not just to guard against international terrorism but to promote commerce
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and safety and to respond to natural disasters, piracy, illegal migration, and arms
smuggling.
MDA is an important part of this nation’s security strategy, and achieving
it will require new thinking regarding the roles of national and international
maritime-security forces. Establishing “maritime interagency task forces,” or
something similar, will go a long way toward that goal. But whatever means it
chooses, the United States is a maritime nation in a maritime world—achieving
maritime domain awareness is a twenty-first-century strategic imperative.
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REVIEW ESSAY
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: GETTING IT RIGHT
Richard Norton
Brooks, Risa A. Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of
Strategic Assessment. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
2008. 315pp. $26.95
An impressive array of cross-disciplinary studies has long pointed to the criti-
cal importance of accurate assessment as a precondition for successful deci-
sion making. The argument is as simple as it is powerful: get the assessment
right and you still might fail, but get it wrong and you are all but guaranteed to
fail. Nowhere is the importance of assessment more important than in the
arena of national security, where leaders risk their states’ futures and, in cases
involving armed conflict, the lives of their citizens and, at times, national
survival.
Given the importance of strategic assessment, any insight into how to im-
prove the process and protect against failure is both useful and welcome. Shap-
ing Strategy provides just such insight. With work clearly rooted in what scholar
Graham Allison has titled “government politics,” Risa Brooks argues that two
key variables—the degree to which military and polit-
ical leaders dominate power relationships among gov-
ernment leaders and their respective organizations,
and the degree to which those leaders agree or dis-
agree over military and political preferences—are
critical in the quality of strategic assessments.
Brooks breaks down the components of strategic as-
sessment into four discrete subcategories: information
sharing, strategic coordination, structural competence,
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security af-
fairs at the U.S. Naval War College. While in the U.S.
Navy, he served at sea, as well as on Capitol Hill as a
Senate liaison officer with the Navy’s Office of Legisla-
tive Affairs. He retired from the Navy in 1996 with the
rank of commander. He holds a PhD from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in international rela-
tions. Dr. Norton has edited three national security vol-
umes published by the Naval War College.
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and the authorization process. This provides an elegant matrix by which to ana-
lyze the impacts of different power relations and preferences on strategic
assessment.
She first looks at Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s, essentially contrasting the
strategic assessments of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat. Her work in
this regard is excellent; it is painstaking and convincing. She then briefly re-
views six additional cases: five are Great Britain before the First World War,
Germany in the same years, Great Britain during the First World War, Pakistan
from 1997 to 1999, and Turkey from 1996 to 1999. The sixth and most recent,
lesser case focuses on the strategic assessment conducted by the United States
prior to initiating Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 2003 war with Iraq.
Brooks concludes that strategic assessment will be more successful when po-
litical leaders are dominant in power relationships and when divergence of pref-
erence from their military leaders is low. In contrast, strategic assessment is most
likely to be poor when military and political leaders share power and preference
divergence is high. In the majority of the selected cases, the evidence for this
conclusion is compelling.
However, the case of the United States raises some questions. Brooks holds
the U.S. strategic assessment in the case of Iraq to have been very poor, basing
this judgment on the clear failure of postcombat stability operations. She points
out that relations between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior
military leaders initially had been marked by significant strain, only to note that
by 2003 most, if not all, senior military leaders had been selected by Rumsfeld,
greatly reducing those tensions. Brooks also fails to address the contradiction
between the stunning successes of U.S. forces in the combat phase of IRAQI
FREEDOM in contrast to later failures in stability operations. In other words, how
did the same people get the first part so right and the second part so wrong? She
is also silent on how the State Department was all but excluded in planning
Phase IV (the occupation), and on the degree to which Secretary Rumsfeld may
have been influenced by strategic assessments made by different government
agencies, such as the CIA, as well as by Iraqi exiles and powerful political indi-
viduals, such as the vice president. This is interesting, because Brooks’s ap-
proach—examining power distribution and preference divergence—should
shine an explanatory light on these intracabinet and extramilitary relationships as
well.
One of the major strengths of Shaping Strategy is Brooks’s refusal to oversell
her research and conclusions. National-security decision making is one of the
most complex of human activities. It does not lend itself to prescriptive pana-
ceas or simplistic explanatory theories. Brooks’s research is all the more
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important because it does not pretend to do either but rather provides a useful
tool and a practical caution for explaining why strategic assessments tend to fail
under certain conditions and thereby how national leaders might be able to re-
duce the risks of such failures.
R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 4 9
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BOOK REVIEWS
“A WAR NOT YET FINISHED”
Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq,
2006–2008. New York: Penguin, 2009. 394pp. $27.95
Thomas Ricks begins his latest chroni-
cle of the American strategic experience
in Iraq where he left off in Fiasco
(2006). In this account, Ricks uses his
familiar journalistic approach to de-
scribe how the civilian and military
leaders arrived at a change of policy and
strategy, commonly known as “the
surge,” in the war in Iraq. Ricks’s new
book appears to be more even in its
treatment of the leaders and the new
strategy than was Fiasco, with its prose-
cutorial tone. In spite of his upbeat as-
sessment of the American leaders,
however, Ricks ends this volume with
measured, if not pessimistic, projec-
tions for the future of Iraq.
Ricks covers familiar developments de-
scribed in Bob Woodward’s The War
Within, but he sheds new light on the
role of General Ray Odierno in pushing
for a change of strategy. Specifically,
Ricks recounts how Odierno corre-
sponded with his mentor and old boss,
retired general Jack Keane, to change
the “bridging strategy” then advocated
by Generals George Casey and John
Abizaid, and by the Pentagon leader-
ship. Not wanting to lose this war on
his watch, Odierno relied on Keane and
American Enterprise Institute strategist
Fred Kagan to change the direction of
the strategy in Iraq. They sought to
change the strategy of transitioning
power to corrupt and impotent Iraqi se-
curity forces into a new strategy of pro-
viding security for the Iraqi people. The
most remarkable aspect of Ricks’s story
is that this change in strategy developed
outside the president’s designated Na-
tional Security team and against the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs
and the Iraq Study Group. According to
Ricks, Keane and Kagan clearly led the
way in the White House to get more
American combat forces into Iraq.
Ricks describes in some detail how
events in al Anbar province greatly influ-
enced a key aspect of the new strategy.
The Marines’ experience with the recon-
ciliation movement, or “Sunni Awaken-
ing,” of tribal leaders in al Anbar in 2005
and 2006 was the pivotal instance show-
ing how to turn former belligerents into
potential allies. In effect, the American
forces in al Anbar were already practic-
ing the tactics and techniques of the new
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual
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recently published by General David
Petraeus and a Fort Leavenworth team.
Ricks highlights how Odierno adopted
this new COIN approach in the em-
ployment of the five surged combat bri-
gades. Instead of putting all the
additional forces into central Baghdad
to “secure the people,” Odierno de-
ployed them into the fractious “Bagh-
dad belts.” During the surge, American
troops would not only live among the
Iraqi people in “joint security stations”
and combat outposts but also target the
insurgent lines of operations running
from Syria and Iran into central
Baghdad.
Overall, this appears to be a balanced
narrative of a war not yet finished. In
the last section Ricks considers the last-
ing effects of the “surge” strategy pur-
sued in 2006–2008. He winds up with a
discussion of that famous Petraeus
question of 2003, “How does this end?”
Ricks notes that perhaps this war does
not end. Clausewitz declared, “Even the
ultimate outcome of war is not always
to be regarded as final”; in Ricks’s view,
that will be true of the outcome of this
war.
JON SCOTT LOGEL
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican
Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007.
391pp. $17.96
Paradoxically, this is one of the most
innovative yet least original books
written in the past decade on the the-
ory and practice of international rela-
tions. Daniel Deudney synthesizes a
broad understanding of the history of
Western political theory with an
equally broad study of contemporary
world politics to recover what he calls
“republican security theory.” He sees
this theory as having developed from
the Greek polis through the Italian Re-
naissance to the Enlightenment (in the
thought of Montesquieu especially), to
the American founding to the present,
and as having important implications
for nuclear proliferation and disarma-
ment in the “global village” of our
time. Deudney demonstrates conclu-
sively that the leading schools of inter-
national relations today—realism and
liberal internationalism—are both in-
tellectual “fragments” of this older tra-
dition, with the fragmentation often
obstructing practical efforts to recon-
cile security from external threats to
the liberty of public citizens and pri-
vate individuals.
Such a reconciliation is the raison d’être
of republican security theory and prac-
tice, though as Deudney shows, the via-
bility of the endeavor depends on
learning much from the school of hard
knocks. Twenty-five hundred years ago,
the members of the Delian League
sought to secure their independence
from Persia by following the leadership
of Athens, but in so doing they jumped
from the frying pan of external anarchy
into the fire of Athenian imperialism.
The Roman republic, if only because its
more inclusive approach to citizenship
enabled it to grow stronger as it ex-
panded, proved more successful at unit-
ing external security with internal
liberty than had Athens or the Delian
League, but ultimately it got too big.
Generals like Caesar, Pompey, and Au-
gustus were able to count on the private
loyalty of soldiers to help them establish
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despotic power on the ruins of republi-
can freedom. Studying this checkered
past with care, both Niccolò Machiavel-
li (whom some see as the founder of re-
alism) and Charles de Secondat, Baron
de Montesquieu (who could be consid-
ered a founder of liberal international-
ism), sought ways to combine the
security advantages of large empires
with the freedom (from military rule
especially) of healthy republics.
What practical use might this mixed
success of republican security theory be
today? Clearly, it lies at the origins of
the two grandest experiments in inter-
national cooperation of the twentieth
century––the League of Nations and the
United Nations. Rather than view the
less-than-complete success, and some-
times patent failure, of either as proof
that republican security theory has
reached a point of diminishing returns,
Deudney concludes with an analysis of
how early experiments in nuclear arms
control might suggest ways to apply re-
publican security theory to avoid the
danger of nuclear violence while pre-
serving individual freedom. In this re-
spect, Deudney appears to have more in
common with contemporary liberal in-
ternationalists than with today’s real-
ists, but he has no patience with charges
that his project is utopian. It has
worked in the past, and it continues to
work in the American union. With
enough intelligence and determination,
he argues, it might be the only practica-
ble solution to the global problems of
this century, which no single state can
address on its own. In making this
claim, Deudney has gone, like the
starship Enterprise (which served a fed-
eration of republics!) where few today
have gone before, to help found a new
discipline, one that might be called
“world political theory.” At a time
when U.S. maritime strategy has be-
come ever more concerned with the
security of the global system, this is a
book that thoughtful strategists will
need to read again and again.
KARL WALLING
Naval War College
Coicaud, Jean-Marc. Beyond the National Inter-
est. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007. 297pp. $19.95
It should come as little surprise that
Jean-Marc Coicaud, a noted French
scholar with extensive experience at the
United Nations, sees the need for a fun-
damental change in the way the inter-
national system addresses its most
pressing security problems. He be-
moans the fact that “narrow national
interests” have made prompt, effective
multilateral peacekeeping interventions
on behalf of humanitarian needs very
difficult. In his Beyond the National In-
terest he offers prescriptions to alleviate
this situation.
This short book covers in some detail
the history of international humanitar-
ian interventions since the 1990s, in
search of trends and lessons learned.
The author conveys a sense of optimism
that the end of the Cold War presented
a perfect opportunity for universal hu-
man values to displace traditional val-
ues according to which sovereignty was
sacrosanct and nation-states responded
only to direct external threat. He opti-
mistically proclaims that NATO was
moving forward progressively in this
direction.
Unfortunately, his detailed historical
examples consistently belie this
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 3
158
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:46:50 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
159
War College: The Full Summer 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
optimism, as some protagonist (nor-
mally the United States) always allows
its conduct to be driven by the atavistic
notions of sovereignty and physical se-
curity. In fact, the United States (partic-
ularly the last Bush administration)
comes out as the book’s principal vil-
lain, although the Clinton administra-
tion also takes its hits. Owing to its
superpower status, the United States is
directly involved in every incident in
which humanitarian intervention is a
possible course of action, and its
responses never meet the author’s high
standards.
While Coicaud’s facts and historical
analysis are correct and fundamentally
sound, a reader might get the impres-
sion that it is only a matter of time be-
fore the entire world is persuaded to see
the responsibility to protect––the inter-
national community sending in forces
to protect the citizens of an offending
country––much as an enlightened Eu-
ropean does now. I am certain that
Coicaud is buoyed by the advent of the
Obama administration in hopes that
the United States will eventually join in
this enlightenment. Unfortunately, his
optimism is probably misplaced, for
two reasons. First, none of today’s
emergent powers (China, Russia, India,
or Brazil) have been proponents of
what the author calls “conditional” sov-
ereignty. If anything, they hold dearly
their sovereignty and support this right
for other nation-states. The second
point forces us to focus on the title of
the book.
That is, national interest is the real cul-
prit. As long as nations constitute the
world’s central cast, there is little like-
lihood that it will achieve Coicaud’s
idealistic standards. Even his recom-
mendations to strengthen the United
Nation’s peace-enforcement and
humanitarian roles are largely bureau-
cratic and peripheral, suggesting that
the author is also aware of the funda-
mental resistance. As long as the UN
remains nationally based, the likeli-
hood that its members will be driven
by “supranational” interests will be
slim. Indeed, simply getting beyond the
national interest is not enough. The in-
ternational community must adopt su-
pranational interests or it will forever
be hampered by the primacy of “secu-
rity issues” and “self-centered nation-
alism,” which, unfortunately for
Coicaud, is likely to be a long time
coming.
Although a welcome addition to those
advocating for the rights of individuals
over those of nation-states, the book
unfortunately fails to deal meaningfully
with the real obstacles to the ideal. Fur-
ther, since much of this book is a dia-
tribe against the Bush administration,
its salience is increasingly historical.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Cohen, William A. A Class with Drucker: The Lost
Lessons of the World’s Greatest Management
Teacher. New York: AMACOM, 2008. 248pp.
$24.95
Krames, Jeffrey A. Inside Drucker’s Brain. New
York: Penguin, 2008. 257pp. $24.95
Peter Drucker, considered the father of
modern management, died in 2005 at
the age of ninety-five. For six decades
he consulted with industry and govern-
ment leaders and taught at New York
University and the Claremont Graduate
School of Management, publishing
thirty-nine books, including one on
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Japanese art. Drucker’s principles of
leadership, responsibility, management,
and strategy transcended organizational
mission, whether for-profit, nonprofit,
or military.
It is not surprising that several books
about Drucker have been published
since his death. One interesting one, A
Class with Drucker, is by Bill Cohen.
Cohen graduated from West Point and
was a PhD student of Drucker’s. He
served as a major general in the Air
Force reserves, worked in the defense
industry, and remained in touch with
Drucker for thirty years. The goal of
Cohen’s book is to share lessons from
Drucker’s classroom.
Peter Drucker was an exceptional
thinker and writer. His perspectives on
organizations were refreshingly unor-
thodox and expressed with piercing
logic. Drucker drew deeply from global
history and economics. Although he
was an academic, his audience was the
practitioner. Ethics and social responsi-
bility themes permeated his writing and
teaching. Many concepts that are now
part of everyday organizational vocabu-
lary originated with Peter Drucker, such
as management by objectives, knowl-
edge workers, decentralized manage-
ment, and strategic leadership in
business.
Two things make Cohen’s book inter-
esting. One is Drucker’s influence as his
mentor and teacher, and the other is his
own military perspective. Cohen inter-
weaves Drucker’s concepts of leader-
ship, strategy, ethics, and professional
development with his own military edu-
cation and experiences, often adding
candid personal reflection and revealing
anecdotes.
One revelation emerged during a class
session when a student asked Drucker
how he got started as a “management
consultant.” Drucker talked about be-
ing mobilized for World War II, armed
only with a PhD and experience in eco-
nomics. Drucker’s job classification in
the Army was “consultant,” but neither
he nor his colonel had any idea what
that entailed. Drucker started asking the
colonel about the group’s goals and re-
sources, and a few days later he went
back with a report of priorities and al-
ternatives. As it turned out, the group
was quite successful in its mission.
Cohen affirms that Drucker’s principles
of strategy and leadership are tightly
coupled to personal responsibility, and
he elaborates on the distinctive chal-
lenges between tactical and strategic de-
cisions for the military leader. The
strategic leader must persistently ask
the right questions; as Drucker would
state, “You can’t get there unless you
know where there is.” To be a strategic
leader, one must avoid developing
strategy by formula and instead devote
time to self-development by expanding
one’s knowledge and perspective.
Drucker’s advice for professional devel-
opment was to “read, write, listen and
teach . . . and strive for expertise in an
area outside your profession.”
Drucker lectured his students about
what to do, not how to do it. Cohen
sometimes takes a Drucker principle
and expounds on it using his own
“boilerplate” advice. Some of the elabo-
rations are unremarkable, but others
are a genuine fusing of Drucker’s influ-
ence with the author’s experience.
Another book on the subject published
about the same time is Inside Drucker’s
Brain, by Jeffrey Krames, a seasoned
writer who has written extensively on
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 5
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General Electric’s Jack Welch. In 2002
he published a work on Donald
Rumsfeld and his leadership style.
Krames’s new book draws on a six-hour
interview that took place in Drucker’s
home about two years before he died, as
well as upon Drucker’s writings. As
Krames sat down for the first (and ap-
parently only) interview, Drucker men-
tioned that Jack Welch had sat in that
same upholstered chair twenty years
earlier, just before Welch became the
legendary CEO of General Electric.
The goal of Krames’s book is to capture
the relevance of Drucker’s most impor-
tant management philosophies and
strategies. Reading this book, one gets
the sense that the author wants to en-
sure that Drucker’s contribution to
management knowledge does not
diminish with time.
His concern has merit. Drucker’s career
path was varied and unconventional, so
he was never really viewed as a true aca-
demic, especially by other academics.
Krames points out that although
Drucker had a seminal influence on
such leaders as Welch, Tom Peters, Jim
Collins, Michael Dell, Andy Grove, and
Bill Gates, Drucker is rarely referenced
in management textbooks. Perhaps one
reason is that Drucker was not a
self-promoter. You will not find a
Drucker Consulting Group, spin-off
publications, or Drucker training work-
shops. Drucker declared, “My aim has
never been academic, that is, to be rec-
ognized; it has always been to make a
difference.”
Like Cohen, Krames centers on leader-
ship, strategy, and social responsibility,
covering much of the same ground.
However, Krames has more of a busi-
ness and historical perspective than
Cohen, who writes from a military van-
tage point. Each book makes its own
unique contribution. For instance,
Krames’s extensive insights into Gen-
eral Electric amplify the little-known
influence Drucker had on the company
and its iconic leaders. On the question
of whether leaders are born or made,
Drucker said that some leaders are nat-
urals (like Welch) but that there are not
enough of them—so leaders have to be
made! That is one of the reasons why
General Electric has done so well; the
company has been developing leaders at
its renowned Crotonville Training Cen-
ter since the 1950s. Drucker was a
founder of Crotonville, along with
Ralph Cordiner, General Electric’s CEO
at the time. For readers interested in
where great leaders get their ideas, the
book’s chapter entitled “Drucker on
Welch” is quite interesting.
However, it seems presumptuous to say
that after only one interview and a few
letters, the author got “inside Drucker’s
brain.” The reader is left wondering




Wukovits, John. One Square Mile of Hell: The Bat-
tle for Tarawa. New York: New American Library,
2006. 320pp. $15
One Square Mile of Hell relates the story
of the November 1943 battle for the
Tarawa Atoll from the personal level of
the Marines who endured this remark-
ably bloody fight. John Wukovits makes
use of firsthand interviews with veter-
ans of the operation, while also citing
personal letters and diaries. The result
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is a personal history that draws the
reader into the lives of the corpsmen,
privates, lieutenants, and colonels who
grimly made their way across the
central Pacific.
As events unfold, Wukovits traces the
lives of several Marines as their paths
converge on Tarawa. The marriage pro-
posals and strong family ties ominously
set the stage for the tragedies that
would follow, although the general his-
torical discussion of the war leading up
to Tarawa is at times made awkward by
the intermixed personal story lines.
The assault on Betio, a strip of sand and
coconut trees two miles long and half a
mile wide, became a bloody slugfest.
There was little room to hide or maneu-
ver on the island, and the frontal as-
saults by the Marines produced
unprecedented casualty ratios. As a bat-
talion commander emphasized to his
men, there were two choices: move for-
ward or die. Complicating the opera-
tion was the fact that amphibious
planners had utilized outdated charts
and inadequate tide tables to determine
water levels over the island’s outer reefs,
resulting in numerous groundings and
unnecessary exposure to enemy fire. Af-
ter three days of brutal, hand-to-hand
fighting, the Marines subdued the
Japanese defenders and claimed a costly
victory.
A common theme of the accounts is the
incredibly adverse battle conditions.
The limited space and high casualties
resulted in a layer of death and carnage
over the entire island. The equatorial
sun and legions of flies added to the
misery, but it was the smell of death
and decay that lingered in one’s mind.
“The smell was inescapable,” wrote a
correspondent; “it evoked instant and
nightmarish memories. . . . Betio was
nothing but stink and death.”
Besides being a testament to the coura-
geous leadership and fighting spirit of
the Marine Corps, the Tarawa opera-
tion raised questions in 1943 regarding
the degree of force that should be em-
ployed in war. The issue has been con-
tinually debated following the dropping
of atomic bombs on Japan, and it is still
argued today in connection with harsh
interrogation techniques used on
suspected terrorists.
Time reporter Robert Sherrod, who ac-
companied the Marines during the
Betio landing, struggled to reconcile
what he saw at Tarawa with the clean,
edited version of war presented to the
American home front. “Americans,” he
wrote, “are not prepared psychologi-
cally to accept the cruel facts of war.”
Sherrod’s observation makes One
Square Mile of Hell poignant indeed for
Americans today.
While it is noble to memorialize the
courage and sacrifice of the Marines at
Tarawa, it is equally important to re-
mind ourselves that victory comes at a
steep price. Sherrod regarded the car-
nage of Tarawa as “the most haunting
memory of World War II.” Indeed, the
story of Tarawa should haunt all
Americans.
RONALD R. SHAW, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Fischer, David Hackett. Champlain’s Dream: The
European Founding of North America. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2008. 834pp. $40
David Hackett Fischer writes of Samuel
de Champlain, who founded French
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Quebec four hundred years ago, that
“[Champlain] wrote thousands of pages
about what he did, but only a few words
about who he was.” It is well for our
own and future generations that
Fischer, in his Champlain’s Dream, has
now splendidly written about both the
admirable man and his remarkable
deeds. In this, another of his signature
and wonderfully readable narrative his-
tories (he is also the author of the ma-
jestic 1989 Albion’s Seed and the
Pulitzer Prize–winning Washington’s
Crossing of 2004), Fischer presents
Champlain as a master mariner, ex-
plorer, cartographer, ethnologist, cour-
tier, and soldier, but above all as a
deeply humane person in a world that
was anything but. Fischer writes that
Champlain “had a dream of humanity
and peace in a world of cruelty and vio-
lence. He envisioned a new world as a
place where people of different cultures
could live together in amity and
concord. This became his grand design
for North America.”
Champlain pursued this grand design
with astounding skill, perseverance, and
stamina, crossing the North Atlantic
twenty-seven times between 1599 and
1635 without losing a single major ship.
In New France (now Canada) he faced
cold, isolation, hunger, mutiny, corrup-
tion, war, and other hardships almost
beyond imagining. Among his many ac-
complishments, what stands out is per-
haps the balanced relationship that
Champlain formed with the indigenous
people. He had an insatiable curiosity
about the complex Indian cultures he
encountered and was genuinely inter-
ested in what he could learn from them,
an attitude that resulted in numerous
long-lasting alliances, respect, and trust.
On the eastern side of the Atlantic, he
faced a far different but equally treach-
erous environment. It took deft and
constant lobbying within the French
court to maintain royal support for his
daring enterprise in the New World.
Champlain did all this, Fischer explains,
not for conquest or riches but “to in-
crease the power and prosperity of
France, to spread the Christian faith, to
learn more about the world, and to
bring together its many people in a
spirit of humanity.” Fischer is scrupu-
lous in his research and in distinguish-
ing established fact from assertions
based on less-certain accounts. His
book includes sixteen appendixes ad-
dressing such diverse subjects as Cham-
plain’s separate voyages, the essay he
wrote on leadership in 1632, his ships
and boats, and the Indian nations in
Champlain’s world. There are also
thirty-six pages of “memories of Cham-
plain” that explore images and interpre-
tations of the man from 1608 to 2008.
Fischer concludes his commanding
work with 161 pages of notes, bibliogra-
phy, and credits.
Fischer’s prodigious research persuaded
him that Champlain was a dreamer,
who imagined “a New World where
people lived at peace with others unlike
themselves.” In this grand book Fischer
superbly tells the story of Champlain
the man, who surmounted the chal-
lenges he faced with fairness, prudence,
and faithfulness to his dream.
WILLIAM CALHOUN
Naval War College
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program
Icannot live without books.” So wrote Thomas Jefferson to John Adams in 1815.Jefferson, one of the most learned founders of the Republic, amassed the largest
personal collection of books in the United States. After the British burned the Li-
brary of Congress during the War of 1812, he sold 6,500 books from his collec-
tion to Congress to reestablish its library. Nearly two centuries later, the Navy’s
leadership bought ten times that number of books, over sixty-five thousand,
when it established the Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) in 2006. In
both cases, the intent was to make great books more readily available to improve
the lives of America’s citizens.
The sixty titles included in the initial rollout of the NPRP and the five new
titles released in 2009 are excellent books that cover a wide range of topics.
They do not, however, necessarily constitute the best or only books of value to
professionals in the maritime services. In fact, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, encourages sailors to “use these titles as a
starting point to expand your intellectual horizons.” The NPRP website,
www.navyreading.navy.mil, provides summaries of the sixty primary books
and also information on several hundred other titles in the Supplemental
Reading List. This list is designed to help readers who want to delve into greater
detail on concepts they may have encountered while reading primary selec-
tions. Especially noteworthy books on the Supplemental Reading List include:
• The Innovator’s Solution, by Clayton M. Christensen and Michael E. Raynor, a
follow-up to The Innovator’s Dilemma (a primary selection in the NPRP), of-
fers suggestions on ways in which leaders and managers can deal with mas-
sive change and disruptive technologies. The authors note that while
experience in dealing with change is important, equally important is that
leaders “have wrestled with it and developed the skills and intuition to meet
the challenges successfully the next time.” This book is written in a business
context, but many of its lessons apply to leaders in military service.
164
T:\Academic\NWC Review\Summer 2009\Printer\NWCR SU09.vp
Thursday, May 07, 2009 2:47:02 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
165
War College: The Full Summer 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
• China Goes to Sea, edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and
Carnes Lord. Throughout Asia today, China dominates the conversation.
Within this dialogue, China’s turn to the sea and its development of a
blue-water capability have economic, diplomatic, and military implications.
This valuable new book from the Naval Institute Press provides in one vol-
ume a comprehensive assessment of China’s naval development, the principal
historical precedents, and the complex thought processes that guide the Chi-
nese navy’s leadership.
• Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, by P.
W. Singer, is a truly remarkable and highly readable study of the impact that
unmanned/robotic systems are having today and will no doubt have tomor-
row on the conduct of warfare. Anthony Lake, former U.S. national security
adviser and a professor of diplomacy in the School of Foreign Service at
Georgetown University, says of this book: “Singer’s book is as important
(very) as it is readable (highly), as much a fascinating account of new tech-
nology as it is a challenging appraisal of the strategic, political and ethical
questions that we must now face. This book needs to be widely read—not
just within the defense community but by anyone interested in the most fun-
damental questions of how our society and others will look at war itself.” An-
other reviewer stated: “In no previous book have I gotten such an intrinsic
sense of what the military future will be like. Lively, penetrating, and wise. . . .
A warmly human (even humorous) account of robotics and other military
technologies that focuses where it should: on us.”
These are just three of the several hundred suggestions for additional reading
found on the NPRP website. In early 2009, CNO noted in a Navy-wide message,
“Reading, discussing, and understanding the ideas and concepts found in the
NPRP will not only improve our critical thinking, it will also help us become
better Sailors, better leaders, and better citizens. As President John Adams once
warned, ‘A fighting spirit without knowledge would be little better than a brutal
rage.’ I encourage all personnel to renew their fighting spirit through the power of
professional reading.”
We hope that the NPRP primary selections and the suggested additional read-
ings will serve as roadmaps to books that contribute to the professional develop-
ment of the service.
JOHN E. JACKSON
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